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CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTION LAW AND PROGRAMSt
By JACOBUS TENBROEK*
Lo ! In the Orient when the gracious light
Lifts up his burning head, each under eye
Doth homage to his new-appearing sight,
Serving with looks his sacred majesty,
And having clim'd the steep-up heavenly hill,
Resembling strong youth in his middle age,
Yet mortal looks adore Ins beauty still
Attending on his golden pilgrimage;
But when from highmost pitch, the weary car,
Like feeble age, he reeleth from the day,
The eyes, 'fore duteous, now converted are,
From his low tract and look another way:
So thou, thy self out-going in thy noon,
Unlook'd on diest, unless thou get a son.tt
I. Introduction
Recent developments in California's adoption programs affecting both
agency and independent placements, have thrown those programs into a
state of flux. The number, character and variety of bills before the Legisla-
ture upon the subject, bespeak the turmoil in the field.
On October 15, 1954, the State Supreme Court handed down its decision
in the McDonald case.1 In holding that agency "consent" is not necessary
to the granting of an adoption petition for a child relinquished to the agency,
the court overturned an administrative practice of twenty years' standing.
In the opinion of citizen and professional workers in the field of child wel-
fare, the impairment to agency operations is serious. The agency authority
and role in the adoption of children committed to them, say these workers,
is not now commensurate with their full responsibility for the interim care
of the child and their exclusive duty to make his adoption placement.
t For their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article, the author Ls indebted to:
Lucile Kennedy, Chief, Division of Child Welfare; Bessie C. Irwin, Supervisor, Bureau of
Adoptions; Verne E. Gleason, Administrative Assistant; Philip Keller, Chief, Bureau of Re-
search and Statistics, all of the California State Department of Social Welfare; Richard Mayers,
Deputy Attorney General; Irene Velasko, Supervisor, Alameda County Probation Department;
Lorenzo Buckley, Alameda County Probation Department.
The publication of this paper was made possible by a generous grant from Mr. Elmer E.
Skinner of San Francisco.
*Professor, University of California, Berkeley; A.B. 1934, MA. 1935, LL.B. 1938, J.S.D.
1940, University of California, Berkeley; SJ.D. 1947, Harvard Law School; Member of Cali-
fornia State Board of Social Welfare.
i W .m SHAxESPEAim, SouN= No. 7.
1 In re Adoption of McDonald, 43 A.C. 453, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
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The Attorney General's 1953 ruling -The other major focus of dis-
turbance in the adoption field - has elicited reactions from some quarters
which are far less temperate. Responding to a question put by the Director
of the State Department of Social Welfare, the Attorney General read
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1620b and Civil Code Section 224q
as criminally forbidding all unlicensed adoption placements not made di-
rectly and personally by the parents. He thus found to be illegal and sub-
ject to penal sanction the practice - commonly engaged in by physicians,
attorneys, ministers, nurses, and other friends, acquaintances and consult-
ants of the biological parents - of serving as third-party intermediaries
who actually find or select the adoptive couple and place the child with
them.
"This thing of the Attorney General's," said one attorney and member
of the State Assembly, "I consider a gratuitous insult to the conscientious
members of the medical profession and conscientious members of the legal
profession. It is a sorry day when doctors and lawyers cannot use the intel-
ligence and the judgment that they have acquired over years of training
and experience to the best of their ability, even in matters of this kind, and
to be, because of some gimmick, forced to use evasive practices in order
to carry out what I consider to be a very legitimate and a very high prin-
cipled activity of members of the Bar and members of the medical pro-
fession."2
Resolutions were passed by the House of Delegates of the State Bar
Association and by the California Medical Association urging the Legisla-
ture, in the words of the latter, "to clarify the adoption laws by adding a
section thereto specifying that the parent of a child has the right, in present-
ing the child for adoption, to act through her attorney or her physician, or
both, and to have legal counsel and medical assistance, in this field as in
all others;
A representative of the California Medical Association, appearing be-
fore the Assembly Committee on Judiciary pleaded. "I can say that we
wish clarifying legislation so we all won't be looked upon as criminals for
assisting a mother in arranging an adoption." 3
The matter "boils down," testified one attorney with a large adoption
practice, "to a case of interprofessional rivalry," between the doctors and
the lawyers on the one hand and the social workers on the other.4 If so,
said a prominent welfare admimstrator who is also a lawyer, attorneys
2 Hearings, Assembly Committee on Judiciary 112 (Nov. 1954).
3 Hearings, zd. at 134. See also the statement of the representative oi the Califorma State
Bar Association at 72.
4 Id. at 78.
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should "confine their adoption activities to matters of giving legal advice
and representing their clients in court. .. To. . place the responsibility
upon attorneys to engage in social work practices and to place children for
adoption, introduces a novel and illegal function in the practice of law."
".... the conducting of social investigations, the making of social studies,
and the placement of children for adoption" are the proper functions of
social workers.5
"The question is not whether," said still another attorney, "doctors
should practice medicine, lawyers law and social workers should practice
social work. The question is whether all of the parties involved [in an adop-
tion] are more adequately protected in an agency adoption than in one
arranged by a doctor or lawyer or any one else." 1
In this period of flux, agitation and movement, it seems especially im-
portant and appropriate to attempt an overall review of California's adop-
tion law and programs. The present article essays that task.
II. Special Adoptions -Adult, Stepparent, Conduct
The California Civil Code provides for five types of adoptions: 1)
adoption of an adult by an adult; 2) adoption by a stepparent of a child
which is in the custody and control of his spouse as its natural or adoptive
parent; 3) adoption by the biological father of his illegitimate child; 4)
so-called independent or direct adoption, in which the biological parent or
parents select adoptive parents, place the child with them and consent to
the adoption by them; 5) so-called relinquishment or agency adoption, in
which the biological parent or parents turn the child over to a licensed
adoption agency, execute and deliver to the agency a general relinquish-
ment of rights and responsibilities and in which the agency then selects the
prospective adoptive parents and places the child with them.
Adult Adoptions
The adult adoption provision was added to the Civil Code in 1951.1
Under it, "Any adult person may adopt any other adult person younger
than himself, except the spouse of the adopting persons, by an agreement
of adoption approved by a decree of adoption of the Superior Court of the
county in which either the person adopting or the person adopted resides.
The agreement of adoption shall be in writing and shall be executed by the
person adopting and the person to be adopted, and shall set forth that the
parties agree to assume toward each other the legal relation of parent and
5 Letter of Director, Department of Social Welfare to California State Bar, June 14, 1954.
6 Hearings, supra note 2 at 79.
I CAIar. CIv. CODE § 2 27p.
child, and to have all of the rights and be subject to all of the duties and
responsibilities of that relation." The consent of the spouse of the adopting
and adopted persons must be secured (if they are capable of giving con-
sent) but no parental or other consent is necessary Investigation and report
to the court by county probation officer or the State Department of Social
Welfare is not required but may be called for by the court. The court is
directed to "withhold approval of the agreement and deny the petition"
unless it "is satisfied that the adoption will be for the best interests of the
parties and in the public interest, and that there is no reason why the peti-
tion should not be granted."
How the superior courts will exercise the sweeping discretionary power
thus vested in them, by what standards they will decide whether the adop-
tion is "for the best interests of the parties and in the public interest,"
whether they will require an affirmative showing that the adoption is "in
the public interest" as the language precisely requires or will allow the last
of the three required elements in effect to displace the other two and grant
petitions if they see "no reason" why they should not do so, the circum-
stances in which and the motives for which persons will seek consummation
of such adoptions - all these questions remain unanswered by the limited
experience under the section.2 During the first nine months of operation of
the section, the State Department of Social Welfare received notice of the
filing of 152 petitions. Fifty-eight of these involved adoptions by step-
parents.3 In fiscal year 1953-1954, 124 adult petitions were filed, 40 of
which represented adoption by stepparents.'
Of thirteen adult adoptions referred by the court to the Alameda County
Probation Office in 1954 for investigation and recommendation, seven
were stepparent adoptions, the majority of which could not be consummated
during the person's minority because of refusal of a biological parent to
give his consent. Some were unaware of the adoption law as it related to
stepparents, and only when they attempted to insure the stepchild's suc-
cession to an estate did they realize legal adoption was necessary Five
referrals indicated a desire on the part of the petitioner to give security to
the person adopted. A bond of affection existed between them and the pe-
titioner wished to protect the person adopted against the claims of relatives
at time of inheritance. The ages of the persons adopted ranged from twenty-
2The SDSW has received few requests from judges for investigation of reports.
3 BIENNIAL REPORT, SDSW 79 (1950-19S2).
4 These data are compiled from notices of adoption petitions received by the State Depart-
ment of Social Welfare. Since CAIrr. Crv. CODE § 227p does not make the sending of such
notices mandatory upon the county clerks, the number of adult adoption petitions filed may
be higher than the figures given here.
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three to forty-four years and of the person adopting thirty-eight to seventy
years. The seventy-year old had petitioned to adopt a person who had been
in her home since infancy as a foster child. They had taken their relation-
ship for granted until the petitioner suddenly realized that she needed to
take steps to insure the inheritance rights of her foster child. In no case did
the court specifically request an investigation and recommendation as to
whether adoption was in the public interest.5
Of the three adult adoptions referred to the State Department of Social
Welfare for investigation and report: The first was a petition for the adop-
tion by an older man of a thirty-two year old woman, a close friend of the
petitioner's daughter. The second case involved a petition for the adoption
of a forty-three year old married man by an older couple living in another
state. The man had been taken into the home of the couple when a boy,
following the separation of his parents and his desertion by his own father.
At the time the petition was filed, the man was contributing to the support
of his aged biological father who was receiving Old Age Security in Cali-
fornia, and it was questioned whether the purpose of the adoption was to
escape this liability. The third case involved an older woman who was
reported to be very erratic and alienated from members of her own family,
including a stepson and an adopted daughter. She petitioned to adopt a
married couple who had been in her employ for several years. The petitioner
was well to do and there was some thought in the community that the couple
might be attempting to get as much as possible from her.0
Even though the numbers of such adoptions becomes substantially
greater, and regardless of whether the courts adopt a restrictive or expan-
sive interpretation of the section, the social interest in adult adoptions and
the problems involved in the administration of the program are quite dif-
ferent from the social interest and problems involved in the program for
the adoption of minors and particularly infants.
Stepparents Adoptions
The general provisions of the Civil Code governing the adoption of
minors apply to stepparent adoptions. As the result of certain historical
5 Letter from the Alameda County Probation Department to the author, January 14, 1955.
6Letter from the Supervisor, Bureau of Adoptions, SDSW, to the author, Dec. 28, 1954.
Other possible cases falling under the adult adoption law are indicated by the Bureau of Adop-
tions. "We recall one case in which a family of several children were being adopted by the foster
parents with whom they had been living for a long time. However, the oldest child had passed
his twenty-first birthday and the petition had to be demed as far as he was concerned. There
was some question on the part of the other children as to whether they wished to be adopted
if their older brother could not. We also recall several other instances in which petitions were
filed when the child was almost twenty-one and the study and report had to be hurred through
m order that the case could be heard before the twenty-first birthday."
factors, however, stepparent adoptions are handled by a different adminis-
trative setup from that employed in other adoptions. Civil Code Section
22 7a provides: "The probation officer in the county in which the action for
adoption is pending shall make an investigation of each case of adoption
by a stepparent where one natural parent retains custody and control of the
child. No order of adoption shall be made by the court until after such
probation officer shall have filed his report and recommendation and the
same shall have been considered by the court. Civil Code Section 226 pro-
vides: "In case of an adoption of a child by a stepparent where one natural
or adoptive parent retains his or her custody and control of said child, the
consent of either or both parents must be signed in the presence of a county
clerk or probation officer of any county of this State on a form prescribed
by the State Department of Social Welfare and the county clerk or proba-
tion officer before whom such consent is signed shall immediately file said
consent with the clerk of the superior court of the county where the petition
is filed and said clerk shall immediately file a certified copy of such consent
to adoption with the State Department of Social Welfare." Civil Code Sec-
tion 226 in requiring the consent of the State Department of Social Welfare
or a licensed county adoption agency if the father or mother signs consent
outside the state, adds that such consent is not necessary "where the adop-
tion is by a stepparent and one natural parent retains custody and control
of the child."
When the 1927 amendments to Civil Code Section 226 were passed
requiring State Department of Social Welfare investigation of all adoption
petitions, stepparent adoptions were included in the general language. In
1931, at its own request, the State Department of Social Welfare was re-
lieved of investigative and reporting responsibility in stepparent cases. It
had found that almost all of the 425 stepparent petitions investigated in the
two years 1928-1930 had been favorably recommended and that the time
of its limited staff could be better spent on actual placement cases. 7
In 1933 the Civil Code was changed to make investigation and report
of stepparent adoptions the responsibility of county probation officers. In
fact, the amendment provided that the court could not grant the petition
7 Report of the Californza Adoption Survey Committee, 3 (1946) The Department's step-
parent investigations had also revealed that injustice sometimes resulted from section 224 of
the California Civil Code which at that time provided that the consent was not necessary
"From a father or mother adjudged guilty of adultery or cruelty and for either cause divorced."
The Department, as a matter of policy, notified both divorced parents of pending adoption
petitions, regardless of the ground of divorce. The parent not having custody and whose con-
sent was not necessary to the adoption often had serious objections to it based on a genuine
interest in his child. In 1931, Civil Code section 224 was therefore amended to delete the lan-
guage above quoted.
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without a favorable recommendation from the probation officer. "The pro-
bation officer in the county in which the action for adoption is pending,"
said Civil Code Section 227a, "shall make an investigation of each case of
adoption by a stepparent. No order of adoption shall be issued by the court
until after favorable recommendation thereon is made by such officer."
This rather anomolous provision that an officer of the court could bar action
by the court remained in effect until 1943 when the present language was
enacted forbidding the making of a stepparent adoption order by the court
"until after such probation officer shall have filed his report and recom-
mendation and the same shall have been considered by the court." In 1945,
the State Department of Social Welfare was relieved of responsibility for
investigation and report when one of the petitioners is an adoptive parent.
In that year also, Civil Code Section 227a was amended to require probation
officer investigation of stepparent cases only "where one natural parent
retains custody and control of the child."
The difference between and among the various paragraphs of Civil Code
Section 226 and Section 227a resulting from the amendments of 1945 -
sometimes referring to a child in the custody and control of a natural parent,
sometimes of a natural or adoptive parent - remains in the law to the
present time. Civil Code Section 22 7a, requiring probation officer investiga-
tion of stepparent adoptions, does so "where one natural parent retains
custody and control of the child" whereas unnumbered paragraphs 1, 3
and 5 of Civil Code Section 226, excluding stepparent adoptions from the
responsibility of the State Department of Social Welfare, do so "where one
natural or adoptive parent retains control and custody of the child." [Italics
added.] The State Department of Social Welfare is thus divested of a
larger responsibility than that vested in the probation officers. And, on a
literal reading of Civil Code Sections 226 and 227, neither department is
responsible for investigating and reporting upon stepparent adoptions in
which the child remains in the custody and control of an adoptive rather
than a natural parent. Civil Code Section 22 7a is, in this respect, also diver-
gent from unnumbered paragraph 8 of Civil Code Section 226, requiring
parental consent to be signed in the presence of a county clerk or probation
officer in stepparent adoptions "where one natural or adoptive parent re-
tains his or her custody and control of said child."8
In the fiscal year 1953-1954 there were 2,764 stepparent adoptions in
California, 32.8 per cent of the total number of adoptions. As in the case
8 Unnumbered paragraph 9 of Civil Code section 226, dealing with state department or
county agency consent when parental consents are signed outside the state, excepts stepparent
cases m which "one natural parent retains custody and control of the child."
of other adoptions, stepparent adoptions have increased phenomenally in
the past fifteen years.
1939-1940 423 1947-1948 1980
1940-1941 512 1948-1949 2135
1941-1942 860 1949-1950 2044
1942-1943 1366 1950-1951 2502
1943-1944 1622 1951-1952 2515
1944-1945 1527 1952-1953 2585
1945-1946 1699 1953-1954 2764
1946-1947 1742
Stepparent adoptions have few of the features and almost none of the
problems of ordinary adoptions. The children are generally older than in
cases of adoption by non-relatives; in fact, they are most often not infantsY
Their birth status is a socially acceptable one, i.e., they were born in wed-
lock.' 0 There is no problem of finding a home and placing the child in it;
he is already there. A determination of the suitability of the adoptive home
is virtually meaningless. The child is with one natural parent who has the
right of custody and control; and that natural parent is married to and
living m the same household with the stepparent. A denial of the adoption
petition does not result in the removal of the child from the home, whether
adjudged suitable or not. The reasons for adoption are not the social pro-
tection of the child or providing him with a family and home. These he
already has. The reasons for adoption are legal and financial, to endow
the parent-child relationship with a legal status and attendant rights and
duties, entitling the child to such rights as guardianship, inheritance,
support, and the name and status in the family that he would have had if
he had been born to both parents, and entitling the stepparent to rights of
custody, control, services and earnings. In this sense, the effect of a step-
parent adoption is to legalize an already existing family relationship, not
to establish a new one.
The adrmnistrative separation of stepparent adoptions from other adop-
tions, while it may be explained historically, can hardly be justified other
than in terms of maintaining the status quo of existing staffs and work
loads. The State Department of Social Welfare has no direct responsibility
in stepparent cases unless the general duty to study the operation of the
law and recommend changes in it be considered such. Superior court clerks
are obligated to file certified copies of consents taken in stepparent adoption
cases by county clerks or probation officers with the State Department of
Social Welfare; and such consents are to be on the forms prescribed by
9 FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, ADOPTION OF CILREN, CHILDREN'S BUREAu, STATISTICAL
SERIES No. 14, 4 (1951).
1
0lIbid.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6
Mar., 1955] CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTION LAW AND PROGRAMS 269
the state department." The state department has no power to approve or
disapprove, to accept or not to accept such consents. County clerks are also
required to notify the state department of all official actions in adoption
cases including stepparent adoptions.' All substantial administrative re-
sponsibility, however, for the handling and processing of stepparent adop-
tions rests with the county, primarily through the county probation de-
partment. The probation officer must investigate each case and make a
report and recommendation which are prerequisite to final judicial action.'3
Moreover, this is not a delegated function from the state department as it is
with county and private adoption agencies. It is conferred directly by the
law."' Yet adoptions are a part of a larger program of child welfare services.
Much of that larger program is supervised and administered by and through
the State Department of Social Welfare. Stepparent adoptions, though
quite different from ordinary adoptions, are equally a part of that larger
program. They are more properly classified as problems of dependent
children than as problems of delinquent children as is true under existing
arrangements.' 5
Conduct Adoptions
Section 230 of the Civil Code, dealing with the adoption of an illegiti-
mate child by his natural father, was originally placed in the Code in 1872
and has remained intact ever since. It provides that: "The father of an
illegitimate child, by publically acknowledging it as his own, receiving it
as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and
otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as
such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from
time of its birth." The other provisions of the code chapter dealing with
adoption "Do not apply to such an adoption."
Eighty-two years of judicial application of this section have produced
11 CAMI. CIV. CoDE § 226, unnumbered paragraph 8.
12 CAL. Civ. CODE § 226, unnumbered paragraph 1: "Any person desiring to adopt a child
may for that purpose petition the superior court of the county in which the petitioner resides
and the clerk of the court shall immediately notify the State Department of Social Welfare at
Sacramento in writing of the pendency of the action and of any subsequent action taken."
13 CALzF. Civ. CoDn § 227a.
14 Ibid. The Attorney General of California has ruled that in an adoption by a stepparent
where neither natural parent retains custody or control, in case of dissolution of marriage by
death or divorce, the investigation and report on the petitioner is the responsibility of the State
Department of Social Welfare under Sections 226 and 227a of the California Civil Code.
NS-5323, 3 Ops. Atty. Gen. 129 (1944).
15 Another area in which there is duplication and overlap in the functions of the county
probation departments and the county and state welfare departments is that of the foster care
program in which some dependent and neglected children who are wards of the juvenile court
are committed by such court to the care of the probation department.
a sizable body of interpretation, not always harmonious and consistent.
The number and character of the elements prescribed to establish this
form of adoption - illegitimacy, paternity, public acknowledgment by the
father, reception into his family, consent by his spouse given with knowl-
edge of the illegitimacy, other treatment by him of the child as legitimate
16
- involving as they do not simply a single public act or declaration of
recognition or a duly recorded formal proceeding but a whole course of
conduct made up out of the acts and conversations of daily living, not only
create difficult evidentlary and interpretative problems for judges but also
for persons seeking to show that adoption occurrred.T
Reversing an earlier decision, 8 the California Supreme Court held, in
1945, that the benefits of Civil Code Section 230 were available, not only
to minors, but to all persons born illegitimate "whether they be minors or
adults and whether the acts essential to effectuate their legitimation oc-
curred during their minority or later."' 9 In 1951 the Legislature wrote this
judicial conclusion into the law by amending Civil Code Section 221 to
provide that "In Sections 228, 229, and 230 'child' and 'children' include
both minor persons and adult persons.""
The California Supreme Court has drawn a line of distinction between
adoptions under Civil Code Section 230 and ordinary adoptions. " the
verb 'adopts'," it said, "as used in Sec. 230 of the Civil Code, is used in
the sense of 'legitimates,' and the acts of a father of an illegitimate child
if filling the measure required by that statute, would result, strictly speak-
ing, in the legitimation of such child, rather than in its adoption. Adoption,
16 In re Floods Estate, 217 Cal. 763, 21 P.2d 579 (1933), Laugenour v Fogg, 48 Cal.App.2d
848, 120 P.2d 690 (1942).
17 The California Supreme Court decisions reveal a great deal of judicial confusion about
the meaning of each of the principal requirements for adoption under Calif. Civ. Code Section
230. How public must a public acknowledgment be? Are acts sufficient or must there be declara-
tions and if so to whom? Can a single person without relatives or fixed abode meet the recep-
tion into the family requirement? Can such reception occur in an illicit relationship family?
Must the consent of the wife be secured even though she is not a part of the family? For a
presentation and discussion of the confused holdings on these questions see ARmSTRONG, FAM Y
LAw, 925 ff. (1953).
18 Estate of Pico, 52 Cal. 84 (1877).
19 Estate of Lund, 26 Cal.2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945)
20 In Estate of Lund, the Califorma Supreme Court held that Civil Code Section 230 is
complied with although the legitimating acts actually take place m other states while the father
and his family are domiciled there and these states do not authorize legitimation. "We are
satisfied," said the court, "that the public, unconditional, and long-continued ackowledgment
of a child by his father, with full knowledge of the facts, accompamed by reception of the child
into the family and treatment as a legitimate child, constitutes a continuing representation
which by its nature is inherently permanent and continuing and goes with the father wherever
he goes " 26 Cal.2d 472, 496, 159 P.2d 643, 656 (1945).
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properly considered, refers to persons who are strangers in blood; legitima-
tion, to persons where the blood relation exists."'"
The distinction is not altogether accurate. Adoption proceedings under
Section 226 of the Civil Code are available to blood relations, including
natural parents.22 In fact, if a child has been lawfully adopted by strangers
or judicially declared free of the custody and control of the parent, pro-
ceedings under Civil Code Section 226 are the only method by which the
natural parent may establish or re-establish the legal relation of parent and
child.2' An unwed mother may have the rights to custody and control but
go through an adoption under Civil Code Section 226 as a means of pub-
licly establishing the parent-child relationship while keeping the community
from knowing that the child is her natural offspring.24 A mother who later
21 Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 916 (1892), In re Navarro, 77 Cal. App.2d 500,
175 P.2d 896 (1947).
22 A twenty-five state study by the United States Children's Bureau indicates that one per
cent of all adoption petitions are filed by biological parents of the child to be adopted. STATis-
TICAI SEMIES No. 14, supra note 9, Table 3 at 13.
23 See for example, No. 29966 and No. 27446, consolidated, Superior Court, Butte County,
(1952). Abandonment proceedings had been completed and a decree entered under Section 701,
California Welfare & Institutions Code, with respect to the three children m question. Three
adoption petitions were filed: One by a couple in whose home one of the children had been
placed by the county probation department; one by another couple with whom the two other
children had been placed; and the third by the natural mother and stepfather. "The practical
effect," of the abandonment decree, said the court, "is that, for better or worse, the mother
appears herein along with her husband, a step-father, as strangers m petitions counter to
petitions of foster-parents, also strangers, for the adoption of the children." In this situation
the natural parent was placed on the same legal footing as the other petitioners subject as they
were under Civil Code Section 226 to investigation, report, determination of suitability of the
home and the like. The judge conceded that "the tie of blood would weigh the scales in favor
of the mother's petition," "if as between the petitioners all things appeared fairly equal in
devotion to the children (and reciprocated devotion of child for parent), and the moral, cul-
tural and physical advantages offered by the respective petitioners . ""However," continued
the court, in the Memorandum of Decision, "any equities in favor of the mother arising out
of the circumstances disclosed by the testimony can be now adjusted only if the welfare of the
children would coincide with her present wishes. If the legislative intent was that Section 701,
Welfare Code, would not have such unhappy result, then revision of the section or of Civil
Code Section 224 is necessary. While parental rights should be accorded great respect and sanc-
tity, a like respect for and sanctity of judgments regularly entered is necessary to the orderly
administration of the law." Weighing the testimony and reports submitted and looking at the
three homes comparatively, the judge decided that the best interests of the children would be
served by granting the petitions of the two sets of foster parents and denying the petition of
the natural mother and stepfather. In doing so the judge also rejected the recommendation of
the State Department of Social Welfare that the petition of the foster parents having the two
children should be denied and the children returned to the natural mother and stepfather.
24 The records of the SDSW reveal that in this instance the petition for adoption was
granted. Cf. Marshall v. Marshall, 196 Cal. 761, 765-767, 239 Pac. 36, 37 (1925), where the
California Supreme Court said: "Our Civil Code provisions respecting adoption contain no
definition of the term, but all of the definitions seem to be in substantial agreement to the
effect that it is the act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are created and recognized
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marries a man not the father of her child may join with the stepfather in
a petition for adoption as a device for keeping the child from eventually
figuring out that it was born out of wedlock. 5 Moreover, the natural father
of an illegitimate child may wish to resort to adoption under Civil Code 226
in the interest of giving the child's status the certainty derived from formal
proceedings rather than leaving it dependent on the difficulties of proof of
compliance with all of the requirements of Civil Code Section 230.26
But while the difference between blood relations and strangers does not,
in and of itself, deserve the weight given it in the quoted passage, it does
point to a valid distinction which the court apparently had in mind: The
object and effect of Civil Code 230 is to attribute to certain conduct of the
natural father the legal significance of changing the status and capacity of
an illegitimate child to the status and capacity of a child born in lawful
wedlock, the primary object and effect of adoptions under Civil Code Sec-
tion 226 is to secure homes and parental relationships for children without
any regard to their legitimate or illegitimate birth. There is no provision
in Civil Code Section 226, such as is contained in Civil Code Section 230,
that, upon adoption, an illegitimate child is "deemed for all purposes legiti-
mate from the time of its birth." Civil Code Section 226 simply does not
deal with the problem of illegitimate status (though many of the children
adopted under it are illegitimate) whereas Civil Code Section 230 is geared
to deal with one phase of that problem. Accordingly, Civil Code Section
230 not only makes a child so adopted by the natural father "for all pur-
poses legitimate from the time of its birth" but it frees the process of adop-
tion from the "limitation express or implicit in ordinary adoption pro-
ceedings." 2
Since Civil Code Section 230 is in fact a provision for legitimation by
paternal conduct, the judicial construction of the section reflects and em-
bodies social attitudes towards illegitimacy As long ago as 1889, Chief
Justice Beatty of the California Supreme Court expressed the view that
Civil Code Section 230 was "remedial in nature designed to secure to
innocent unfortunates a just share of the rights to which they are by
nature as fully entitled as are legitimate offspring in cases of this kind
as legally existing between persons not so related by nature or by law In other words, it is a
proceeding by which the adopting parent assumes a parental relationship toward the child of
another. It seems unthinkable that one who is both the natural mother and the legal mother
of a child can legally adopt such child. The natural mother of a child could legally adopt
such child only m a case wherein her parental relationship had theretofore been severed as a
matter of law. "
25 The petition was also granted m this case.
26 The State Department of Social Welfare lays some emphasis upon the desirability of
fathers using Civil Code Section 226 m its Adoption Manual Sections 2070-00 D.C.
27 Lund, supra note 19 at 493, 159 P.2d at 654.
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the only strictness required is in proof of paternity. That being satisfac-
torily established by plenary proof,. . courts should lean strongly in favor
of a finding that the father of an illegitimate child has done what every
honest and humane man should be not only willing but eager to do, and
what a just law would compel the unwilling to do."" It is notable that this
view, however, was expressed in a dissenting opinion. A much more com-
mon opinion, then and later, on and off the bench, has been that the Megiti-
macy of children has a salutary bearing on the morality of adults and that
as a matter of social policy legitimation should be made difficult. In 1942
Judge Parker wrote in the Laugenour case: "The argument is that when
the father of an illegitimate child severed his relations with his lawful wife
he then became a man without a home of any kind with the right to re-
establish a home elsewhere with whom he chose and under whatever con-
ditions he chose. This, too, regardless of the laws governing divorce and a
separation. It is a strange contention and if adopted would mean the end
of what we have heretofore deemed the backbone of any civilized country
to wit, the home and family. .. If the rules are relaxed or misconstrued
to the extent here sought we will unsocialize our system beyond description.
The terms 'home' and 'family' will have no meaning other than designating
sheltered centers for sex promiscuity.
'29
In recent years, judicial and probably popular opinion too have come
to a fuller recognition of the injustice and futility to heaping punitive con-
sequences upon offspring for disapproved conduct in their natural parents.
We are still a long way from the desired goal of treating "all children (how-
ever conceived and born) on a legal and social parity with each other"
"for all purposes and under all circumstances." I But rhetoric and holdings
in some recent California cases dealing with legitimation represent progress
in that direction. " . . so called illegitimate children," said the California
Supreme Court in the Lund case, "in truth could more accurately be re-
ferred to as the natural children of illegitimate parents .... ,
In Estate of Garcia, decided in 1949,12 the California Supreme Court
unanimously laid at rest the notion which had received judicial sanction
earlier 3 that legitimated illegitimates, with respect to inheritance rights
are not on the same footing as those born legitimate. Said Justice Traynor:
28 In re Jessup's Estate, 81 Cal. 408, 435, 22 Pac. 742, 750 (1889).
9 Laugenour v. Fogg, 48 Cal. App.2d 848, 851-852, 120 P.2d 690, 692 (3rd Dist., 1942);
see also Estate of De Laveaga, 124 Cal. 158, 75 Pac. 790 (1904).
3 0 Edwin J. Lukas, Babzes are Neither Vendible nor Expendable, 5 Record of the Ass'n of
the Bar of the City of New York 88 at 98 (1950).
3 1 Supra note 19 at 642, 159 P.2d at 654.
3234 Cal.2d 419, 421, 210 P.2d 841, 842.
3 Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346 (1916), on denying rehearing.
"It is clear, therefore, that with regard to direct inheritance from the father,
the words 'illegitimate child' in section 255 [of the Probate Code] are
applicable, not to every child who is born illegitimate, but only to children,
born illegitimate, who have been legitimated under either section 215 or
section 230 of the Civil Code. These words must have the same meaning
with regard to inheritance through the father if their meaning has any
consistency Otherwise the restrictive language of section 255 would con-
flict with the provision of section 230 of the Civil Code that a child legiti-
mated by adoption is thereafter 'deemed for all purposes legitimate,' and the
provision of section 215 of the Civil Code that 'A child born before wedlock
becomes legitimate by the subsequent marriage of its parents.' A child who
is 'deemed for all purposes legitimate' cannot be regarded as still illegiti-
mate for some purposes, and a child who has become legitimate can no
longer be regarded as an 'illegitimate child.'
"The statutes are not in conflict when the words 'illegitimate child' are
interpreted as referring only to children born illegitimate who have not
been legitimated under the provisions of the Civil Code. Although this
interpretation renders some of the restrictive language of section 255 super-
fluous, it is supported by the legislative history of the statutes."
84
Conclusion
Stepparent adoptions recognize and put the stamp of legal status upon
a family relationship already in being, which usually came into existence
when a second parent was added by marriage to an already existing family
of the child or children and their biological or adoptive parent who had and
retained full rights of custody and control, and the continuation of which
does not depend upon the granting or denial of the petition of adoption.
Adult adoptions create the legal status of parent and child but, except per-
haps when they are also stepparent adoptions, they imply nothing with
respect to normal family relationships and living plans. Whereas the step-
child usually has been and will continue to be living in the same household
with the parent and stepparent, an adult adopted person may himself be
married and have a family of his own and may not either before or after
adoption have occupied or occupy a common household or other normal
aspects of a family relationship with the adopting person. Conduct adop-
tions, being in truth legitimations without judicial action or other formal
proceeding, couple biological paternity with the full legal status of parent
and child. With respect to all three of these types of adoptions or so-called
adoptions, therefore, there are major features which differentiate them from
34 See also In re Bartons Estate, 94 Cal.App.2d 919, 212 P.2d 18 (1950).
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what might be called ordinary adoptions. They are numerically significant
and each possesses a set of legal and practical problems in its own right.
They do not, however, either in numbers or in the character of the social
problem presented, compare with ordinary adoptions. It is these which
constitute the heart of California's adoption program.
I. Ordinary Adoptions: Legal Character and Effect
The Civil Code sections governing ordinary adoptions provide, in gen-
eral: "Any unmarried minor child may be adopted by any adult person, in
the cases and subject to the rules prescribed" in the chapter of the Civil
Code on Children by Adoption.' But "The person adopting. . must be
at least ten years older than the person adopted,"' and a married man or
a married woman cannot adopt without the consent of the spouse, unless
there is a lawful separation or the spouse is not capable of giving consent.'
These provisions were first put in the Civil Code in 1872 andhave under-
gone only minor changes in the intervening period. In 1874, the age differ-
ence was reduced from fifteen to ten years and a requirement was deleted
that the person adopting must have been married, and, if a woman, must
be a widow, or be lawfully divorced without her fault. In 1953, a distinction
was made between unmarried and married minors, the latter being treated
as adults.
A common way of describing the relation created by adoption is to
speak of it as artificial and to contrast it with the "natural relationship."
"The law," says Madden after employing the quoted terms, "cannot, and
does not purport to, do the work of nature, and create one a child who by
nature is a stranger. But it can and does fix the status of the adoptive child
to the adoptive parent as substantially the same as the status of a natural
child. By the act of adoption, the child becomes, in a legal sense, the child
of the adoptive parent. The general effect of adoption, therefore, is, with
few exceptions, to place the parties in the legal relation of parent and child,
with all the legal consequences. The law declares the status, and from the
status, as a necessary consequence, spring the ordinary rights, duties, and
liabilities which arise out of the same status created by nature."4
Statements such as these raise more questions than they answer. Pulled
together from various judicial opinions, they are better summaries of the
rhetoric of the court than of the holdings; and emphasize rather than
reconcile the divergent points of view out of which they are composed.
The status of parent and child is "created," "fixed," or "declared," by the
1 CALzF. Civ. CODE § 221.
2 CALyF. CIV. CODE § 222.
3 CALiF. Civ. CODE § 223.
4 MADDENx, PERSONS AND Domsmic RELATIoNs, 359-60 (1931).
law in cases of adoption, in other cases, "the same status," is "created by
nature." The "artificial" adoptive relation gives rise to substantially the
same rights, duties and liabilities "as arise out of the natural relation."
There seems to be some confusion here between legal creation and biologi-
cal procreation. Do rights, duties and liabilities "arise out of the natural
relation?" Whatever may be said of the origins of the child, and, for that
matter, of the parent, is the "status" of parent and child "created by na-
ture?" Is not the "status" in both cases "fixed," "declared," and "created"
by the law? And, indeed, does not the law fix, declare and create a different
relationship among children all of whom occupy the same natural relation
to their parents but some of whom were born within and some without wed-
lock? What is left of the parent child status "created by nature" when the
law can and does fix, declare and create an adoptive parent-child relation,
thereby at the same time extinguishing the relation of parent and child
which existed before and was "created by nature?" Moreover, just what
is the "natural relation" under discussion? It is scientifically clear that the
"natural relation" is not what it is commonly said to be, namely, a "blood
relation." If the genetic connection is what is meant, then it must be noted
that the act of transmission is accomplished in a comparatively short time
and does not necessarily involve any after-contact or relationship. Is this
"natural relation" more natural or more important than the mutual, recipro-
cal and continuous relation between parent and child, which may occur
in adoptive or non-adoptive families, involved in the rearing of a child
from infancy to maturity with all of the impact of day-to-day care and
upbringing upon character, psychology, outlook, emotional make-up, and
even biology which that entails? In this sense, does not nature "do the
work of nature" and create one a child who by nature is a stranger? In fact,
in this sense, does not nature do the work of nature and create one a child
who by nature is not a stranger?
In prescribing the effects of adoption with respect to the adoptive par-
ents and child, the Civil Code speaks explicitly of the "legal" relationship.
Civil Code Section 228 provides. "After the adoption the two [the adopt-
ing person and the child] shall sustain towards each other the legal relation
of parent and child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties
of that relation."5 In dealing with the effects of adoption upon the former
5 In at least one way provided by the Civil Code itself, the new "legal relation" differs
from the old. It may be annuled in certain circumstances: "If any child heretofore or here-
after adopted under the foregoing provisions of this code shows evidence of being feeble-minded,
epileptic or insane as a result of conditions prior to the adoption, and of which conditions the
adopting parents or parent had no knowledge or notice prior to the entry of the decree of
adoption, a petition setting forth such facts may be filed by the adopting parents or parent
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parents, the word "legal" is absent from the clause discharging them of all
rights and duties - hence, literally including natural rights and duties as
well as legal - and the former parents are not referred to as "natural par-
ents" but merely as "parents" - hence, presumably the provision applies
to former adoptive as well as biological parents. Thus, Civil Code Section
229 provides: "The parents of an adopted child are, from the time of adop-
tion, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for the
child so adopted, and have no right over it."
The over-all purpose of these sections, taken together with Civil Code
Section 221, evidently was to create a new legal relationship of parent and
child which normally would be coupled with the natural relation of parent
and child springing from the fact that that is the relationship in which they
actually live; and to make the new legal relationship legally the same as
the old legal relationship of parent and child which normally is coupled
both with the genetic and the factual natural relation of parent and child.
Despite this over-all purpose of the sections and the complete absence
from them of any reference to "natural parents" (whether conceived as
biological progenitors or as those who discharge the function of caring for
and rearing the child with all its natural consequences), the distinction
between the natural and adoptive relationship has always been prominent
in the minds of many judges and is often the theme of discussion in judicial
analyses of California Civil Code Sections 228 and 229.
In Estate of Jobsonq is illustrative, though it must be conceded that the
facts in that case particularly invited such discussion if they did not render
it inevitable. The question there at issue was whether the adopted child's
relationship to his biological father was revived by the death of his adoptive
parent. The adopted child, who had been reared in the adoptive family from
the age of three years, had died intestate, leaving a widow but no issue. His
adoptive parent had predeceased him three years earlier, transmitting to
him by will the very estate the distribution of which was now in controversy.
His biological father survived him and claimed one-fourth of the estate to
which he was entitled under Civil Code Section 1386(2) if he was the
"father." The California Supreme Court denied the claim and affirmed dis-
tribution of the entire estate to the widow as sole heir.
Two dissenting justices laid heavy emphasis on the distinction between
with the court which granted the petition for adoption. If such facts are proved to the satisfac-
tion of the court, it may make an order setting aside the decree of adoption.
"The petition must be filed.within which ever is the later of the following time limits:
(a) Within five years after the entering of the decree of adoption, or (b) within one year after
the effective date thereof, if such a condition were manifest in the child within five years after
the entering of the decree of adoption." Calif. Civ. Code Sec. 227b. See Helling, Adoption:
Annulment of Status, 29 Notre Dame Lawyer 68 (1953).
6 164 Cal. 312, 317, 128 Pac. 938 (1912).
the "artificial" and the "natural" parent and child relation. Adoption
statutes, they felt should be treated "like an invading force upon a hostile
domain," and allowed to alter the natural relation "only so far as its lines
extended."' They argued. "The whole purpose and object of the adoption
statute is to create, artificially, the relation of parent and child, to provide a
status controlling them for thier joint lives. That relation cannot last longer
than the lives of the two parties to it. When either dies, the relation ceases,
and there remains nothing upon which the statute under which it was
created can operate. It has not, as has the natural relation, blood con-
nections through which it may continue to work after it has itself ceased
to have a present existence. There is not in the adoption statute a word to
the effect that, where the adoption has served its purpose by prevailing over
the natural relation during the joint lives of the two parties and has ended
by the death of one of them, it shall thereafter continue for any purpose.
So far as the statute goes, and while the new statute, [status] lasts, the
natural relations are altered, removed or suspended. But they are not
utterly destroyed. The natural inclinations and affections must remain. The
statute cannot destroy them. Beyond the limits of the changes affected by
the adoption, and after it has terminated, the natural relations should pre-
vail and control, since there are then, in that field, none other. The result
should be and would be that, after this termination of the mutual relation,
the inheritance from the survivor, upon his subsequent death, will be
controlled by the general law of descent and the natural relationship will
prevail. "8
Thus, in this remarkable passage: (1) the legal status of parent and
child after adoption is not compared with the legal status of parent and
child after biological parenthood but is instead compared with natural
facts or supposed facts; (2) the natural relation is identified as consisting
of "blood connections through which it may continue to work after it has
7 In ex parte Clark, 87 Cal. 638, 641, 25 Pac. 967, 968 (1891) the same doctrine was
couched in terms of the adoption statutes as a derogation of the common law. "We have held
that our law of adoption is not unconstitutional, but to acquire any right tinder it its provisions
must be strictly followed, and all doubts in controversy between the natural and adopting
parents should be resolved in favor of the former. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the
adopting parents, unless the fact of adoption has been done in strict accordance with the
statute. No matter how persuasive may be the equities of the child's case, or how clear the
intention of all parties, it must appear that the statutory conditions have been strictly per-
formed, otherwise the relation never existed, and the right to inherit never was acquired. The
right of adoption is purely statutory It was unknown to the common law, and as the right
when acquired under our statute operates as a permanent transfer of the natural rights of the
parent, it is repugnant to the principles of the common law, and one who claims that such a
change has occurred must show that every requirement of the statute has been strictly com-
plied with."
8 Supra note 6 at 319, 128 Pac. at 940-41.
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itself ceased to have a present existence," and of "natural inclinations and
affection;" (3) it is said the natural relationship cannot be destroyed, it
can only be suspended by a statute; (4) there is no recognition of the fact
that "natural inclinations and affections" may exist or be developed in the
adoptive family and may never have existed or been developed as between
the biological parents and the child, and that the statute cannot create or
destroy them in the adoptive family any more than it can in the other
family; (5) there is not the slightest hint that, whatever the elements
might be in the natural relation, the status of parent and child in the rela-
tion is created by the law just as it is in the case of adoption.
The majority opinion in the Jobson case, far from disclaiming these
views, itself spoke of treating "the act of adoption as creating a relation
which produces as between the parties the legal results flowing from the
natural relationship of parent and child." 9 The majority felt itself bound
however by the unequivocal demand of the sections that, after adoption,
the adopting and adopted person "shall sustain towards each other the legal
relation of parent and child" and the parents are "relieved of all parental
duties ... and have no right over" the child.
In general, despite the persistent emergence of these underlying con-
ceptions, the California Supreme Court has taken the statutory language
seriously It has held that: the adoptive parent has the same-right to para-
mount custody as the biological parent and, after adoption, guardianship
of the adopted child is therefore improper."0 The residence of the adopting
parent becomes the residence of the child;" adopted children are within
the term "any lineal descendant" and are thus exempted from the burden
of a collateral inheritance tax; 2 an adopted child is a "child" within the
meaning of Section 1365 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus entitled
to letters of administration of the estate of the adopting parent; Is a court
having control of a child's custody by virtue of the divorce of its parents is
ousted of its jurisdiction by adoption; 14 "an adoptive parent may contract
with the natural parents to take care of, support and educate the adopted
child for compensation as freely and legally as such contract could be made
by the adoptive parent with a stranger to the blood of such child";' 5 an
adopted child is not part of the immediate family of his biological father
9 Id. at 316, 128 Pac. at 939.
10 In re Santos, 185 Cal. 127, 195 Pac. 1055 (1921).
1 1 Estate of Taylor, 131 Cal. 180, 63 Pac. 345 (1900).
2 Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 468, 74 Pac. 10 (1903).
IS Estate of Camp, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736 (1901).
14Younger v. Younger, 106 Cal. 377, 39 Pac. 799 (1895).
15 Mitchell v. Brown, 18 Cal. App. 117, 121, 122 Pac. 426, 427 (1912).
for the purpose of having set aside as exempt property insurance proceeds
paid into the estate of such father."0
The California Supreme Court has adhered to the same line with respect
to inheritance rights as between parent and child. In In re Newman' the
right of the adopted child to inherit from the adoptive parents was held to
follow inevitably from the adoption statutes. "The provisions of sections
227 and 228," said the court, "extend to all the rights and duties of natural
parents and children. The language is general and comprehensive. The use
of the word 'issue,' in section 1386, does not limit the right of inheritance
to the natural children only The word 'issue' is there used in the same
sense as the words 'child' and 'children.' "118
With respect to other relatives, however, the "natural relationship"
conception has prevailed. In In re Darling9 the court laid down the rule
regarding genetic grandparents. The child's "relationship to his grand-
parents by blood on either side is not affected by the adoption. As to them,
he is, notwithstanding the adoption the 'issue' or 'child' of their child."
'20
California Supreme Court dicta"' and lower court holdings22 have similarly
declared that the inheritance rights of an adopted child do not extend to
the ancestors or collateral relatives of the adopting parent because "the
rules of computation of the degrees of kindred, evidently contemplated
relationship by consanguinity."'
Professor Armstrong summarizes the California law concerning the
adopted child's inheritance rights as follows: "The general pattern devel-
oped by the Califorma adoption decisions and dicta is clear. It leaves the
adopted child and his descendants, for succession purposes, in the family
tree into which he was born with all his 'sisters and his cousins and his
aunts' and other blood relatives, lineals and collaterals, save only his father
and mother. In exchange for the latter (i.e., his father and mother by blood)
he and his descendants receive his adopting parent (or parents) but he and
his descendants do not receive any place in the existing ancestral family
tree of his adopting parent (or parents) Our law apparently creates no
new legal lineal or collateral ancestral 'relatives by adoption."'
"As to actual decisions, however, it may be noted that the question
16 Estate of Pillsbury, 175 Cal. 454, 166 Pac. 11 (1917).
17 75 Cal. 213, 219, 16 Pac. 887 (1888).
18 Id. at 219, 16 Pac. at 888; see also Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506, 271 Pac. 1067 (1928).
19 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916).
20 Id. at 228, 159 Pac. at 609.
2 1 lbzd.
22 Estate of Pence, 117 Cal. App. 323, 4 P.2d 202 (2d Dist., Div. 1, 1931), Estate of Jones,
3 Cal. App.2d 395, 39 P.2d 847 (2d Dist., Div. 1, 1934), Estate of Stewart, 30 Cal. App.2d 594,
86 P.2d 1071 (1939). See ARMSTRo G, FAm Y LAw 134 ff. (1953).
2 3 Estate of Pence, Id. at 333, 4 P.2d at 206.
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whether children born to his blood parents after his adoption (or such
children's descendants) would be legally related to the adopted child has
not been adjudicated. Similarly no case has reviewed the converse questions,
i.e., whether children born to his adopting parent after they adopt him (or
such children's descandants), legally as well as factually, would be his
brothers and sisters." 2
Professor Armstrong concludes that, since "succession rights are based
upon rules which make sense only on the assumption of contact with" the
blood relatives, "a legislative re-examination of our adoption statutes lead-
ing to a revision of the succession aspects of adoption would seem in
order."2 Certainly it is with respect to succession rights that the two natural
relationship theories-the genetic theory and the theory that "natural in-
clinations and affections" derive from family experience and contact-come
into sharpest conflict. On the family experience and contact theory, the
relatives of the adoptive parents, lineal and collateral, become the relatives
of the adopted child. Normally, they are the only grandparents, uncles,
aunts, brothers, sisters and cousins he knows. His genetic grandparents,
uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters and other relatives in a sizable percentage
of cases of illegitimate birth will not even have been aware of his existence;
and in many other instances will have known him only very briefly prior
to his surrender for adoption as a very young infant. Moreover, even if
property is to follow the genes, collaterals would have to be excluded since
they do not inherit the genes being followed but only possess genes that
were drawn from a common stock. Thus, brothers and sisters especially,
(but all other collateral relatives as well) both on the common family
experience and contact theory and on the genetic theory, must be those of
the adoptive family whether born before or after the adoption or even if
acquired by adoption. In these circumstances there would be little point
to drawing a distinction between children born before and those born after
adoption - as Professor Armstrong proposes the judges should do pending
legislative revision - neither allowing the adopted child "any legal rela-
tionship to after-born children of the blood parents whose relationship to
him has been extinguished, nor denying him legal relationship to after-
2 4 ARUSTRONG, op. dt. supra note 22 at 1242.
25 Id. at 1243. S.B. 112 introduced m the present session of the State Legislature provides:
"Section 257 of the Probate Code is amended to read: An adopted child succeeds to the estate
of one who has adopted him and to the estates of the lineal and collateral kindred of such
adoptive parent, the same as a natural child; and the person adopting and such person's lineal
and collateral kindred succeed to the estate of an adopted child, the same as a natural parent
and natural kindred. An adopted child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent or to
the estate of lineal and collateral kindred of such parent when the relationship between such
child and parent has been severed by the adoption, nor does such natural parent or kmdred
succeed to the estate of such adopted child."
born children of the parents who have replaced his blood parents." This
distinction can only be justified as a somehow advisable judicial concession
to the disapproved principle of succession (actual past decisions of the
California Supreme Court do not make it necessary) for in part it allows
the extinction of the old legal relationship and the institution of the new to
govern inheritance instead of the facts of family life.
These, then, are the code sections and judicial interpretations which
bear upon the character and effects of adoption. Whether in their present
form, or modified as proposed above, they are only the legal aspects of
what is in fact a considerable social problem. They constitute the encasing
outer shell to some extent limiting, to some extent protecting, and to some
extent determimng the shape of the interests and activities comprising the
vital substance that lies within. Succession rights, rights to letters of ad-
ministration, rights to family allowances and insurance proceeds, rights to
preferred inheritance tax treatment, and the like, are undeniably important
both socially and to the individuals concerned. They are, however, a re-
sidual or contingent remainder of an earlier existing and far more important
family relationship, now dissolved by death or otherwise broken up; and
they are, in any event, altogether peripheral to the human, personal and
social values in the family relationship and experience which are at the
center of adoption. The legal right to the custody, services and earnings
of the child and the legal duty to supply him with care, support, upbringing
and education come nearer to that center but are still a considerable dis-
tance from it. Adoption, in short, is much more than a new legal relationship.
IV. The Social Problem
What is the social problem with which the law of adoption is intended
to cope? What are the elements which compose it? Who are the children
adopted and available for adoption? Who are their biological parents? Who
are the adoptive parents? Why do the biological parents surrender and the
adoptive parents adopt children? What is the magnitude of the problem?
Some of these questions cannot be answered completely The answers
lie buried in uncollected and unalyzed data or hidden deeply in the mysteries
of nature and psychology not yet probed by science. In other aspects, how-
ever, the critical data are at hand.
The United States Children's Bureau estimated that the number of
adoption petitions filed in the United States in 1951 totalled 80,000. Be-
tween 1944 and 1951, there was a 60 per cent increase in such petitions.
The reasons given by the Children's Bureau for the increase were the large
number of homes broken by death, divorce and desertion during and since
the war, the increase in the number of illegitimate children born in that
period and the growing belief of social agencies that periods of institutional
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care should be held at a minimum and children should be placed for adop-
tion as rapidly as is consistent with adequate opportunity for the biological
parents to make a sound decision and for agency study of the child and
the prospective adoptive home.1 To this list of factors might plausibly be
added improved social attitudes towards adoption and adopted children, a
high level of economic well-being, and increased popularity of having
children.
In California, in 1953-1954, there were 8,433 adoption petitions filed 2
The increases in the number of adoptions in California during the last fif-
teen years are shown in the following data:
1941-1942 2,412 1951-1952 6,923
1943-1944 3,972 1953-1954 8,433
The increases in California have been even greater than those in the nation
as a whole: 77 per cent increase from 1943-1944 to 1950-1951; 250 per
cent from 1941-1942 to 1953-1954.
In addition to the factors mentioned by the Children's Bureau, Cali-
fornia's increase is to be explained in terms of the tremendous influx of
population from other states and the fact that coastal urban areas were
concentration points of parental separation during and after the war.
Adoptable children are part of a larger group of destitute, homeless and
neglected children. Some inkling of the size and character of the larger
group can be gathered from a study made by the United States Children's
Bureau in 1945. Relying on 1940 census data the Bureau concluded that
10.7 per cent of the minors in six states under review3 lived apart from their
parents and 31.4 per cent of these lived in non-relative homes or institutions.
The figures for California were 10.3 per cent not living with parents and
38.9 per cent of these living with non-relatives. 4
Many of the children living outside parental homes, it may be con-
jectured, have one or even two parents interested in them and with a sense
of responsibility for them. For some part of these, consequently, the separa-
tion is only temporary. The Children's Bureau believed that "very prob-
ably, for many more, the parents' death, incompetence, indifference, or
legal separation or divorce, or the child's own mental, physical, or emotional
inadequacy, necessitates a separate living arrangement." 5 In all likelihood,
1 FEDERAL SECuiTY AGENCY, CHILDREN'S BuREAU, ADOPTION OF CHILDREN, STATISTICAL
SERIES No. 14 (1951).
2 Since some adoption petitions are denied by the courts and others are withdrawn by the
prospective adopting parents, the number of adoption petitions filed in a year is normally con-
siderably larger than the number of adoptions actually consummated.
3 Califorma, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri.
4 FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, GuAuDiAimsmp: A WAY OF FuimmGo PUBLIC RESroNsi-
BMHIT FOR CHILDREN, CmLoREir's BUREAU PUBICATION No. 330, 137-38 (1949).
5 Id. at 38.
it is m these terms that a fair part of the high percentage of children living
in non-relative homes and institutions must be explained.
A Los Angeles study of 1952 tends to confirm this belief and to shed
light on the situation of children living with non-relatives. The Citizens'
Committee on Adoption in that city investigated 3,394 children under the
age of seventeen in foster homes and institutions under the auspices of pub-
lic or private agencies. Children placed in foster homes directly by their
parents were excluded from the study The committee found that of the
3,394 children. only 14 per cent had parents living together; 25 per cent
of the fathers were listed as "whereabouts unknown," 1 1 per cent of the
mothers were so classified, 3 per cent of the children were full orphans,
12 to 18 per cent were in need of adoption planning but only 2.5 per cent
were legally free for adoption.6
Children of all ages are placed for adoption and have adoption petitions
filed for them. According to a 1951 study of the United States Children's
Bureau covering 25 states: 35 per cent of the children placed for adoption
were under one month old, 11 per cent were between one and three months;
11 per cent were between three months and six months; 12 per cent were
between six months and one year; 23 per cent were between one year and
six years, 7 per cent were between six years and twelve years and one
per cent were over 12 years.7 Fifteen per cent of the children for whom
adoption petitions were filed were under six months old, 25 per cent were
between six months and two years, 29 per cent were between two years
and six years; 24 per cent were between six and fourteen years and 7 per
cent were 14 years and over.s The decided emphasis, however, is upon
6 Final Report, Citizens Committee, Adoption of Children n California, 12 (1953) The
Committee concluded: "The existence of large numbers of children away from their own homes
is in part due to the lack of basic community services to assist children and their parents while
families are still intact, as well as services to assist parents in the rehabilitation of their homes
so that a child in foster care may be returned to his home after only a temporary separation.
It is also partly due to inadequate adoption services in the past."
Sixty-nine per cent of the 3394 children were under the junsdiction either of the county
bureau of public assistance or the probation department; sixty-four per cent had board paid
by public agencies.
Conclusions similar to those of the Citizens Committee were reached by the State Depart-
ment of Social Welfare in a recent study of 74 per cent of the children in the Department's
Aid to Needy Children Foster Care Program. " the findings showed that for many children
adequate services were not being provided to help keep families together; that children were
placed in boarding homes and institutions without sufficient planning and preparation, and
children were allowed to remain in foster care because of lack of help to parents in re-establish-
ing their homes. Many cases showed frequent changes in placement resulting in a lack of con-
tinuity of care and of the stable home environment needed for normal growth and development.
Report on Department Accomplishments in the Aid to Needy Children Foster Care Program
(prepared for California Senate Finance committee in hearings on the 1954-55 budget) SDSW
1 (Jan. 5, 1955).
7 CHILDREN's BUREAU STATISTICAL SERrs No. 14, supra note I at 16.
8Id. at 15.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6
Mar., 1955] CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTION LAW AND PROGRAMS 285
young children. Sixty-nine per cent of those placed for adoption are under
the age of one year; the median age of children at the time of filing adop-
tion petitions is 3.3 years; two-fifths are under two years.
The experience of adoption agencies is that boys over the age of two
and girls of an older age are "hard to place," or, as the preferred expression
now is, are "children with special needs." There is no automatic and hardly
any appreciable demand for them by prospective adoptive parents who are
not relatives. Other children with special needs, in whom adoptive interest
must be cultivated, are children with physical handicaps, children with
some mental retardation, children with emotional problems and children
of minority race and nationality 9 In June of 1950 for example the Los
Angeles County public adoption agency had: 44 Negro children under care,
with applications from only 30 Negro families; 53 children of Mexican
descent with applications from only 22 Mexican families; 11 children of
Oriental and mixed racial elements with only applications from six families
of the same race.10.
In California 86.9 per cent of agency or relinquishment adoptions were
White, and 13.1 per cent non-White (Negro, Mexican, etc.), in independ-
ent adoptions 90.6 per cent were White, 9 4 per cent were non-White. 11
Fifty-one per cent of the children covered in the twenty-five state study
of the Federal Bureau were born out of wedlock, with mothers two out of
9 Helen W Hallinan, Who Are the Children Available for Adoption? AnoproNr PRmciPLEs
AND SERVICES, Family Service Association of America, 21, 22, 26 (1952). Final Report, Citizens
Committee, supra note 6 at 10 (1953), Annual Report, SDSW, Problems in the Adoption Pro-
gram (1954), Marilyn Nott, Breaking Adoption Bottleneck, 86 SURVLY 443 (1950).
10 Marilyn Nott, Id. at 445. The 1951 Children's Bureau Study revealed that of the chil-
dren for whom adoption petitions were filed 94 per cent were white, 4 per cent were Negro and
2 per cent were other. The Children's Bureau explains these figures as follows: "Only 6 per
cent of the children for whom adoption petitions were filed in the 26 States under discussion
were nonwhite whereas the nonwhite child population in these States was 14 per cent. For the
5 reporting States with the highest proportion of nonwhite children (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Virginia), the difference was even greater - 10 per cent of the children adopted,
but 29 per cent of the total child population was nonwhite.
"Among the factors accounting for the relatively small number of adoptions among non-
whites is the inadequacy of adoptive services for Negro children and the inability of agencies
to find adoptive homes for them. In many agencies, moreover, the pressure of applicants for the
adoption of white children forces concentration on services for white children at the expense of
services to Negro children.
"Another reason for the small number of Negro adoptions may be that many adoptable
Negro children are 'taken m' by relatives or friends. These children often live with families
just as they would if they were adopted, although the legal process has not been consummated.
There may be economic reasons why the adoption does not take place or this may be due to
lack of understanding as to what the legal process means to the child and the family." Supra
note 7 at 3.
11 These dates are for the calendar year 1953.
every five of whom were teenagers.1 - Of the remaining 49 per cent the
majority come from homes broken by divorce, separation or desertion,
(27 4 per cent) In 8.9 per cent of the cases one or both parents were dead.
In 4.2 per cent of the cases the parents were alive and living together.'3
The data in California are these: For relinquishment or agency adop-
tions, born in wedlock 8.6 per cent, born in wedlock - husband not father
14.1 per cent, born out of wedlock 76 per cent, other 1.2 per cent;' 4 for
independent adoptions, born in wedlock 28.9 per cent, born in wedlock-
husband not father 19.5 per cent, out of wedlock 44.1 per cent. 5
The age of parents at time of birth of child, Califorma statistics show
is. for the relinquishment or agency program, less than 20 years, 29.2 per
cent; less than 25 years, 67.9 per cent; less than 30 years, 86.2 per cent;
less than 40 years, 99.0 per cent; for independent placements, less than
1 One out of four of whom are below the age of sixteen. Ralph Goff, Introduction PRO-
CEEDINGS, INSTITUTE ON UNWED PARENTHOOD, IV (Nov. 1952).
13 CHILDREN'S BuREAu, STATISTICAL SERIES No. 14, supra note 1 at 17
14 Tabulated as to race these data are as follows:
RELINQUISmENT ADOPTIONS: Race of Child by Legal Status, 1953
Total White Other
Legal Status of Child Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total 1,126 I00.0 979 100.0 147 100.0
Born in wedlock
Husband Father 97 8.6 93 9.5 4 2.7
Husband not Father 159 14.1 141 14.4 is 12.3
Born out of wedlock 856 76.0 735 75.1 121 82.3
Other (1) 13 1.2 9 0.9 4 2.7
Not reported 1 0.1 1 0.1 ............
(1) Includes legitimated by 230 c.c., legitimated by marriage and foundling.
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955.
15 INDEPENDENT ADO'TIONS: Legal Status of Child by Person or Agency
Making Placement, 1953
LEGAL STATUS OF CHILD
Born in Wedlock
Husband Hucband Born Out
Placement made by Total Father Not Father of Wedlock Other
Total 3,981 1,150 778 1,753 300
Percent 100.0 28.9 19.5 44.1 7.5
Parent 1,512 603 272 552 85
Relative of parent 147 57 25 51 14
Physician 1,176 190 271 662 53
Attorney 219 47 48 114 10
Friend of parent 301 72 64 144 21
Probation officer 102 53 15 25 9
Out of state agency 66 26 7 30 3
Other welfare agency 130 33 22 56 19
Other 239 43 53 111 32
Not reported 89 26 1 8 54
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20 years, 22.5 per cent; less than 25 years, 57.9 per cent; less than 30 years,
77.3 per cent, less than 40 years 92.1 per cent. 6
In both agency and independent adoptions, roughly two-thirds of the
mothers had resided in California for one year or longer; 29 per cent in
agency cases and 18 per cent in independent cases resided here for less
than a year; and one per cent in agency cases and 11 per cent in indepen-
dent cases were residents of other states or countries. In 97.7 per cent of
agency cases and 86.7 per cent of independent cases the child was born in
California."2
1G RtLNQuiS ENT ADOPTioNs: Age of Parents at Birth of Child, 1953 and 1952
1953 1952
MOTHER FATHER MOTHER FATHER
Age of Parents Number Pct. Number Pct. Number Pct. Number Pct.
Total 1,126 100.0 1,126 100.0 696 100.0 696 100.0
Less than 20 years 329 29.2 139 12.4 232 33.4 78 11.2
20-24 years 435 38.7 346 30.7 257 36.9 246 35.3
25-29 years 206 18.3 285 25.3 132 19.0 162 23.3
30-39 years 144 12.8 210 18.7 65 9.3 121 17.4
40 years and over 5 0.4 70 6.2 5 0.7 34 4.9
Not reported 7 0.6 76 6.7 5 0.7 55 7.9
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955.
INaPvEwnrDr ADoPTioNs: Age of Parents at Birth of Child, 1953 and 1952
1953 1952
MOTHER FATHER MOTHER' FATHER
Age of Parents Number Pct. Number Pct. Number Pct. Number Pct.
Less than 20 years 894 22.5 248 6.2 826 24.1 215 6.3
20-24 years 1,411 35.4 1,007 25.3 1,191 34.7 923 26.9
25-29 years 774 19.4 952 23.9 651 19.0 771 22.5
30-39 years 588 14.8 832 20.9 508 14.8 753 21.9
40 years and over 80 2.0 333 8.4 62 1.8 272 7.9
Not reported 234 5.9 609 15.3 193 5.6 497 14.5
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955.
17 RELINQUISHMENT ADOPTIONS: Birthplace of Child, 1953 and 1952
YEAR
1953 1952
Birthplace Number Percent Number Percent
Total 1,126 100.0 696 100.0
In Califorma 1,100 97.7 680 97.7
Mother resident
Less than 1 year (332) (29.5) (1)- (1)
Mother resident
1 year or longer (768) (68.2) (1) (1)
In another state 16 1.4 10 1.4
Not reported 10 0.9 6 0.9
(1) Not available.
INDEPENDENT ADoI'noNs: Birthplace of Child, 1953
Birthplace Number Percent
Total 2,864(1) 100.0
In California 2,482 86.7
Mother resident, less than 1 year (526) (18.4)
Mother resident, 1 year or longer (1,956) (68.3)
In another state 243 8.4
In a foreign country 71 2.5
Not reported 68 2.4
(1) Includes only cases on which approval was recommended.
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955.
In slightly over half of all cases, those who petition for the adoption of
children are the relatives of the children. One per cent are biological par-
ents of the children, 39 per cent are stepparents, 12 per cent are other
relatives.' 8 The percentage of relatives and non-relatives filing petitions
varies with the birth status of the child. non-relatives are the petitioners
for 69 per cent of the adoptive children born out of wedlock, relatives are
the petitioners for 75 per cent of the adoptive children born in wedlock.' 9
Reflecting the fact that nearly 80 per cent of relative adoptions are by
stepparents and the further fact that children normally do not acquire step-
parents while they are very young, children adopted by relatives are on
the average older than children adopted by nonrelatives. Two-thirds of the
children adopted by nonrelatives were under two years of age at the time
the petition was filed, only one-tenth of those petitioned for by relatives
were below that age. -0
Adoption is not just the indulgence of the rich. Adoptive parents, on
the contrary, are couples with widely varying resources and incomes. In
Califorma of couples petitioning for agency adoptions almost half had
annual incomes of less than $5,000, and about one-fifth less than $4,000.21
18 CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STATISTICAL REPORT No. 14, supra note 1. Table 3 at 13.
19 CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STATISTICAL REPORT No. 14, supra note 1, 7-8.
Adopted children Petitions filed by-
born in wedlock Relatives Nonrelatives
Total-number reported 7,772 2,635
Total-per cent 100 100
Both parents dead 2 3
One parent dead 19 15
Both parents living and together 4 25
Both parents living, marriage broken 70 46
Other and not reported 5 11
20
Petitions filed by-
Age at time of petition Relatives Nonrelatives
Under 6 months 3% 25%
6 months, under 2 years 8 41
2 years, under 6 years 38 22
6 years, under 14 years 40 10
14 years, under 21 years 11 2
CHIiLDREN'S BUREAU, STATISTICAL SERIES No. 14, supra note i, 6.
21 RELINQUISHMENT ADOPTIONS: Annual Income of Adopting Parents, 1953
Annual Income of
Adopting Parents Number Percent
Total 1,126 100.0





10,000 and over 83 7.4
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Petitioners for independent adoptions had higher incomes. Only 3 7 per cent
had incomes under $5,000, 43.9 per cent were in the $5,000 to $10,000
income range and 13.9 per cent had over $10,000.2 In interpreting these
data it must be noted that stepparents are not included, that persons with
available cash can more easily secure children in the black and grey market
and that, even though state and county agencies and judges place more
weight on ability of a couple to manage on its income than on the size of
the income, still couples who faU below a minimum are denied adoptions.
Adoptive parents fall within the following age ranges:
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS: Age of Woman Petitioner by Age of Man
Petitioner at Time Petition was Filed
1953
AGE OF MAN PETITIONER
Total
Age of Woman Less than 20-29 30-39 40-49 50 years No Man Not
Petitioner Number Percent 20 years years years years and over Petitioner Reported
Total ................ 3,981 100.0 .... 430 2,089 1,049 224 44 145
Per Cent ........... 100.0 10.8 52.5 26.4 5.6 1.1 3.6
Less than 20 years .... 6 0.2 .... 4 1 ... .... 1 ....
20-29 years ............. 834 21.0 .... 347 448 36 1 2
30-39 years ....... 2,127 53.4 .... 72 1,484 524 38 5 4
40-49 years .............. 754 18.9 .... 5 148 470 108 .22 1
50 and over .............. 97 2.4 .... .... 4 10 73 10 ....
No woman petitioner 17 0.4 .... 2 4 4 4 .... 3
Not reported ............ 146 3.7 .... .. . 5 .... 4 137
RELINQUISHMENT ADOPTIONS: Age of Adopting Mother by Age of Adopting
Father at Time Petition was Filed
.1953
Age of Adopting Father
Total
Age of 20-29 30-39 40-49 50 and
Adopting Mother Number Percent Years Years Years Over
Total ....................... 1,126 100.0 134 736 246 10
Per Cent .................. 100.0 11.9 65.4 21.8 0.9
20-29 years ...................... 243 21.6 99 137 7
30-39 years ........................ 795 70.6 34 566 190 5
40-49 years ........................ 86 7.6 1 33 48 4
50 and over ....................... 1 0.1 .... .... .... 1
Not reported ...................... 1 0.1 .... .... I ....
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955.










10,000 and over 551 13.9
Not reported 208 5.2
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955.
Thus, though adoptive parents are generally older than the biological
parents who surrender the children for adoption, they are still within the
ages of biological competence to have children. As to those who are non-
relatives, they are usually, however, couples who have attempted biological
parenthood and failed to achieve it. Sometimes adoptive couples have had
stillbirths, miscarriages or abnormal children. Occasionally, a prospective
adoptive mother expresses excessive fear of bearing a child or the husband
an unwillingness to expose his wife to its hazards. It is a basic fact, however,
that couples seldom deliberately choose parenthood by adoption in prefer-
ence to biological parenthood.24 The California Citizens Committee on
Adoption reported that physicians believe that as many as one out of every
eight couples are involuntarily childless.25
The motives for adoptive parenthood are apparently as numerous and
complex as the motives for biological parenthood. Some couples are very
uncomplicated about it: they just want to have children. Others, beset by
emotional difficulties, look on parenthood "as a tool for healing personality
problems adults themselves have failed to conquer." Others view it as a
possible solution to marital discord or wandering affections. Some hope it
will be solace and replacement for a lost child of their own. Others feel a
need for it to place them on an equal footing in their social set. Still others
fall prey to stories that biological parenthood, though before impossible,
often occurs after adoption.2 6 "The desire for adoption," concludes one
writer after reviewing these possible motives, does not necessarily prove
"the desire for children." 
2
Each of the groups of biological parents - unwed mothers, once mar-
ried but now no longer married mothers, parents married and living to-
gether - and the adoptive parents is beset by a complex of problems.
"The term unwed parenthood," says Dr. Bernard, "is a hybrid desig-
nation. The unwed part is sociological and refers to a status that is a viola-
tion of our social institutions. Since unwed parents are a large collection
of individuals whose psychiatric diagnosis is quite removed from the ter-
minology, which is only descriptive of biological and sociological status,
we cannot talk about a single category of people. We find persons in all
the various categories, and having in common only the fact of unwed parent-
hood."28
24 Ruth Michaels Special Problems in Casework with Adoptive Parents, ADoPToN PRX-
CIPLES AND SERVICES, Family Service Association of America 37 (1932)
25 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6 at 18.
216 Id. at 18-19; and Michaels, supra note 24 at 38-39.
27 Ibid.
- DR. VIoLA W BERNARD, Problems Related to Unmarried Parenthood, PRocr.Emos,
INSTITUTE OF UNWED PARENTHOOD 15 (1952).
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With this caution well in mind it still may be possible to say some
things which are often or generally true of the situation of the unwed mother.
Her problem is likely to be partly financial, partly social, partly psychologi-
cal, and partly inexperience.29 She needs money for hospital and doctor's
bills, and for her own support and eventual return to her home community.
Her earning capacity is severely limited first by her pregnancy, then, after
delivery, by the need to care for the child, and, at all times, in many cases,
by her youth and inexperience. Often her parents and other relatives are
29 See generally the PROCEEDINGS, INSTITUTE ON UNWED PARENTHOOD (mineo, SDSW
(1952), LEONTINE YOUNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK (1954), SARA B. EDLiN, THE UNMARRIED MOTHER
IN OuR SocIETY (1954), UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNMARRIED MOTHER, Fam-
ily Serv. Ass'n of America (1947). With particular reference to the social and psychological
aspects of unwed motherhood see, HELENE DEUTSCH, M.D., II PSYCHOLOGY OF WO]fEN, Chap.
10, Unmarried Mothers; Babbette Block, The Unmarried Mother, Puiuc HEALTH NURSING 154
(July, 1951). With particular reference to minority groups see, Annie -Lee Davis, Attitudes
Toward Minority Groups: Their Effect on Social Services for Unmarried Mothers, THE CHILD
(Dec. 1948).
Charles E. Vincent, Instructor in Family Sociology at the University of California, has
suggested the possibility of sampling bias m studies of unwed motherhood. He writes in The
Unwed Mother and Sampling Bias, 19 AMfERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEw 562 (1954), "A pre-
liminary survey of the investigations of unwed motherhood indicated that the majority of the
samples studied have been taken from public institutions, welfare agencies and psychiatric
clinics. This method of sampling has prolonged the picture of the unwed mother as being an
extremely young, poor, uneducated or psychologically disturbed female. This sampling proce-
dure is in part related to the ease with which such groups can be studied. It is also related to,
and in turn reinforces, a like-causes-like approach which tends to regard unwed motherhood
as bad and then emphasizes bad or pathological etiological factors. Historically, the factors
emphasized have ranged from mental deficiency in the 1920's to psychological disturbances at
the present time.
The findings reported in the present paper resulted from a deliberate attempt to sample
unwed mothers who do not go to agencies, clinics or institutions. The data were based on a
71 per cent response from 576 doctors who provided information on 137 unwed mothers de-
livered in private practice in Alameda County, California, during 1952.
The following findings suggest the need for more inclusive samples in studies of unwed
motherhood and raise additional questions for future research. Of the 137 unwed mothers de-
livered in private practice: 83.9 per cent were white; 51.8 per cent were 22 years of age or older;
38.0 per cent had attended or completed college and 34.3, 24.8, and 35.8 per cent, respectively,
of their fathers, mothers and alleged sexual mates had attended or completed college; 60.5 per
cent were employed in professional or white collar jobs or were college students, and only
8.8 per cent were employed in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs; 36.5 per cent of 74 who were
working, received a salary of $251 dollars or more per month, 78.4 per cent of, those who came
from out of the state to have their baby in California had attended or completed college;
50.0 per cent of those who had attended or completed college were mated sexually with a man
seven or more years their senior; 70.0 per cent of those with less than a 12th grade education
were mated sexually with a man the same age or not more than two years their senior; 90.0 per
cent of those who had attended or completed college were mated with an alleged sexual mate
who had attended or completed college.
Occupational association appeared to be operative as a situational factor in some of the
89 cases for which occupational data were available for both the unwed mother and the alleged
sexual mate. Id. at 566-67.
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unable or unwilling to help if she can bring herself to let them know her situ-
ation. In upward of one-third of the cases in California, she is ineligible for
many forms of public and private aid because she is not a resident of the
state; and in many other cases, though a resident of the state, she has left
her residence in small towns and in the country for delivery in an urban
area." Additional obstacles to the availability of financial assistance under
the federal-state Aid to Needy Children program are the necessity to con-
tact parents and the legal requirement that all cases of non-support be re-
ferred to the district attorney for action." Generally inexperienced in the
handling of her own ordinary affairs, let alone affairs of this sort, (40 per
cent are teenagers, 2 5 per cent are below the age of sixteen) largely ignorant
of available alternatives, she welcomes any out compatible with what she
feels to be a need for speed and secrecy Concerned about the future of the
child and her own future in the face of social stigma, confronted with the
awesome experience of childbirth or deep-moving post-natal reactions, dev-
astated by a sense of isolation and depression, she may very well need at
least what one lawyer familiar with the field calls "supportive therapy in a
uniquely personal sense."32 In this period of trauma, without adequate
assurance and help, her decision to surrender her baby Ls likely to be un-
certain, impulsive, fear-ridden and remorseful rather than a considered
judgment made in full knowledge of all the circumstances. Decisions so
made are a fertile source of later regret, repudiation, refusal to execute
legal consent and efforts to regain custody
What about the father of the unmarried mother's child? He is the for-
gotten man. There is almost no literature or research probing his psychology
or his inner life. He has not been dissected statistically in graphs and charts
showing his age, his geographical, racial and religious distribution, his
economic and marital status. It is a common saying among social workers
that, while society metes out punishment to the unwed mother, it is anxious
to have the product of illicit relations to satisfy the demand of sterile
couples for adoptable children. Society is therefore principally concerned
about the adoptive parents, secondarily about the child which meets their
need, and thirdly about the mother of the child and then only because she
is an indispensable incident to getting it. The most conspicuous thing about
30 Leontine Young, The Unmarried Mother- Problems of Financial Support, 35 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 99 (1954). For a discussion of the financial problems of unwed mothers in Califoria
and of other problems of unwed mothers and the lack of services to meet them in California,
see Charles I. Schottland, A Report on Services for Unmarried Mothers in Californm, PRO-
CEEDINGS, INSTITUTE ON UNWED PARENTHOOD 8 (1952).
31 Schottland, ibid at 12, Sister Rosemary Markham, The View of the Social Worker,
PROCEEDINGS, INSTITUTE OF UNWED PARENTHOOD 38 (1954).
32 Edwin J. Lukas, Babies Are Not Vendible or Expendable, 5 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 88, 105 (1950).
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the father is his absence from society's contemplation and from discussions
about the problem of unwed parenthood. He is little more than a biological
datum known inevitably to have been present at an earlier stage but now
primarily only of geneological significance. The obscure position of the
father is probably due mainly to four factors: It is due to the fact that he
may with a fair amount of success deny paternity or by simply disappear-
ing to escape legal liability and social consequences. The mother's bio-
logical function is attended by more conclusive and generally visible evi-
dence of the facts. It is due also to the fact that in our culture social and
sexual mores are different for men than for women. Thirdly, the unwed
mother is often unwilling or unable to identify the father or, in any event,
wishes to have nothing more to do with him. Finally, "the punitive nature
of our laws, court decisions, and official rulings places even the most con-
scientious man immediately on the defensive," an attitude which is "scarcely
conducive to encouraging his interest in the direction of action."'3 But
whatever the reason, the unwed father (some of them may be married but
to other women) plays little part in solving the problems of the unwed
mother or of the child, at least in those cases in which the child finds its
way into adoption channels."
The group of mothers who have been married but who are at time of
delivery, divorced, separated, deserted or whose marriages have been an-
nulled, have legal, financial and psychological problems which may or may
not be different from those of unwed mothers but which are in any event
acutely felt. In many cases, they have only recently gone through the
failure and breakup of their marriages with likely attendant emotional
turmoil. Some with and some without social stigma, they all face the neces-
sity of reorganizing their lives and redetermining their futures. Conflicting
desires and impulses about keeping or surrendering the child are not less
common and intense with them, because they are perhaps older and have
had marital experience, than they are with unwed mothers. Moreover, they
are as likely to be in straightened financial circumstances. Their source of
support is permanently gone, if it was their husband, and at least tem-
porarily interrupted if they were employed. Responsibility of relatives
provisions often stand in the way of their securing public aid. "Few girls,"
writes an agency worker, "separated from their husbands and pregnant
3 3 LEONTINE YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 29 at 132.
34 For brief discussions of the father of the unwed mother's child, see LEONTINE YOUNG,
ibid, Chap. 8; SARA B. ED=, op. cit. supra note 29, Chap. 15, CECIL J. BAmR, ADoP o N
32-42 (1952), DR. VIOLA W. BERNARD, supra note 28 at 15, Weltha M. Kelley, Perspectives-
Past, Present and Future, PROCEEDINGS, INSTITUTE or UNWED PARENTHOOD 40 (1954), Arthur
A. Clinco, M.D., What it Means to be Unwed Parents or the Child of Unwed Parents in South-
ern California, PROCEEDINGS, INSTITUTR OF UNWED PARENTHOOD 8 (1954).
by another man, will consent to have the absent husband contacted for sup-
port, which they know he will refuse. Most girls who have been divorced
are equally adamant about refusing to have their parents contacted. They
have often been independent of their families for years and refuse to appeal
to [them] for help under such circumstances."35 If the husband or former
husband and biological father are not the same, there are added difficulties
in making certain that the child is legally free for adoption. The consent
of the presumed or legal father must be secured or court action must be
taken elimnating the need for such consent.
Married couples who surrender children for adoption even though the
marriage continues and the couple live together have problems which may
be indicated by the reasons given for the surrender" Illness, marital dis-
cord, economic hardship, the child was born just before or just after mar-
riage and is surrendered as an escape from social disapproval, immaturity,
and unreadiness to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. 36 To this list
doubtless should be added cases in which the child was conceived in adult-
ery and occasional cases of complete psychological rejection of the child
by one of the parents.
Nonrelative adoptive parents have many problems, say workers in this
field, peculiar to their condition and their status. "Adoptive parenthood,"
writes one such worker, "is inherently more difficult than biological parent-
hood." The problems that make it so include "coming to terms with in-
fertility, developing a sense of parenthood to a 'ready made' child of other
biological parents, interpreting the adoption to family, friends, community,
and the child himself." 
37
The psychological impact of infertility and adjustment to knowledge
of it are regarded as central issues in determining qualifications for adop-
tive parenthood."8 Infertility is described as "a narcissistic blow with result-
ing emotional trauma." "The sterility itself may of course be an expression
of unconscious rejection of parenthood, and most agencies have ruled out
couples where no organic reason for sterility can be found. Traditionally,
the woman in our society has had a primary function in life - that of
35 Catherine Donnell, Financial Assistance in an Adoption Agency, ADOPTION PRUNCIPLES
AND SERVICES, Family Serv Ass'n of America 32, 33 (1952).
36 Final Report, Citizens Committee, supra note 6 at 14, CHILDREN'S BUREAU STATISTICAL
SERiEs No. 14.
37 Michaels, supra note 24, 42.
38 HELENE DEUTCH, supra note 29, Chap. 11 Adoptive Mothers, particularly p. 397, RUTH
BRENNER, A FOLLOWUP STUDY Or ADOPTIVE FAriLiES, Child Adoption Research Committee,
New York (March 1951), Family Serv. Ass'n of America, supra note 35, FLORENCE G. BROWN,
WHAT DO WE SEEK IN ADOPTIVE PARENTS 1, 2. Ruth Michaels, Special Problems in Case-
work with Adoptive Parents, supra note 24, p.37, Freda M. Kuhlmann and Helen Robinson,
Rorschack Tests as a Diagnostic Tool in Adoption Studies, Family Serv. Ass'n of America,
supra note 10, p.7, 8.
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reproducing and caring for children. If she is sterile and unable to assume
this role, she may feel she is a failure as a woman. Because of the strong
identification that is made between masculinity and the ability to impreg-
nate, the sterile man may be even more threatened than his partner. The
realization of sterility in one or the other of the couple is an experience
that may create serious disturbance in the marital relationship, and also
reactivate feelings of insecurity and inadequacy which may be basic in the
total personality problem of the individual3 9 It is accordingly, important
to know how the prospective adoptive parents have learned to live with
the knowledge of their infertility. Is it still so painful they cannot discuss
it freely? Do they look upon it as a disgrace? Have they reconciled them-
selves to it or do they continue to long for children of their own? Can they
tell the child, their family and friends about adoption or will they feel
impelled to hide their infertility? The answers to thesequestions may well
determine whether the adoptive child will be given a healthy and stcure
family environment, or, on the contrary, "will be only the symbol of the
parents' frustration." 40
If the prospective adoptive parents have reconciled themselves to in-
fertility and are ready to make the best of it, the next problem "inherent
in adoptive parenthood," we are told, is whether they can accept and treat
as their own a child born to others. Can they develop some narcissistic
identification? On the answer to this question will depend whether they can
"relate to him according to his needs, rather than solely out of their own
conflicts." "Adoptive parents may well have their own fears," writes Ruth
Michaels, "both real and neurotic about the child they adopt. Often the
concern they express about his heredity reflects their basic question about
whether the child will ever really be theirs, and their guilt and self-depre-
ciation lead them to wonder what kind of child they deserve. Or they may
protect themselves from anxiety by placing the blame for failure they
expect outside themselves.
"The knowledge that a child was born out of wedlock may reactivate
and intensify the adoptive parents unresolved fears and conflicts about
sexuality. Even if they have positive information about his good back-
ground, they may fear this 'child of lust' (as one man, applying to an adop-
tive agency, put it) and the potentialities that such a child carries - as
aggressor, as rival, as potential delinquent, or as a source of danger and
disgrace." 41  1
30 Kuhlmann and Robinson, id. at 8.
4 0 BROWN, supra note 38 at 2.
41 MCHAEFS, supra note 24 at 39.
From these data, certain conclusions emerge which have an important
bearing on the necessary and desirable aspects of an adoption program.
1. An adoption program cannot stand by itself in independence and
isolation. Adoption is one method for handling the social and personal
problems of some neglected and dependent children. It is only one method
and it is only feasible and desirable for some of the children who do not
have the care and support of parents and other relatives. It must be weighed
in the individual case against alternative methods and to do this effectively
requires that the adoption program be closely associated, if not coordinated
or integrated, with other child welfare programs. In addition, adoption is
one method (and again only one method) of solving the social and personal
problems of the biological and of the adoptive parents and this requires
close association, if not coordination and integration, with programs de-
signed to aid them.
2. A group of children - we cannot accurately estimate the number
but there are ample indications that it is significant - live outside their own
homes and those of relatives, have little or no contact with their biological
parents or either of them, many of whom are supported at the expense of
the public through governmental or private agencies, and yet who are not
free for adoption because of the laws governing consent or other legal
obstacles. Some of these children are not proper subjects for adoption be-
cause they are imbeciles or because of severe psychological, health or per-
sonality conditions. Still others are not wanted for adoption because of
their age, physical handicap or minority racial status. At least as to some
of the rest, however, judicial abandonment proceedings or other proceed-
ings are needed through which the rights of the biological parents may be
terminated and the child freed for adoption. which will adequately safe-
guard the claim of biological parents who have a continuing interest in the
child and present or prospective fitness and ability to care for and rear it;
which will cut off those parental rights and free the child for the care and
upbringing by somebody else when the parents do not have such interest,
fitness and ability; and which will insure that the situation of children
living outside the homes of parents and relatives are reviewed for these
purposes periodically and systematically Administratively, these proceed-
ings must be closely connected with the adoption program so that adoption
may be utilized with maximum ease and effectiveness in those cases in
which it is the best method of handling the child's problem, and both must
be administratively closely connected to other child care programs so that
the latter may be employed when they are appropriate and so that the
overall child care program may achieve the social objectives in view
3. To a major extent, adoption is inseparably connected with the prob-
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lem of the unwed mother, a problem which is intensified by social stigma
and punitive public attitudes, and which consists of a need for money,
shelter, medical and hospital care, for time in which to make a deliberate
decision about keeping or surrendering the child and, if the latter, through
what channels to do it, and for the information and counseling which are
indispensable if the decision is to be both satisfactory and permanent.
4. To a lesser but still considerable extent, adoption is inseparably
connected with the problem of broken marriages, and particularly with
the problem of the mother who once was married, whether to the father
of the child or not, but who is now divorced, separated, deserted or widowed.
Though the elements comprising her problem may vary in emphasis and
in combination, they are essentially the same as those which constitute
the problem of the unwed mother.
5. Still to a lesser extent, adoption is inseparably connected with the
problem of an adulterous offspring in a marriage that continues and in
which the spouse is willing to keep the wayward partner but not the child.
6. Adoption is also connected with the financial, health, psychological
and social approval problems of biological parents who are married and
living together.
7. To the degree to which this is possible, it must be determined
whether the child has conditions of mind, body, or personality - such as
feeblemindedness, incurable mortal ailments, deep-seated psychological or
emotional problems - in existence at the time or foreshadowed for the
future which would indicate that the child could not benefit from or con-
tribute to family life.
8. To the degree that such is possible, selection among adoptive par-
ents - nine of whom must be turned away for every one accepted, except
with respect to hard-to-place children - involves an evaluation of such
comparatively simple factors as economic, social, cultural and moral fit-
ness, and such exceedingly complex factors as: the motivations for parent-
hood; capacity for parenthood, including the capacity to accept and treat
as their own a child someone else has borfie; reaction and adjustment to
knowledge of infertility; the presence of psychological infertility and the
stability of the marriage.
With these various factors in mind, the United States Children's Bureau
has formulated a statement of objectives for adoption programs which has
received wide acceptance: "To protect the child - from unnecessary sepa-
ration from parents who might give him a good home and loving care if
sufficient help and guidance were available to them; from adoption by
persons unfit to have responsibility for rearing a child; and - from inter-
ference after he has been happily established in his adoptive home, by his
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natural parents, who may have some legal claim because of defects in the
adoption procedure.
"To protect the natural parents - from hurried decisions to give up
a child, made under strain and anxiety
"To protect the adopting parents - from taking responsibility for chil-
dren about whose heredity or capacity for physical or mental development
they know nothing; from later disturbance of their relationship to the child
by natural parents whose legal rights had not been given full considera-
tion."42
The extent to which and the manner in which these purposes and fac-
tors have been incorporated into California's adoption program will be
examined in the following sections of this article.
V. The Evolution of the Public Program and Controls
Adoption, that is, the transfer of the legal status of parent and child
from one parent to another, did not exist at the common law, though doubt-
less children were so transferred. Before 1850, some American states by
statute authorized adoption through agreement between the biological and
adoptive parents expressed in a formally executed instrument.1 In 1851,
42 FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, ESSENTIALS OF ADOPTION LAW AND PROCEDURE, CHILDREN'S
BUREAU, PUBLICATION No. 331 (1949). To achieve these objectives, the United States Children's
Bureau recommends the following principles and procedures: (1) The termination of parental
rights is as important as the establishment of new parental ties bv adoption and should be as
securelv safeguarded. (2) Placement for adoption should be made only by an agency authorized
to make such placements bv the State department of public welfare. (3) Adoption proceedings
should be in a court of record having jurisdiction over children's cases, in the home State of the
petitioners for adoption, and preferably in a local community in which they live and are known
and where the child is properly before the court. (4) In every proposed adoption of a child the
court should have the benefit of a social study and a recommendation made by the State depart-
ment of public welfare, or by a local department of public welfare or other public or private
child-placing agency designated bv the State welfare department. (5) Consent to adoption
should be obtained from the natural parents, or, if their parental rights have been legally relin-
quished or terminated, from a person or agency having legal responsibility for the child and the
right to consent to adoption. (6) Court hearings should be closed to the public and the records,
because of their confidential nature, should be protected. (7) A period of residence in the adop-
tive home, preferably for 1 year, should be required before the hearing on the petition, so that
the suitability of the proposed adoption may be determined. (8) In the event a final decree is
not entered, provision should be made for the removal of a child from a home found to be un-
suitable and for his care and guardianship after his removal. (9) Safeguards should be provided
in related laws, such as those affecting relinquishment of parental rights, regulation of child-
placing services, and determination of guardianship and custody of children, to assure the wel-
fare of the child in all such matters as well as in the adoption proceedings and to define the
rights and the obligations of parents. Id. at 3-4.
1 WALTER GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CiTY 239
(Dodd, Mead Co., 1954), Note, Inprovng the Adoption Process: The Pennsylvanma Adoption
Act, 102 U. OF PA. L. Rlv. 759 (1954), Abney v. DeLoach, 84 Ala. 393, 4 So. 757 (1888),
Succession of Vollmer, 40 La. Ann. 593, 4 So. 254 (1884)
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Massachusetts enacted the first law requiring court action. Today, in one
form or another, and with varying degrees of judicial participation, all
American states require judicial proceedings.
In California the Legislature provided in 1872 "The person adopting
a child, and the child adopted, and the other persons whose consent is nec-
essary, must appear before the County Judge of the county where the person
adopting resides, and the necessary consent must thereupon be signed, and
an agreement be executed by the person adopting to the effect that the child
shall be adopted, and treated in all respects as his own lawful child should
be treated." The judge was required "to examine all persons appearing
before him" and "if satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted
by the adoption, he must make an order declaring that the child shall thence-
forth be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the person
adopting." 2 In the case of In re Stevens,3 this system was subjected to a
constitutional challenge on the ground that adoption was a judicial act
which therefore constitutionally had to be performed by a court and could
not be performed by a judge. This contention was easily and sweepingly
dismissed by the State Supreme Court, Thornton, J saying: "As the legis-
lature has full power over this matter, it may invest any person or officer,
or court with the power of receiving, witnessing and declaring the adoption.
It may prescribe what the ceremony shall be, and before whom it is to be
celebrated. It may make the ceremony so simple that its celebration only
reqmres the consent in writing of the parents of the child, and the accept-
ance of such consent by the person desiring to adopt, and filing such paper
with a public officer." 4
In 1880 Civil Code Section 226 was modified to require appearance
before the Superior Court instead of before the county judge.5
In 1905 a petition was required and the word "court" was substituted
for the word "judge," making the order a formal order of the court rather
than an order made by the judge in chambers.6
The theory of the statutes of other states that the parent-child relation-
ship involves something akin to property ownership which could be trans-
ferred -by contractual arrangements between the parties was thus never
fully accepted in California. It was however recognized as a basic under-
lying proposition. In 1893 the State Supreme Court said: "The adoption of
a child under the section of the Civil Code . . is not a judicial proceed-
ing. although the sanction of a judicial officer is required for its con-
2 CALIF. STATS. 1872 ; CAi . Civ. CODE §§ 226, 227.
3 83 Cal. 322, 23 Pac. 378 (1890).
4 Id. at 331, 23 Pac. at 382.
5 CALIF. STATS. c. XLI, p.47.
6 CALIF. STATS. C. CDXV, p.555.
summation. The proceeding is essentially one of contract between the par-
ties whose consent is required. It is a contract of a very solemn nature, and
for this reason the law has wisely thrown around its creation certain safe-
guards, by requiring, not only that it shall be entered into in the presence
of a judge, but also that it shall receive his sanction, which is not to be
given until he has satisfied himself" of certain specified things.7 In Estate
of Sharon in 19188 this language was repeated with approval.9 In Califor-
nia's early statute this notion was given explicit recognition by the require-
ment of an agreement on the part of the adopting parent. To this extent it
remains in our statutory law today Civil Code Section 227 provides that
"the party or parties adopting shall execute or acknowledge an agreement
in writing that the child shall be treated in all respects as the lawful child
of the party or parties." It survives also in the basic premise of independent
adoptions that they are in the nature of a contract between the biological
and the adoptive parents. If the rights and duties appeartaining to the legal
status of parent and child are determined by the laws and the status is
fixed by the order of the judge or the court on petition of the adoptive
parents and their compliance with certain conditions, and if the former
parent-child relationship is terminated by judicial or agency action taken
with the consent of the biological parents, neither of these official actions
gains any force or effect from an agreement between or by the parties or
either of them.
In the early years of the century, the Legislature began to take steps
to subject to public regulation private agencies, organizations and societies
carrying on functions related to or involved in adoption." In 1903, the
Legislature enacted a statute requiring persons conducting a maternity
hospital, lying-in-asylum, or a place for the reception and care of children
to obtain a license from the county board of health. "The keeping of proper
records" was also required and the board of health was authorized to in-
spect the premises and revoke licenses if the "place is being managed,
conducted or maintained without proper regard for the health, comfort, or
morality of the inmates."" It was soon found, however, that this statute did
not adequately regulate the "disposal" of children. In its 1908-10 Biennial
Report, the State Board of Charities and Corrections wrote: "There has
7 In re Johnson, 98 Cal. 531, 538, 33 Pac. 460, 461 (1893)
8 179 Cal. 447, 454, 177 Pac. 283, 286.
9 See also In re Williams' Estate, 102 Cal. 70, 36 Pac. 407 (1894), Estate of McKeag, 141
Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039 (1903).
10 For a history of child-caring institutions in California see Mary Stanton, The Develop-
ment of Institutional Care of Children in Califorma from 1769 to 1925, 25 Soc. SERV. Rv. 320
(1951).
11 CALIM. STATS. c. CCXXXIX, p.317
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developed in this state another abuse of children that should take rank in
its iniquity with white-slave traffic and that is a traffic in babies. Under
the designation of maternity homes, lying-in hospitals, baby homes or baby
farms, there is in existence a class of institutions that traffic in the illegiti-
mate children of unmarried parents. Women who many times move in good
society commit sin, and when compelled to face consequences, retire to the
privacy of one of these places where for an adequate consideration their
shame is covered up and they return again to society with the statement
that they have been taking the rest cure. And what becomes of the babe
born into the world and abandoned by the natural parents at its very
threshold? It is left with the maternity home to dispose of. It will be used,
if possible, to furnish an income to the home where it is born and left, and
is frequently used for purposes of blackmail. It is impossible to get all the
facts concerning these places and this class of cases as all those involved
do their best to cover up and conceal. Occasionally, however, a window is
broken open and the light thrown in." 12
The report recommended that "all persons or societies engaged in the
conducting of maternity homes, lying-in hospitals, baby-homes, or baby
farms, should be compelled to make reports" to the state department "and
obtain from said Board annually a permit to engage in said work. It should
also be made a misdemeanor with adequate punishment for any person,
society, or association, to give away or place out in any home other than
that of the immediate relatives any child unless such permit has been first
obtained ..
In 1911, all child-placing activities, by agencies or individuals, includ-
mg placements for adoption were put under the licensing power of the
State Board of Charities and Corrections;' 3 and, in 1913, boarding homes
and institutions conducted as a place for the reception and care of children,
maternity hospitals and lying-in asylums were added. 4 In 1911, also, it
was provided that parents could relinquish children for adoption by a re-
linquishment for adoption expressed in writing before an officer authorized
to take acknowledgments. 5 In 1913 relinquishment was authorized by a
1 2 STATE BoAnD or CnmuTis AND CoRRECTIoNs, 1908-1910 BIENNIAL REPORT.
13 CALIF. STATS. c. 569, p. 1087. It was made a misdemeanor to engage m such placement
activity or solicit funds therefor without a license.
14 CATar. STATS (1913) c. 69, p. 73.
15 CAm. STATS. c. 569, p.1087 . This provision replaced an 1870 law providing that "The
surviving parent of any half orphan child may surrender all control and authority over such
child to the Managers of said San Francisco Orphan Asylum Society, or of any other orphan
asylum society m this State; and such surrender, made m writing and acknowledged before a
Notary Public or magistrate, shall vest in said Managers as full and complete authority over
such half orphan as they can legally exercise over any orphan children." CALI. STATS. (1870)
c. 234, p. 335.
writing signed before the secretary of a licensed organization or society
engaged in placement of dependent or deserted children."
In 1917, relinquishments for adoption taken by child placement agen-
cies were required to be filed with the State Board.
The next step in the development of the state's adoption program did not
occur for another decade. The law of 1927, however, when it did come,
represented a basic innovation. As 1911-1913 were landmark years in the
public control of private agencies, so 1927-1931 were in the public control
of independent adoptions. In 1927, the Legislature established the prin-
ciple that social investigation is a minimum essential of effective regulation.
The law of 1927 contained these features. It required notice to the State
Department of Public Welfare of the pendency of all adoption petitions.
It called for state department investigation and report as to whether the
dhild was a proper subject for adoption and as to the suitability of the
adoptive home. It provided that all persons whose consent was necessary
should appear personally before the county clerk and sign the consent on
a form supplied by the state department. 8 Before 1927, a petition for
adoption was acted upon by the court without investigation of the condi-
tion and circumstances of the child, the biological parents and the adop-
tive parents. Frequently the petition was filed and the adoption order was
granted on the same day " Consent could be signed before any notary
In 1931 the Legislature provided that consent in independent adoption
had to be signed before an agent of the State Department of Social Welfare
and made it "the duty of the department to ascertain whether the child
is a proper subject for adoption and whether the proposed home is suitable
for the child, prior to accepting consent of a natural parent to the adoption
of the child by the petitioner."' The state department had found that,
under the law as it stood before, "when consent was filed with the petition,
the parent gained the impression that his whole responsibility toward the
child had been severed by such an act, and if during the investigation it
was learned that either the child or the home was not suitable, it was fre-
quently difficult to refer back to the natural parent and to hold him to a
legal responsibility Some parents had gained such an impression of
"' CALIF. STATS. (1913) c. 92, p. 95. In 1921, Civil Code Section 224 was amended to pro-
vide that a relinquishment reciting that the person making it is entitled to sole custody oi the
minor, when duly acknowledged, shall be prima facie evidence of such person's right to sole
custody and sole right to relinquish. CALIF. STATS. (1921) c. 229, p. 307
17 CALIF. STATS. c. 558, p. 770.
1S CALIF. STATS. c. 691, p. 1197 Two bills were introduced in the 1929 session of the Legis-
lature and passed repealing the svstem established in 1927 but they were pocket-vetoed bv the
Governor.
19 REPORT OF TIE ADOPTION SURVEY COMMITTEE 1 (1946)
20 CALIF. STATS. C. 1130, p. 2402.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOUlRNAL [Vol. 6
Mar., 1955] CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTION LAW AND PROGRAMS 303
finality that the child was frequently left in unfit surroundings with the
petitioners leaving no person or agency responsible for the child."'" The
requirement of investigation before departmental acceptance of consent,
not only protected the. adoptive parents by making more certain that they
had an adoptable child, and the child, by making more certain that he was
going to a suitable home, but it also aided the biological parent. She was
necessarily-brought into contact with the state department. She could be
informed of community, financial and other resources available to her.
She was afforded time ,in which to make her decision. She was given op-
portunity and knowledge to consider alternatives in making the placement.
The power of the state department, however, was not unlimited in the
premises. A restriction was placed on the finality of a refusal or failure by
the department to accept a content. In such cases, the parent was author-
ized to appeal to the superior court of the county in which the petition
was filed and the court, after reviewing a report of the department on its
findings, was authorized to allow the signing of consent in open court.
22
The fourteen years following 1931 were characterized by a number of
supplementary additions to the adoption law, some relaxation of -controls,
the testing of various devices, and the repeal and reinstatement of pro-
visions.
In 1935 provision was made for the consent in open court if the state
department did not complete its investigation and make its report within
one hundred and eighty days after the filing of the petition or any extension
of time allowed by the court."s
In 1937, abbrogation of an adoption was authorized if the child de-
veloped insanity, feeblemindedness or epilepsy within five years of the
granting of the adoption petition. 4 In 1939 the court making such an order
was directed to instruct the district attorney or the county probation
officer to take proceedings for the institutional commitment of children
thus left without parents responsible for them.25 Care of the child during
the intervening period was left to the discretion of the court and "liability
2
1 THmiD BIENNIAL REPORT, STATE DEPARTaIENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE, July, 1930 - June,
1932, p. 52.
22 CAL. STATS. C. 1130, p. 2402. In 1931 also the SDSW was directed to give consent m
cases in which "(the) consent [of the natural parent or parents] is not necessary and no agency
licensed to place children for adoption is a party to the petition" if "the child's welfare will be
promoted by the adoption." Calif. Civ. Code Sec. 226[4]. State department consent was also
made necessary when the biological parents resided outside of California and signed their con-
sent before a notary. CALIF. STATS. (1931) c. 1130, p. 2403.
23 CALIF. STATS. c. 563, p. 1656; CALIF. Civ. CODE § 226.
24 CALIF. STATS. c. 336, p. 786; CALI. Civ. CODE § 227b.
25 CALIF. STATS. c. 1102, p. 3035, CALIF. Cirv. CODE § 227b.
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for support was imposed upon the county until he is able to support
himself."
'26
In 1939 it was provided that "The report of the Department of Social
Welfare may be waived by the department in all cases m which a society,
licensed by the Department of Social Welfare to place children in homes for
adoption, is a party or joins in the petitipn for adoption. Such waiver may
be issued by the department at any time, either before or after the filing of
the petition for adoption."27
In 1943 the superior court was authorized to grant an adoption petition
without the consent of the State Department of Social Welfare in those
cases in which its consent is required and is not given if the court deems
that the welfare of the child will be promoted thereby 2
In 1945 substantial new controls were imposed on independent adop-
tions and activities connected with them. It was made a misdemeanor for
any unlicensed person or organization to advertise by any public media
that he or it will place children for adoption.29 This provision was strength-
ened in 1951 by subjecting to the misdemeanor penalty a person who
advertises that he will accept, supply, provide or obtain children for adop-
tion or who so requests or asks for any child or children for adoption.8"
In 1945 Section 2 24q was added to the Civil Code providing "Any per-
son other than a parent or any orgamzation, association, or corporation
that, without holding a valid and unrevoked license or permit to place
children for adoption issued by the State Department of Social Welfare,
places any child for adoption is guilty of a msdemeanor.''
In 1945 consent by parents temporarily outside the state was author-
ized to be signed before a notary and in such cases the consent of the State
Department of Social Welfare (or, later, the county adoption agency) was
made necessary 32
In 1947 placements "for adoption" were specifically mentioned in the
already existing provision in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1620
which, together with Section 1629, make all placements of children a mis-
demeanor when done by any unlicensed person.
3
At the same time in 1945, departmental authority was sharply curtailed
in one important respect. It was made the duty of the State Department of
Social Welfare (or later the licensed county adoption agency) "to accept
26 CALIF. STATS. c. 1102, p. 3035, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 227c.
27 CALIF. STATS. c. 463, p. 1813, CALIF. Civ. CODE § 226.
28 CALIF. STATS. C. 901, p. 2748; CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226.
29 CALIF. STATS. c. 1317, p. 2468; CALIF. CIV CODE § 2 2 4p.
30 CALIF. STATS. c. 638; CALIF. CIV. CODE § 224p.
31 CALIF. STATS., c. 1317, p. 2468.
32 CALIF. STATS. c. 1317, p. 2468; CALIF. Civ. CODE § 226.
33 CALIF. STATS. c. 1363, p. 2914.
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the consent of the natural parents to the adoption of the child by the pe-
titioners," thus reversing the interpretation of Civil Code Section 226 as it
stood earlier that acceptance of consents or in other words the right to
impose conditions governing the acceptance of consents was a matter lying
within the discretion of the department.3 4
In 1947 a third development of top importance took place; and that
year must rank along with 1911-1913 and 1927-1931 in the history of Cali-
forma's adoption program. By the earlier measures, the Legislature had
established state department licensing and supervision of private agencies
and various regulations and controls of independent adoption activity.
Now, the Legislature moved to create public adoption agencies. It author-
ized the state department to license and finance county agencies "to per-
form the home-finding and placement functions specified in subdivision
(b) of Section 1620 of [the Welfare and Institutions Code], to investigate,
examine, and make reports upon petitions for adoption filed in the superior
court in that county, to act as a placement agency in the placement of
children for adoption, and to perform such other functions in connection
with adoption as the State Department of Social Welfare deems necessary,
or to do any of them."35
In 1947 also, in addition to authorizing county adoption agencies under
the license of the State Department of Social Welfare, the Legislature
expanded the supervisory jurisdiction of the state department by bringing
to an end certain adoption placements made by probation officers under
the supervision of the juvenile court. Welfare and Institutions Code Section
551 had permitted the placement of wards of the juvenile court with families
to be members thereof "by legal adoption or otherwise." Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 551 was in obvious conflict with Civil Code Sec-
tion 224 q prohibiting placement for adoption by any unlicensed person
other than the natural parent. The Legislature in 1947 deleted the words
"by legal adoption or otherwise" from Welfare and Institutions Code Sec-
tion 551 and today probation officers may make such adoption placements
only if they have been licensed by the state department as county adoption
agencies under Civil Code Section 225m, Welfare and Institutions Code
Sections 1640-1644. None. of them has been so licensed.36
3 4 CAIF. STATS. c. 1316, p. 2464. Adoption of Parker, 31 Cal.2d 608, 191 P.2d 420 (1948).
35 CAIF. STATS. c. 529; CALIF. Civ. CODE § 225m.
s6 CALIF. STATS, c. 529. In 1947 the Legislature also added provisions that superior court
adoption hearings must be private (CALIF. STATS. c. 529, CALIF. Civ. CODE § 226m) and that
any report filed by the State Department of Social Welfare or by a county adoption agency
recommending denial on the ground that the home of the petitioner is not suitable be imme-
diately referred by the county clerk to the superior court for reviw. (CALIF. STATS. c. 529;
CAF I. Civ. CODE § 226[7].
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The 1949, 1951 and 1953 sessions of the Legislature added only sup-
plementary, minor or corrective provisions to the adoption law
In 1949, it was provided that, once signed, the consent of the natural
parents to the adoption can be withdrawn only with court approval, such
approval to be given only if "the court finds that withdrawal of the consent
to adoption is reasonable in view of all the circumstances, and that with-
drawal of the consent will be for the best interests of the child. "337 The
State Department of Social Welfare or the county adoption agency was
required to appear at such court hearings to represent the child.3s In cases
of independent adoption in which the department or the county adoption
agency recommends denial and in cases in which "the petitioners desire to
withdraw the petition for the adoption or to dismiss the proceeding," the
state department or the county agency were given the duty to recommend
a suitable plan for the child and to appear to represent the child.3 9 Parental
consent was declared unnecessary when a court of another state has freed
the child from the custody and control of the parents, or when the parents
there "voluntarily in a judicial proceeding surrendered right to the
custody and control of such child pursuant to any law of that jurisdic-
tion ", or when the parents have relinquished the child to an adoption
agency in another state.4 °
In 1951 an amendment authorized the court to retain jurisdiction over
a child in an adoption proceeding in cases in which the petition was with-
drawn or dismissed. 4' A three year limit was imposed within which a pro-
ceeding may be brought to vacate or set aside, an adoption decree "on the
ground of any defect or irregularity of procedure in the adoption proceed-
ing." All other actions to set aside adoption decrees were subjected to a
five year statute of limitations.
The 1953 amendments were somewhat more numerous and important.
An agency to which a child is relinquished for adoption was made "respon-
sible for the care of the child" and was given "custody and control of the
child at all times until a petition for adoption has been granted." Agencies
were authorized to terminate "any placement for temporary care, or for
adoption" "any time prior to the granting of a petition for adoption." In
such event, the child was required to be "returned promptly to the physical
'7 CALIF. STATS c. 731, CALIF. CIv CODE § 226a.
38 CALIF. STATS. c. 731, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226a.
39 CALIF. STATS. c. 731, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226b.
4 0 
CALIF. STATS. c. 960; CALIF. CIV. CODE § 224(1)(b), (3).
41 CALIF. STATS. c. 638, CALIF CIV. CODE § 226b.
42 CALIF. STATs. c. 638, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 227d. Also in 1951 CALIF STATS. c. 637, CAL.
Civ. CODE § 226 was amended to permit licensed county adoption agencies as well as the State
Department of Social Welfare to give consent in those cases in which out-of-state parents
signed consent before a notary
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custody of the agency ",43 In those cases in which the court denies the
petition and removes a child from the home of adoptive petitioners but
does not return the child to his parents, the court was directed to "commit
the child to the care of the State Department of Social Welfare or the
licensed county adoption agency for that agency to arrange adoptive place-
ment or to make a suitable plan." In counties not having a licensed adop-
tion agency, the welfare department was designated to act as agent of the
state department to "provide care for the child in accordance with rules
and regulatiofis established by the department."44
Hospitals and maternity homes were required to send the state depart-
ment within forty-eight hours after release of a child to the custody of
anyone other than a relative by blood or marriage the name and address
of the person, orgamzation or corporation receiving the child. The State
Department of Public Health had earlier required such reports as an
administrative order.
Parents who are minors were given the right to relinquish children for
adoption to a licensed adoption agency and such relinquishments were
declared not revocable by reason of minority46 An unmarried, pregnant
minor was empowered to give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical
and surgical care related to her pregnancy, such consent being not subject
to disaffirmance because of minority The consent of her parents was made
unnecessary to secure such care.4
Relinquishments once filed with the State Department of Social Wel-
fare were declared to be "final and binding" and thereafter rescindable
"only by the mutual consent of the adoption agency and the parent or
parents relinquishing the child."
48
The State Department of Social Welfare was authorized to license
county adoption agencies to operate in such other counties in their general
area as the department deems conducive to the effective and efficient ad-
ministration of the public adoption program. 9
VI. Relinquishment or Agency Adoptions
The general provisions of the adoption law apply to relinquishment
or agency adoptions. There are, in addition, specific provisions in the Civil
and Welfare and Institutions Codes which apply only to agencies. Section
1620 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides: "No person, associa-
43 CALIF. STATS. C. 1122, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 224n.
44 CALIF. STATS. C. 1343, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226c.
45 CALIF. STATS. C. 1491, VELT. & INST. CODE § 1620.5.
46 CALIF. STATS. c. 1220; CALIF. CIv. CODE § 226[10].
47 CALIF. STATS. C. 1654, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 34.5.
48 CALI. STATS. C. 1391, CALIF. CV. CODE § 224m.
4 9
CALIF. STATS. C. 1342; WELF. & INST. CODE § 1640.
tion, or corporation shall, without first having obtained a written license
or permit therefor from the State Department of Social Welfare or from an
inspection service approved or accredited by the department:
"(a) Maintain or conduct any institution, boarding home, day nursery,
or other place for the reception, or care, of children under sixteen years of
age, nor engage in the business of receiving or caring for such children,
nor receive nor care for any such child in the absence of its parents or
guardian, either with or without compensation.
"(b) Engage in the finding of homes for children under sixteen years of
age, or place any such child in any home or other place, either for temporary
or permanent care or for adoption.
"The provisions of subdivision (a) do not apply to any hospital or
establishment holding a license in good standing issued under the provisions
of Chapter 2 or Chapter 3 of Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code.
However, where a hospital or establishment holding such a license from
the State Department of Public Health provides services not incidental to
its primary purpose, the provisions of subdivision (a) continue to apply
to the hospital or establishment in respect to such additional services."
Section 1640 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorizes the State
Department of Social Welfare to license county agencies "to perform the
home-finding and placement functions specified in subsection (b) of Sec-
tion 1620 of this Code, to act as a placement agency in the placement
of children for adoption, to accept relinquishments for adoption, and to
perform such other functions in connection with adoption as the State
Department of Social Welfare deems necessary, or to do any of them."
Under Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 1623 and 1624 licenses
issued to public or private adoption agencies may not continue indefinitely
or be made automatically renewable; they "expire twelve months from
date of issue." Sweeping rule-making and inspection powers are vested in
the State Department of Social Welfare by Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 1621. Thereunder the department may "make such rules and regu-
lations as it deems best for the government of any institution or for the
performance of any service" specified in Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 1620 and may "inspect and examine any such institution, home, or
place, or the performance of any such service." Civil Code Section 224m
authorizes parents to relinquish their children to a licensed adoption agency
by a written statement signed before two subscribing witnesses and ac-
knowledged before an authorized official of the agency By the same section,
such relinquishment is made of no effect whatsoever until a certified copy
is filed with the State Department of Social Welfare, after which it is final
and binding and may be rescinded only by the mutual consent of the adop-
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tion agency and the parent or parents relinquishing the child. Civil Code
Section 224n grants to the agency rights of custody and control of children
so relinquished to it and imposes on it responsibility for the care of such-
children until a petition for adoption has been granted. Civil Code Section
224n also empowers the agency, at its discretion, to terminate any place-
ment for adoption at any time prior to the granting of a petition for adop-
tion and, upon such termination, requires that the child "shall be returned
promptly to the physical custody of the agency." Civil Code Section 226
says the state department "may" waive the report and recommendation
required of the department or county adoption agencies in all cases (except
stepparent cases) in which a licensed agency "is a party or joins in the
petition for adoption."
Pursuant to these provisions and to the license and rules issued by the
State Department of Social Welfare, adoption agencies, public and private,
have the following functions and duties: to accept parental relinquishments
of children for purposes of adoption; to take the custody and control of
children so relinquished and to assume responsibility for their care until
they have been adopted; to find homes for children relinquished to them
and to place children in such homes for adoption; to share responsibility
with the adoptive parents prior to adoption for children placed with them;
to withdraw the children from prospective adoptive homes in which they
have been placed and to regain physical custody of them if developing or
newly discovered elements in the child or the home make such action ad-
visable; to join with the adopting parents in the petition of adoption.
The functions and duties assigned by the Civil and Welfare and Insti-
tutions Codes to the State Department of Social Welfare with respect to
adoption agencies are: to grant licenses to public and private agencies and
to make a redetermination about their issue annually; to exercise the in-
spection and rule-making functions and thereunder to issue such regu-
lations as "it deems best"; through the licensing and rule making powers,
to supervise the administration of adoption agencies; to accept relinquish-
ments for filing ;through its agents, the county adoption agencies, or di-
rectly through its own staff, to report and recommend to the court on
adoption petitions or to issue a waiver of such reports and recommendations.
The detailed and meticulous way in which the state department has
utilized its statutory powers and carried out its statutory duties can be seen
from a glance at the department's Manual of Adoption Policies and Pro-
cedures. In that manual the regulations dealing with the principles to be
applied and the services to be rendered by adoption agencies are extensive.
Detailed consideration is given and standards laid down for agency treat-
ment of the biological parents, the child and the adoptive couple.
The agency must proceed upon the assumption that, in our culture and
under our laws, the biological parents have the right to custody and con-
trol of children born to them and along with it the responsibility for their
support, care and upbringing. The surrender of that right and that respon-
sibility should not occur lightly or hastily It should not occur at all under
the emotional stresses connected with childbirth, in the plight often ex-
perienced by the unmarried mother, prodded or compelled by temporary
emergencies, or made necessary by poverty or straitened financial cir-
cumstances. Consequently, when they employ the agency method of adop-
tion, biological parents must be counseled as to the alternatives available
to them, must be put in contact with agencies which may be able to give
them financial help if that is what they need and, if there are such agencies
in the community, must be encouraged to consider the welfare of the child
as well as their own welfare, and must be given time for a deliberate de-
cision. The agencies, says the Adoption Manual, shall adhere to these
principles in carrying out all child placement functions: "A child's own
home and family are the natural setting in which the child's social and
personality growth normally occur and his own home and family are a
basic right of each child. The child's own family should be assisted in
every possible way to meet the child's needs in his own home. Primary
emphasis shall be placed upon skillful and understanding professional serv-
ices to parents" and a child should be accepted for adoption study and
placement "only after efforts to bring about favorable conditions within
the home for normal development have been unsuccessful."' Accordingly,
the agencies are required to provide "adequate services to natural parents,
including counseling, referral to other agencies when indicated," and
to see "that help is given to parents in thinking through and making the
best plan for the child." 2 The agency may accept a relinquishment only
after determining" "(a) That the parents have come to the decision to sur-
render him with knowledge that all ties will be permanently severed with
the surrender, full awareness of all the implications, and with knowledge
of other resources available to them. (b) That adoption is for the child's
best interests. (c) That the child is legally free for adoption. (d) That the
child is a proper subject for adoption. No relinquishment can be accepted
before the child is born or while the mother is still in the hospital." 3 A study
of the natural parents must be made which includes: "The history and
family background of each, their marital status, education, occupation,
citizenship, health - physical and mental - religion and religious prefer-
I ADOPTION MANUAL § 2420-00-11-1.
2 ADOPTION MANUAL § 2420-11-2.
3 ADOPTION MANUAL §2420-11-2.
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ences for the child, temperament and personality "4 The relatives. of the
parents, i.e.,.their parents and siblings, also must be studied to determine
educational and occupational patterns in the family and the presence of
any unusual illness, physical or mental, "or nervous defects, epilepsy,
feeblemindedness, tuberculosis, diabetes, eczema, or allergies, commitments
to hospitals . or prisons." 5
With respect to the child himself, the manual declares "the focus of the
agency shall be on finding homes for children for whom adoption appears
to be the best plan, rather than on providing children for applicants." 6
The agency accordingly, is required to place "special emphasis on the study
of the individual child and his needs," so that "it may select the home
which will offer the best potentialities for his full development."17 That
study must include: birth certificate or other verified information estab-
lishing the child's identity; complications of pregnancy and birth and the
condition of the child at birth, secured from the physician attending de-
livery; psychometric and psychiatric reports if these are indicated by
observation of the child or knowledge of his background, progress of the
child's growth and development; attention to hereditary factors in the
maternal and paternal histories; "the economic and social adjustment of
the immediate relatives;" and the behavior of the child "as a knowledge of
characteristic reactions and his responses are important guides in selecting
4 ADopTioN MANUAL § 2420-11-2 and § 2400-00.
5 ADolIo.N MANUAL § 2440-00. The time it takes to do all this can be seen from the follow-
ing table.
RELiNQuiSHmENT ADOPTIONS: Elapsed Time between Date Parent Accepted for Study
and Date Child Legally Freed, by Type of Adoption Agency- 1953
TYPE OF AGENCY
Total Public Agency. Pnvate Agency
Elapsed Time Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total 1,126 100.0 591 100.0 535 100.0
Less than 1 month 103 9.1 68 11.5 35 6.6
1 month, less than 3 months 386 34.4 204 34.5 182 34.0
3 months, less than 6 months 418 37.1 183 31.0 235 43.9
6 months and over 219(1) 19.4 136(1) 23.0 83 15.5
(1) Includes 7 cases for which elapsed time was not reported.
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955
The median time involved in work with the natural parent up to relinquishment is about
the same for both public and private agencies-a littie more than three months. Public agencies
showed a larger proportion of children relinquished (or otherwise legally freed) m less than
three months than did private agencies. However, the private agencies show a larger proportion
legally free within six months of study and a smaller proportion extending beyond six months.
These data suggest that public agencies may take relinquishments more readily than private
agencies in early periods of work with the parent. On the other hand, private agencies obtain
more relinquishments within the six-month period.
6 ADOPTION MANUAL §2420-00.
7 ADoPTION MANUAL § 2420-00.
the right family for the child, estimating his aggressiveness or timidity,
sociability or seclusiveness, adaptability, emotional security ,8
In prescribing agency relations with and services to adoptive parents,
the Adoption Manual first says that no child may be placed in an adoptive
home until all of the necessary relinquishments have been secured and
filed with the State Department of Social Welfare and it has been deter-
mined that the child is adoptable. It then requires a thorough investigation
of the prospective adoptive parents "to determine their fitness as parents
and the suitability of their home for the particular child." 9 The agency
must keep a list of approved homes sufficiently large to provide wide choice
from which to select the home best meeting the needs of the individual
child. In selecting the home, the agency is required to give consideration
to the age of the prospective adoptive parents, their health, mentality,
personality, character, religion, cultural background and status, education,
financial security, standard of living, marital status, harmony of home life,
understanding of children and motives for adoption.10
Adoptive homes cannot be approved, if the application is made by a
single person-widowed, divorced, or unmarried, if the application involves
a placement commitment of a particular child which does not leave the
agency free to place the child elsewhere if it deems that in his best interest;
if any person in the home has a physical or mental condition which would
be damaging to the child, impair the ability of the parents to care for it,
or indicate that one of them does not have a normal life expectancy; "if the
family income, financial resources, and past and present employment are
such as to indicate inability to provide adequate standards of health and
education and opportunities for normal development.""
If the applicants are not citizens of the United States or the woman is
more than forty and the man more than forty-five years of age (and they
8 ADOPTION MANUAL § 2430-00. In almost half of the relinquishment adoptions completed
in 1953, the children were placed within three months after being accepted for care and three-
fourths were placed within six months.
RELINQUISHMENT ADOPTIONS: Elapsed Time between Date Child Accepted for Care
and Date of Placement - 1953
Totwi
Elapsed Time Number Percent
Total 1,126 100.0
Less than I month 44 3.9
1 month, less than 3 months 484 43.0
3 months, less than 6 months 305 27.1
6 months and over 293 26.0
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Feb. 1955
9 ADOPTION MANUAL § 2420-00.
10 
ADOPTION MANUAL § 2420-00-HI-2 and § 2450-00.
1 1
ADOPTION MANUAL § 2460-00.
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are applying to adopt an infant) the application will normally be denied,
unless the agency has special need for the home."2
The manual provides that the racial background of the child and adopt-
ing parents "should be similar" and that the religious faith of the adoptive
parents "shall be" the same as that of the child or his biological parents.
An exception to this requirement can be made "only in accordance with
the expressed wishes of the parent or parents.""' "The personality, tem-
perament, education, intelligence and cultural level, stature and coloring
of the adoptive parents shall be considered in relation to the personality,
temperament, physical appearance, coloring, cultural background, and
potential mental ability of the child." 14
Provision is made for a supervised interim period between placement
and adoption, usually one year.'5
The identity of the adoptive parents may not be revealed to the natural
parents. Adoptive parents may be told the names of natural parents at the
time of adoption.
6
The extensive regulatory system thus established seems on the whole
reasonably well adapted to the achievement of the objectives of the pro-
gram. True, as I shall indicate in a moment, there are serious questions
about various provisions, but these are administratively correctable and
in any event, however important, are confined to a relatively narrow area.
Outside of that area, the administrative rules and requirements are de-
signed to impel a searching inquiry into factors and a determination based
upon tests that have a direct bearing upon the protection of the interests
of the biological parents, the child and the adoptive couple.
The emphasis upon discussions with the biological parents, upon serv-
ices to them, upon assisting them to contact their community facilities and
resources, upon not taking relinquishments until after the mother has left
the hospital, tends to make as certain as precautions can that the child is
not unnecessarily separated from his biological parents, that their decision
to relinquish him is made with knowledge of alternatives open to them,
that they have had aid, time and opportunity to consider all the factors,
that they are aware of the consequences and finality of the relinquishment.
The marital status of the biological parents, their previous marriages and
divorces, must be discovered in order to determine whether all necessary
relinquishments have been secured. Ancestral health, mental and physical,
past hospital commitments, and diseases endured may have an important
12 ADPnoN MANUAL § 2460-00.
13 ADopoN M UAL § 2460-00.
14 Ao onON MANUAL § 2460-00.
15 ADopInoN MAruAL § 2475-00.
16 ADOpn'oN MANUAL § 2420-00.
bearing on the health of the child, his mental and physical susceptibilities
and characteristics and perhaps even his temperament. With respect to the
child itself, certainly establishment of its identity, knowledge of the con-
ditions of pregnancy and birth, awareness of hereditarily transmissable
factors and observation of the child itself - with psychometric and psy-
criatric studies only if the foregoing factors indicate that these are desirable
- all of these are necessary if the adoptability of the child is to be deter-
mined and an adoptive couple selected in the light of his particular needs.
The fitness of the adoptive couple and the suitability of their home can
only be assessed if there is an investigation of their age, health, mentality,
personality, character, financial security, standard of living, marital status,
harmony of home life, understanding of children, and motives for adoption.
If single persons were accepted, the child would grow up without the ad-
vantages of a father or mother, as the case might be, or, in the event the
adoptive parent should marry, without a determination of the fitness of
the spouse as a parent. Health conditions damaging to the child or impair-
ing the adoptive parents' ability to care for it, and below-minimum financial
security and income will not be contested as conditions properly precluding
approval of an application.
The propriety of considering these various factors in the situation and
make-up of the biological parents, the child and the adoptive couple, and
the emphasis given to them are not open to serious challange. Serious ques-
tions, however, do arise as to the relevance or weight of other factors treated
in the Adoption Manual with the same or greater emphasis.
What is the relevance of educational or occupational patterns of the
biological ancestors or of the cultural background and present education
of the adoptive parents? Even granting that bright children should be
placed with bright parents, educational patterns among the biological
ancestors are not any necessary measure of the child's mtelligance; nor is
the lack of cultural and educational status any test of the educational
aspirations adoptive parents may have for their adoptive children. To some
extent, the Adoption Manual rules were framed to apply not only to adop-
tion placements but also to other placements. Cultural and educational
matching of biological and foster parents may be important in the case of
older children temporarily placed with foster parents and presently to
return to their biological parents. In such cases too great a cultural and
educational difference may result in an adverse reaction on the part of the
child either to the foster home or later to the biological home. Moreover,
these considerations are particularly emphasized in the manual in the re-
quirements for study of the two sets of parents and the child. But they are
not confined to the temporary foster home placement or to the study re-
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quirements; and a policy of matching cultural, educational and, particu-
larly, occupational backgrounds of biological and adoptive parents, at
least when the adoption placement is of a very young child, is in a sense
a contradiction of the ideal of a free society that individuals will not be
tied to their ancestral place in the world but will have their station deter-
mined by their individual merits. A bright child, if his intelligence can be
determined by the time of placement, might well be placed with a profes-
sional family though he comes from a long background of poverty and
ignorance; and, vice-versa.
Citizenship is another factor given far more weight than it can properly
claim in the light of the purposes of the adoption program. There are cir-
cumstances in which citizenship should be considered. When, for example,
it has a bearing on the opportunity of the adoptive couple to earn a liveli-
hood or on their necessity to move out of the community before adoption
is completed. Outside of these occasional circumstances, what is the sig-
nificance of the citizenship of the biological or adoptive parents to the hu-
man and social purposes in an adoption program? The child is in no less
need of a home because his biological parents were aliens; and the fact
of alienage may not affect in the slightest the capacity of a prospective
adoptive couple to meet the needs of the particular child. Yet the Adoption
Manual does not establish citizenship as a criterion to be considered in
appropriate circumstances. It provides for the automatic rejection of appli-
cations of adoptive couples who are not citizens unless the agency has
special need for the home.
17
Finally, what about race and religion? The administrative identity of
religion requirement is mandatory It is thus far more rigid and sweeping
than the statutes in many states which permit exceptions "when it is not
practicable" to place children with adoptive parents having their religion
or that of their biological parents." What is the purpose of this mandatory
requirement? Is it related to the best interests of the child?
It is significant that the requirement applies to children of all ages, to
older children with definite religious consciousness and preferences as well
as to the new-born infant. To place an older child with fixed religious com-
mitments in a family of a different religion may result in emotional dis-
turbance to the child and a bad home situation. No such consequences can
follow from any placement of a chlld who is too young to have received
religious instruction. Even in the case of the older child there may be in-
stances in which he connects his past religion with misfortune and in which
17 AopoN MVANUA § 2460-00.
18 Note, Religzous Factors in Adoption, 28 I'DiANA LJ. 401 (1953). Note, Religion As a
Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody 54 CoL. L.R. 376 (1954).
it would be desirable therefore to put him in a household of a different
faith. 9 Matching the religion of the adoptive parents and the child, if the
child himself actually has a religion may very well be in the best interests
of the child, but even in this situation, religion is only one factor among
many others, no one of which should be automatically controlling if the
best interests of the child are to be paramount. When very young children
are involved, any requirement of identity of religion between biological
and adoptive parents cannot be founded on any consideration of the best
interests of the child and an automatic requirement may be very detri-
mental to them. If the sect is a small one, there may be no suitable adoptive
couples, and, even if the religion is a major one in the community, the
requirement reduces the number of available adoptive couples and there-
fore the selection.
The purpose of the requirement, especially in its automatic form, one
must conclude, is to fulfill church doctrine, not to promote the secular wel-
fare of the child. It is in effect a state-enforced recruitment or maintenance
of church membership provision applicable to the offspring of church mem-
bers. Moreover, the California rule does not leave enforcement to parental
declarations about church affiliation. The Adoption Manual provides. "For
all applicants it is desirable to have as one reference the mimster or pastor
of the church attended by the applicants. For applicants who are members
of the Catholic church the agency shall obtain a statement from their parish
priest or the local Catholic welfare bureau regarding the catholicity of the
applicants."'
Can this state policy and implementing procedure stand in the face of
Government Code Section 8400 providing that: "The inclusion of any
question relative to an applicant's race or religion in any application blank
or form required to be filled in and submitted by an applicant to any depart-
ment, board, commission, officer, agent, or employee of this State is pro-
hibited" and made a misdemeanor. Should this policy and procedure stand
in the face of the policy laid down in Federal and State constitutions guar-
anteeing freedom of religion and prohibiting religious tests.2 Can it stand
in our general system of separation between church and state historically
impelled, judicially implemented and of as much importance to the church
as to the state? The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently
held, and the United States Supreme Court demed certiorari without
opinion, that a less drastic identity of religion clause in the laws of Massa-
chusetts did not violate the First Amendment of the United States Consti-
19 For an example see Religious Factors in Adoption, Id. at 405, n.27.
20 ADOPTION M.wDAL §§ 2450-00-C-10.
2 1 U. S. CONST. AmmND. I, CALIF. CONST. Art. I, § 4.
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tution or the freedom of religion clauses of the Massachusetts constitution.
"All religions," said the court, "are treated alike. There is no 'subordina-
tion' of one sect to another. No burden is placed upon anyone for mainte-
nance of any religion. No exercise of religion is required, prevented or
hampered."'  It may be that the danger from state support of churches is
reduced or eliminated by a constitutional requirement of equal treatment
of all sects but the wall of separation doctrine precludes such support even
though equally distributed; precludes above all else, one would think, a
maintenance of membership or recruitment provision enforced by a relig-
ious test upon adoptive couples implemented not by the voluntary state-
ments of the adoptive couple but by a variety of references to the religious
establishment including a formal certificate.
Moreover, the role attributed in California to the biological parent in
this arrangement - permitting her to suspend the requirement and imply-
ing that it is controlled by her wishes is oddly in conflict with the total
surrender of parental rights and control explicit in a relinquishment.
The administrative rule with. respect to race is stated in terms of a
general policy rather than as an automatic mandate. Is the justification for
this policy founded in the best interests of the child? If a child is con-
spicuously different racially from his adoptive parents, does this have ad-
verse emotional and psychological effects on the child. Is there a well-
established scientific answer to this question? The answer may depend,
one might suppose, on the context of racial groups and attitudes in the
community. If so, or in any event, should the racial element not be left to
evaluation in the individual case? Should the choice not rest primarily with
the adoptive couple? Should this question not be considered, too, in the
light of the fact that children belonging to minority races are hard to place;
that there is an excess of minority-race children over couples of their own
race wishing to adopt them. Finally, in a state whose Government Code
contains Section 8400 and whose Supreme Court has struck down a law
forbidding racial intermarriage on grounds that it was constitutionally
repulsive,24 and in a nation whose Supreme Court only recently has held
that the Constitution will not tolerate racial segregation in the schools 25
22 Petitions of Goldman, 54 A.S. 745, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954) ......... U.S ......... (1955). The
Massachusetts statute provided: "In making orders for adoption, the judge when practicable
must give custody only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. Mass. Gen.
Laws c. 737, Sec. 3. In this case the mother and father were both Catholic. The petitioners were
Jewish. The children were transferred when they were two weeks old. The mother consented
to having the children raised in the Jewish faith. The trial court found that it was practicable
to place the children with Catholics and denied the petition.
2 3 1d. at 54 A.S. 751, 121 N.E.2d 846.
24 Perez v. Sharp, 93 Cal. App.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
25 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
and which has long declared distinctions based on race "odious to a free
people,"2 6 can it be constitutional or proper policy for an admimstrative
agency of the state to declare, however mildly, that as a general rule chil-
dren should be placed for adoption only with families of their race?
The questions here suggested with respect to adoption principles are
sufficiently serious at least to call for a searching departmental reexamina-
tion of the relevant sections of the Manual of Adoption Policies and Pro-
cedures. Just such a reexamination is currently in progress and a new
manual is in course of preparation.
The importance of leaving these matters in the hands of the admrnis-
trative agency rather than settling them by legislation is very great. Not
only is overall review and revision more feasible administratively than
legislatively but, as knowledge and techniques improve in the field, spe-
cific adjustments can more easily be made. Most important of all is the
need for flexibiltly and individualization. Generally, the weight to be at-
tributed to any particular element should depend on what other elements
are present in the case and how it combines with them. These matters should
not be determined by automatic formulas, and, while the elements that
should be considered may be listed, (and even here science and experience
will suggest additions and deletions from time to time), they cannot be
prescribed by mandatory rule. Only very rarely should any one factor be
made decisive in all cases, regardless of individual variations, by a fixed and
rigid rule. Perhaps oftener it might be proper to ordain the irrelevancy
of a factor. A flexibile, evaluative and constantly adjusting process such
as this is more suitably left to the administrative operation and discretion
of the State Department of Social Welfare than controlled by legislative
regulation. Adoption standards and principles are to some extent a matter
of social and community mores, habits and beliefs. They are to some extent
the product of medical and psychological knowledge and investigation.
They are to some extent the product of the common knowledge and experi-
ence of workers in the field. But whatever the source, they are much more
a matter of discovery and development than of legislative fiat.
Within this statutory and administrative framework, there has been a
phenomenal growth in the number of public and private adoption agencies
since 1947 Before that date, there were only two such agencies in existence
in the whole of California. The Children's Home Society, formed in 1891
and still operating; and the Native Sons and Daughters Central Committee
on Homeless Children, started in 1909 and ended in 1947 Today there are
26 Hirabayashi v United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 1385 (1947)
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sixteen public adoption agencies"7 - all county welfare departments -
and nine private.2 The following table shows the year-by-year increase in












State Department of Social Welfare Annual Report, 1955
There was nearly a twenty per cent increase in the number of children ac-
cepted for study (from 2614 to 3109) from the fiscal year 1952-1953 to
1953-1954; and a thirty per cent increase in the number of children placed
(from 1338 to 1746) In 1953-1954, sixty-two per cent of the children ac-
cepted for pre-placement study and sixty per cent of the children placed
by agencies were accepted and placed by county agencies.
The special merit of the agency system, private and public, is that it is
better geared than any other to the protection of the multiple interests
involved - those of the child, the biological parents, the adoptive couple
and the community Even if, as the writer has argued, some of the adminis-
trative rules and requirements are unfounded, unwise or unconstitutional
these only detract from, they do not destroy, the major features and benefits
of the program. Biological parents are given counsel, aid and time. Since
roughly three-quarters of the mothers are unmarried, special attention is
paid to problems connected with out of wedlock births as they bear upon
the decision to retain or give up the child. Perhaps the greatest evidence
of the importance of this process is the fact that more than forty-five per
cent of the mothers who come to adoption agencies in the end do not relin-
27 San Diego, licensed 1949; Fresno, licensed 1949; Tulare, licensed 1949; Alameda, licensed
1949; Stanislaus, licensed 1950; San Francisco, licensed 1950; Contra Costa, licensed 1950; San
Mateo, licensed 1950; San Bernardino, licensed 1951, San Luis Obispo, licensed 1952; Sacra-
mento, licensed 1952; San Joaqum, licensed 1954, Solano, licensed 1955.
28 Of the nine private agencies placing children for adoption, four are specialized agencies
limiting their services to adoptions. They are: The Children's Home Society of California,
1891, The Adoption Institute, Inglewood, 1948; The Holy Family Adoption Service, Los
Angeles, 1949; The Infant of Prague Adoption Service, Fresno, 1953. The remaining five pro-
vide adoption service as a part of their child placing or institutional programs. They are:
Homewood Terrace, San Francisco, adoption license 1949; Vista Del Mar Child Adoption
Service, Los Angeles, adoption license 1949; Catholic Social Service of the Archdiocese of San
Francisco, adoption license 1952, The Family and Children's Agency of San Francisco, adoption
license 1952; Edgewood, San Francisco, adoption license 1954.
quish their children for adoption. 9 The mothers who do decide on relin-
quishment are more likely to have reached a decision that.they can live
with permanently The direct benefits of agency service to the child are
these: It makes certain that his separation from his biological parents is
necessary It provides him with care and supervision until he is placed for
adoption. It studies his personality, heredity, aptitudes and physical and
mental equipment to determine the kind of home he needs. From among
available couples, it seeks to select the one best able to give him what he
needs. It retains responsibility for him until it is satisfied that adoption is
right for him. The agency serves the adoptive parents. by giving them a
child which is adoptable, i.e., not feebleminded or having other defects of
a serious nature; by giving them a child whose needs they are not only able
but especially qualified to meet; by giving them every assurance that the
child is legally free for adoption and that all necessary relinquishments
have been procured, by concealing their identity from the biological par-
ents and thus protecting them against harassment and future efforts to
regain custody and control, by supplying them with information about the
child's background which will be helpful in his upbringing; by aiding them
in making adjustments and meeting problems which may arise in the period
after the child has been placed with them and before adoption, and by
joining with them in the adoption petition.
It may well be that these various protections are not always or com-
pletely achieved. There are inescapable limitations on the number and
quality of staff. There are errors of judgment and interpretation of data.
The balancing of the interests involves weighing imponderables. In the
end, too, psychology and psychiatry still have much to learn and to reveal
about the nature of man and the particular problems of these groups, even
if case workers generally were masters of existing knowledge in these areas.
Within all of these conceded limitations, however, the agency system does
operate upon a principle of the evaluation and protection of the interests
involved and it succeeds with a reasonable degree of satisfaction in a high
percentage of the cases. In only one per cent of agency cases are there
denials or dismissals of the adoption petition.
The McDonald Case
In the Matter of the Adoption of Patrici McDonald,30 handed down
October 15, 1954, the State Supreme Court rendered a decision bearing
29This 45 per cent probably includes mothers from whom relinquishments are not taken
for reasons other than a deliberate and careful decision on the part of the mother not to relin-
quish the child. The agency may find that the child is not legally free for adoption or that the
child is not a proper subject for adoption. These reasons too, however, have an appropriate
bearing on the importance of pre-surrender discussions with the mother.
3o In re Adoption of McDonald, 43 A.C. 453, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
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heavily on the responsibility and control of agencies in matters affecting
the adoption of children relinquished to them and particularly on the role
of such agencies vis-a-viz the courts. The precise issue was whether the
agency must approve the adoption of a child relinquished to it and placed
by it before the court can grant a petition for adoption.
The agency had placed a child relinquished to it with an adoptive
couple three weeks after its birth. Eight months after placement, the adop-
tive father committed suicide. The agency demanded the return of the
child. The adoptive mother refused to surrender it and filed a petition for
adoption in the superior court. The court held that the consent or approval
of the agency was not necessary and granted the petition as in the best
interests of the child.
The State Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, con-
cluding "not only that no requirement of consent by the agency can reason-
ably be implied from the code sections - Civil Code 221, 224, 224m and
226 - but that the court is expressly empowered thereunder if it deems
the welfare of the child will be promoted by the adoption, to grant the
petition without such consent."'" The language so "expressly" empowering
the court was identified as occurring in paragraph 11 of Civil Code Section
226. The court also relied on confirmatory inaction by the 1953 Session of
the Legislature and on an argument from the general purpose and character
of the adoption law. It particularly rejected the contention that the agency
which has received a relinquishment stands in the same position as the
parents of the child, with the same right to withhold consent to adoption;
and the further contention that if the power to consent is denied the agency
the exclusiveness of its placement function under Civil Code Sections 224p
and 224q and Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1629 will be sub-
verted. It completely ignored the argument, pressed upon it with great
vigor,3- that a long standing administrative construction - supported by
rulings of the Attorney General and concurred in by the Legislature which
reenacted the statute with knowledge of the construction - required such
consent, presumably on the ground that administrative constructions should
only be given weight if the statutory language is not clear.
Paragraph 11 of Civil Code Section 226, the key to the court's opinion,
states: "If for a period of 180 days from the date of filing the petition, or
upon the expiration of any extension of said period granted by the court,
the Department of Social Welfare or the licensed county adoption agency
fails or refuses to accept the consent of the natural parent or parents to
31 Id. at 458, 274 P.2d at 862.
3 2 Brief of Holy Family Adoption Service as Amicus Curiae and brief of Attorney General
as Amtcus Curiae, In Matter of Adoption of Donna Lynn Pior, 43 A.C. 467, 274 P.2d. 637
(1954).
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the adoption, or if said department or agency fails or refuses to file or to
give its consent to an adoption in those cases where its consent is required
by this chapter, either the natural parent or parents or the petitioner may
appeal from such failure or refusal to the superior court of the county in
which the petition -is filed, in which event the clerk shall immediately notify
the Department of Social Welfare of such appeal and the department or
agency shall within 10 days file a report of its findings and the reasons for
its failure or refusal to consent to the adoption or to accept the consent
of the natural parent. After the filing of said findings, the court may, if it
deems that the welfare of the child will be promoted by said adoption, allow
the signing of the consent by the natural parent or parents in open court,
or if the appeal be from the refusal of said department or agency to consent
thereto, grant the petition without such consent."
According to this paragraph, appeal may be taken to the superior court
from the failure or refusal to act of "the State Department of Social Wel-
fare or the licensed county adoption agency" From a failure or refusal to
do what? " to accept the consent of the natural parent or parents to the
adoption or to file or give consent to an adoption in those cases in which
its consent is required by this chapter." In the McDonald case, there was
no issue involving failure or refusal to accept the consent of the natural
parent. Was there then a failure or refusal on the part of the state depart-
ment or the county adoption agency "to file or give its consent to an adop-
tion in those cases in which its consent is required by this chapter?" It is
only if (1) the failure or refusal to act was a failure or refusal by the State
Department of Social Welfare or a county adoption agency and (2) the
failure or refusal was a failure or refusal to file or give consent "in those
cases in which its consent is required by this chapter" that paragraph 11
authorizes the superior court "to grant the petition without such consent."
To take the second point first, paragraph 4 of Civil Code Section 226
and Civil Code Section 224 tell us explicitly what "those cases" are in which
state department or county agency consent "is required by this chapter."
Paragraph 4 provides. "In all cases in which the consent of the natural
parent or parents is not necessary and an agency licensed to place children
for adoption is not a party to the petition, the State Department of Social
Welfare or the licensed county adoption agency shall, prior to the hearing
of the petition, file its consent to the adoption with the clerk of the superior
court of the county in which the petition is filed." Was a licensed agency
"a party to the petition" in this case? The answer is yes. A party to the
petition, under Civil Code Section 226, is a party to the proceedings whether
as petitioner or respondent. In paragraph 1, even "joining in the petition"
is used in this way For that phrase is there used to except agencies from
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the requirement imposed on natural parents that they sign their consent
in the presence of an agent of the State Department of Social Welfare. In
paragraph 5, authorizing waiver of reports in agency cases, "party" and
"joins in the petition" are redundant expressions. Thus, parties to the peti-
tion, and also, under paragraph 1 at least, those who join in the petition,
are those who are parties to the proceedings initiated by the petition. If the
agency which has placed the child approves the adoption, it is included
in the proceedings to indicate that approval; likewise if it disapproves.
Being a party to the petition is the same as being a party in a petition action.
In this case, there was no doubt as to the agency's status as a party; Holy
Family Adoption Service, along with the Los Angeles County Adoption
Agency, had been ordered to show cause why the petition should not be
granted.
Civil Code Section 224 lists the cases in which the consent of the natural
parent or parents is not necessary. They are: (1) cases in which the child
has been judicially freed of the custody and control of his parent or parents;
(2) cases in which the child has been deserted without provision for its
identification; and (3) cases in which the child has been relinquished by
its parent or parents to a licensed adoption agency In the McDonald case,
the mother had executed such a relinquishment, and, since the child was
illegitimate, she could act alone.
Civil Code Section 224 reenforces the interpretation just given of para-
graph 4 of Civil Code Section 226. Parental consent is declared unnecessary
in relinquishment cases because it has already been secured. A relinquish-
ment is a consent. True, it involves additional elements - transfer of cus-
tody of and responsibility for the care and support of the child - but
basically it is a parental consent to the surrender of rights to the child.
It is so treated by the Adoption Manual when it prescribes the same rules
for taking relinquishments and consents,83 and by Civil Code Section 224m
when it prescribes the circumstances and conditions in which relinquish-
ments are authorized. Civil Code Section 224(3) therefore simply recog-
nizes and declares that consents and relinquishments serve the same func-
tion and says, in effect, that no further parental consent is necessary after
a relinquishment has been taken. No state department or county agency
consent being required after a duly executed parental consent, and con-
sents and relinquishments being basically the same, the same rule is now
applied to relinquishments. And paragraph 4, Civil Code Section 226, by
the exclusion of cases in which agencies are "party to the petition," takes
cognizance of this fact. In other cases, cases of abandonment and judicial
termination of parental custody and control, the natural parents are out
33 ADoPTioN MANUAL § 2205-00.
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of the picture and under paragraph 4 departmental consent is required
in lieu of theirs.
Since the present case is one of relinquishment pursuant to Civil Code
Section 224(3) and since the agency is a party to the proceedings, thus
excluding the case from coverage by paragraph 4 Civil Code Section 226
directing state department or county agency consent, we do not have in
the McDonald case one of those cases referred to in paragraph 11, Civil
Code Section 226 in which the superior court is authorized to grant the
petition of adoption without the consent of the state department or county
agency if the state department or county agency fails or refuses to give
its consent. Paragraph 11, far from settling this case in "clear and precise"
language, is simply irrelevant to it.
Paragraph 11 is also entirely inapposite for another reason. It deals
only with a failure or refusal to act by the state department or a county
adoption agency In this case the failure or refusal of those agencies was
not at stake, although they had failed to file or give consent. True, Los
Angeles County reported and made a recommendation against the granting
of the petition but that was done pursuant to the investigating and report-
ing requirements of paragraph 5, Civil Code Section 226, (which of course
could have been waived because an agency was a party) and was not pur-
suant to any consent requirements under paragraph 4 This was a case of
refusal, not of failure, and the refusal was the refusal of a private adop-
tion agency-The Holy Family Adoption Service. Private adoption agen-
cies are not mentioned at all in paragraph 11. On a second ground, there-
fore, paragraph 11 does not "expressly" or otherwise empower the court
to grant the petition in this case.
This conclusion is consistent with the over-all purposes of paragraphs
4 and 11 of Civil Code Section 226. Paragraph 4, adopted in 1931, was
designed to close a gap in the law There were children who were not re-
linquished to agencies having authority over their placement and whose
parents were not available or legally entitled to give consent. In addition
to abandoned children and those judicially freed, the child in In re Santos'
4
illustrated this point. He was a child whose parents were dead and who
was in the care of a guardian whose consent, the court held, was not neces-
sary under the law The consent of someone or some agency being thought
desirable in all cases, this duty was imposed on the state department by
paragraph 4. Paragraph 11 evolved through a number of changes out of an
effort to limit department power to control adoptions through its authority
over consents. Paragraph 11 included consequently not just cases in which
the department was directed to give consent and had not (lone so but also
341 85 Cal. 127, 195 Pac. 10S5 (1921).
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cases in which the department refused to accept consents signed by the
parents in cases of independent adoption. In 1947 the county adoption
agencies were authorized. They were to perform two distinct types of func-
tions: (1) to serve as adoption agencies, i.e., to accept relinquishments of
children and to care for and place such children for adoption, and (2) to
serve as an administrative agent of the State Department of Social Welfare
receiving some of its powers by delegation. The power to accept parental
consents signed in the presence of their agents in independent adoption
cases was one such delegated power. The power to give consent for the
adoption of children not relinquished to it in cases in which parental con-
sent is not necessary was another. The county agency powers referred to
in paragraph 11 belong to these two categories of delegated state depart-
ment power. They are different from the powers of the county agency which
belong to it as an adoption agency and are likewise possessed by licensed
private agencies to approve or disapprove adoptions in the cases of children
relinquished to them as an indispensable feature of their adoption place-
ment function. These are the powers involved in this case.
With the removal of paragraph 11, Civil Code Section 226 from the
case, the central support of the court's opinion is withdrawn. On close ex-
amination, some of the minor supports also crumble. The court pointed to
the fact thatin its 1953 Session, the Legislature "refused to enact an amend-
ment ... that 'a child relinquished for adoption cannot be adopted without
consent of the agency to which the child has been relinquished.' " The in-
ference from context is that the law did not require such consent and the
Legislature did not want it to. The legislative history of the proposed
amendment, however, refutes any such inference. The amendment which
had been introduced at the request of the State Department of Social Wel-
fare provided in Section 2 "This act is intended as a clarification of the
existing law and is not intended as a change thereof."8 5 The Assembly
adopted the amendment. By the time it was before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the district court of appeals handed down its opinion in the
Kitchens case,8" holding that agency consent was necessary under the law
as it stood. The committee's attention was called to the holding of the
Kitchens decision. "A member of the committee then stated that in his view
the enactment of A. B. No. 1225 was unnecessary in view of the Kitchens
decision." Thereafter the hearing on the bill was put over at the request
of the author and still later at the request of the author the bill was not
85 AJB. 1225.
86 In the Matter of the Adoption of James Kitchens, 116 CalApp.2d 254- ....... Pac ........
(1953).
87 In the Matter of the adoption of Donna Lynn Pior, supra note 32, Brief of the Attorney
General as Anicus Curiae m Support of Respondent, at 22-23. In this brief the Attorney Gen-
again set for hearing. 7 Thus, not only does this legislative history refute
the inference drawn by the Supreme Court, but it has an exactly contrary
effect. The Legislature declined to pass the amendment on the authority of
a district court of appeals decision that the law already required agency
consent.
The court also justified its conclusion on the ground that its construction
sustained the object of the adoption laws. For this object, it relied on the
much quoted statement in the Santos case that: "The main purpose of
adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the
benefits of the home and care of their real parents, by the legal recognition
and regulation of the consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart
of the relationship of parent and child."3 This is better rhetoric than law
"Consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship
of parent and child" I For any child? With any adoptive couple? The law
makes it plain that the answer is only for a child which is a "'proper subject
of adoption," only for adoptive couples who have a "suitable home" and
only "when the best interests of the child are promoted" by the adoption.
When these elements are injected into the rhetoric of the Santos case and
the machinery which the law elaborates to safeguard and secure these ele-
ments is placed in its proper relationship to them, it is clear that the im-
pairment of that machinery and through it the impairment of that purpose
which the court sanctioned in this case cannot accurately be described as
a construction which sustains the object of the adoption laws.
Much of the difficulty encountered in the McDonald case arises from
the confusion created by the variety of ways in which the codes and manual
sections use the word "consent" and by the persistence of notions that an
adoption agency stands in loco parentis.39 Sometimes consent refers to par-
ental consent; sometimes to state department or agency consent in non-
relinquishment cases, sometimes to agency consent in relinquishment cases;
sometimes to consent of the child himself. These various forms of consent
cannot be equated or treated as if they involve the same elements and con-
sequences. They express different functions and arise from different rela-
tionships. Consent in the case of parents is an expression of willingness
and agreement to surrender their rights to their child. State department
eral states that the bill was tabled. This is on the recollection of a representative of the Attorney
General's office who was present at the hearing. The representative of the state department
who was shepherding the bill gives the version above accepted. The two versions differ only
on the technical point and both h'ave the same bearing on the reason for discontinuing effort
to secure enactment of the measure.
3s In re Santos, supra note 34 at 130-31, 195 Pac. 1057
39 See Brief of Holy Family Adoption Service, supra note 32 at 21 ff., Brief of Attorney
General, supra note 32 at 13 ff., Hearing, Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Domestic Relations and Juvenile Court Matters 29, 47 (Nov. 1954).
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and county agency consent in non-relinquishment cases is an exercise of
public authority, vested in the absence of parental consent, and exercised
on a consideration of the community's interest in the welfare of the child.
The department and the agency do not surrender any rights to the child.
They have none. In relinquishment cases, agency consent has the same
public character, this time, however, exerted after parental consent and
in the presence of statutorily created duties to care for the child and hold
its custody. It is exercised as an inseparable incident of an adoption place-
ment function and as an act of approval for a particular home as suitable
for a particular child. In the case of the child himself, consent is more often
an expression of affectional ties on the positive side or negatively an ex-
pression of fear of the known or unknown. To cover all of these with the
same label is to create an impediment alike to social analysis and statutory
construction. While the court recognized that these consents cannot be
equated, it failed to follow out the implications of the differences; failed,
that is, except in dealing with the question as to whether the agencies stand
in loco parentis. The right of the parent to withhold consent, said the court,
is based on the "natural affection between parent and child," or on " 'the
natural and sacred rights of natural parents to their children.' ,,4o These
not subsisting between agencies and children, the agency does not have the
power to withhold consent. Agencies certainly do not legally or socially
stand in the same relation to children as their biological parents - whether
the relation between biological parents and children is always or ever quite
as here asserted. Hence, any claim of rights based on the identity or simi-
larity of the relationship must fall. The conclusion, however, that therefore
agencies possess no power to consent does not follow They do possess that
power but, as indicated earlier, it is derived from a different source.
Under the clear but not always precise language of the statutes, adop-
tion agencies are vested with the function of placing children for adoption.
This is expressed in the provisions vesting the authority to license adoption
agencies, public and private. Under Welfare and Institutions Code Section
1620 "No person, association, or corporation shall, without having first
obtained a written license or permit therefore.., engage in the finding of
homes for children under 16 years of age, or place any such child in any
home or other place . for adoption." Under Welfare and Institutions
Code Section 1640, the State Department is authorized to license county
agencies "to act as placement agencies in the placement of children for
adoption. . ." Thus, in providing for the existence, licensing and supervi-
sion of adoption agencies, public and private, they are specifically assigned
the adoption-placement function. This explicit grant is borne out by other
4 0 In the Matter of the Adoption of Patncia McDonald, supra note 30 at 464, 274 P.2d 867.
sections - sections which authorize relinquishments to be "acknowledged
before an authorized official of an organization licensed by the State De-
partment of Social Welfare to find homes for children and place children
in homes for adoption,"'" excepting from consent-signing requirements
agencies "licensed by the State Department of Social Welfare to find homes
for children and place children in homes for adoption, ' 4 excepting from
other consent requirements agencies "licensed to place children for adop-
tion"43 and so on.44 Moreover, the adoption placement function is exclu-
sively vested in licensed adoption agencies, except for the natural parents,
not only by the license and the provisions of law dealing with it but by the
provision making it a crime for anyone, other than the natural parent or
a licensed agency, to place children for adoption.45
What is the nature of the adoption placement function thus lodged in
licensed adoption agencies and made exclusive to them and natural par-
ents? Before a child can be placed, a decision must be reached as to the
home in which to place it. Some homes must be rejected; others accepted.
And the law itself lays down the standard of judgment, i.e., the suitability
of the home. Thus the adoption placement function involves selection
among prospective adoptive couples. It involves, secondly, agency respon-
sibility for the child during the time it has been placed with the adoptive
couple down to the time a petition for adoption is granted.46 It involves,
thirdly, the power to terminate the placement at any time prior to the
granting of an adoption petition if, m the judgment of the agency, the home
is or becomes unsuitable; and in such event, the adoptive couple is under
a statutory obligation to return the child "promptly to the physical custody
of the agency ,41 It involves, fourthly, the duty of the agency to accept the
return of the child if the adoptive couple decides not to adopt after the
child has been placed with them.48
The adoption-placement function as thus set forth by the Legislature,
necessarily entails the power to withhold approval and to prevent the
placement of a child relinquished to it in homes which are not suitable.
Without such power to withhold approval, placement in homes which prove
41 CALIF. CIV. CODE § 224m.
42 CALIF. Cirv. CODE §226[1].
4-3 CALIF. CIv. CODE § 226[4].
44 See also CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226[5] and § 224(3).
45 CAI. Civ. CODE § 224q; see also § 224p.
46 CATi. CIv. CODE §224n.
47 CALIF. CiV. CODE § 224n.
48 CALIF. Civ. CODE §224n. These latter provisions were placed m the law m 1953 but the
court stated that their presence "would not affect the result" m the McDonald case "even if
they had been m effect at the time the order was entered." Supra note 30 at 457 n. 1, 274 P.2d
862 n 1. In addition, these provisions were largely declaratory m any event.
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unsuitable cannot be terminated because the termination, as happened in
the McDonald case, can be frustrated by adoption. Without such power,
even the original act of placement cannot be controlled by the agency In
fact, the moment a child is relinquished to an agency, it is open to adoption
by anyone including those with whom it was not placd .4 9 The selective
character of the placement function, the determination of the suitability
of the home, the study of the home with the child in it for a trial period, and
the exclusiveness of the authority to do these things - all are open to
vitiation if the agency does not have the power to withhold approval. That
power is thus an inseparable incident of the placement function assigned
by the Legislature to licensed adoption agencies and they therefore possess
it. There are fair, though not necessarily conclusive, implications to the
same effect in the various "agency joins in the petition," agency is "a party
to the petition," agency "is a party or joins in the petition" phrases earlier
discussed, contained respectively in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Civil Code
Section 226. But these are merely confirmatory
In the judgment of the present writer, therefore, the California Su-
preme Court erred on both accounts. Paragraph 11 of Civil Code Section
226 does not "expressly" or impliedly authorize the superior court to grant
a petition of adoption without the consent of a licensed adoption agency
to which the child was relinquished; and the power to stay the granting
of the petition of adoption by withholding approval is necessarily included
in the powers conferred on licensed agencies in other sections of the Wel-
fare and Institutions and Civil Codes - Welfare and Institutions Code
Sections 1620, 1640 and Civil Code Sections 224q, 2 24p, 224n.
49 For examples of these situations see the testimony of Lucille Kennedy, Chief, Division
of Child Welfare, State Department of Social Welfare at 36-37, and Walter Health, Director Los
Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions, at 53-54, Hearings, supra note 39. In speaking of the
McDonald decision Heath stated: "I do think it should be corrected. I do think that agencies
have been given responsibility for a child which extends to removing the child from any
home it sees as unsuitable for the child, and at any time until the adoption has become legal
and final through the action of the Superior Court.
"Now if that power is limited by the possibility that a court can grant an adoption, the
agency might better not have the power or the responsibility to move a child up until that
time. Mainly, I believe, that it is sound procedurally for an agency to have the final say-so in a
matter of this sort. To do otherwise, is going to involve people in law suits and appeals and it
is going to keep a child from a permanent home in a state of suspended animation, if you can
suspend a child, for perhaps several years.
"We have such a case on hand now in Los Angeles. It is a case in which boarding parents
whom we were paying to take care of a child decided, after we removed the child from their
home, that they wanted to adopt that child. They have filed an independent petition. The
child is in an adoptive home. These are good people undoubtedly that were boarding this child
and they have known the child longer than the family in which we have placed the child.
"If they win, I think the family whom we placed the child with will likely appeal. They
will want to carry the matter further, and this child can be kept in the status of suspended
animation for a long time. And this is not an isolated case. We have had others." Ibid.
In the judgment of the present writer, there is still another line of
reasomng, rejected by the court, which might properly have been deter-
minative of this case. It has to do with the provisions of the statutory law
dealing with the powers of the State Department of Social Welfare. Under
these provisions, those powers are of such a character and have been exer-
cised in such a way that they reasonably precluded the action taken by
the superior court in granting the petition with or without the consent of
the private agency which accepted the relinquishment and placed the child.
The Supreme Court referred to the statement in Civil Code Section 221
that "any unmarried minor child may be adopted by any adult person,
in the cases and subject to the rules prescribed in this chapter," and con-
cluded that "the controlling rules are the 'rules prescribed in this chapter,'
not the rules of any department or agency, public or private." In reaching
this conclusion, the court completely disregarded rules prescribed and
authorized in another chapter of another code, which in effect, have sub-
stantially modified the provision in Civil Code Section 221 by later legis-
lative enactment. The provision in Civil Code Section 221 remains in its
present form, (as is true of many of the sections of the Civil Code dealing
with adoption), despite statutory changes affecting it, because all of the
relevant provisions of the Civil Code have not been examined and adjusted
as numerous changes have been made in the Civil Code and other codes for
specific purposes. As an historical matter, this provision of Civil Code
Section 221, placed in the Code in 1872 has failed to reflect the much later
additions dealing with licensing and the powers of the State Department
of Social Welfare instituted at various times but all much later and some
of which only recently have been transferred from the Civil Code to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.5" In fact, no state administrative agency
with powers in the field existed in 1872. Hence, the reference in the code
section is to "rules prescribed in this chapter," not to rules prescribed or
authorized in this chapter. The provisions of the Welfare and Institutions
Code which are of much later enactment, m effect have modified Civil
Code Section 221 to read. " subject to the rules prescribed or author-
ized in this chapter or in the Welfare and Institutions Code", though as a
result of the way in which the codes have developed and of careless drafts-
manship the formal change in language has not been made.
What are the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code which
have a material bearing on this case? They are Sections 1620b and 1621
forbidding persons not licensed by the State Department of Social Welfare
50 The licensing provisions with respect to private agencies which are now in the Welfare
and Institutions Code formerly were in the Political Code. Those dealing with public adoption
agencies formerly were in the Civil Code.
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to place children for adoption and authorizing and directing the State De-
partment of Social Welfare to "make such rules and regulations as it deems
best" concerning such placements. Adoption placements made by an adop-
tion agency, accordingly, can only be made if that agency is licensed by
the state department and must be made in accordance with such rules and
regulations as that department issues and deems best. The rule involved
in the McDonald case, i.e., the rules that placements cannot be made with
single persons, falls within the sweeping rule-making authority thus con-
ferred. The rules thus authorized and issued to govern adoption placements
must also govern the judicial determination of "the interests of the child"
upon the granting or denial of the petition. The superior court sits in these
matters as an administrator, not in the capacity of the reviewer of ad-
mimstrative actions. If the superior court in deciding whether the granting
of the petitions will promote the interests of the child need not conform to
the rules governing placement, then the two administrators operating in
the same area and on the same subject matter may operate on different
standards and at cross purposes. The rule-making authority vested in the
state department may be countermanded by the discretionary power vested
in the court to grant a petition of adoption if it concludes that the interests
of the child will be promoted thereby In this case, there were just such
conflicting operations. The department's rule provides: "No application
shall be accepted from a single person, whether unmarried, widowed, or
divorced."'" In accordance with this rule, the agency sought to withdraw
a child for which it was responsible from the home of the petitioner who
was widowed. The superior court granted the petition in contradiction of
the rule.
If weight is given to the later and more specific grant of authority. to
the administrative agency and if the whole theory underlying and justify-
ing specialized administration is given recognition, this sort of conflict
must be resolved in favor of superior court compliance with the adoption
placement rules of the state department in determining what is in the inter-
ests of the child when passing upon an adoption petition.
This is of course not a question of giving weight to an administrative
interpretation of a statute whether long-standing and consistent or not.
This is a matter of the obligatory character of rules made by and within
the authority vested in an administrative agency. The courts are free to
give such weight as they please to administrative interpretations. It is by.
61 ADopT oN MAxuAL § 2460a. Since under the rules of the Adoption Manual an exception
may be made if the status changes after the placement has been made and since the rule as above
quoted specifically deals with applications, the court might have concluded that the manual rule
did not apply mn this case. It did not, however, choose to follow this course but simply pro-
ceeded on the assumption that it was not bound by the rules.
their authority that any weight is given. If, as the Supreme Court con-
cluded, the statutory language governing this case was plaun, an adminis-
trative interpretation of that language should be given no weight at all.
The question here is not a rule of interpretation created by the court itself.
It is the obligatory character of quasi-legislative rules authorized, directed
and made binding by the Legislature, and the courts are controlled by them
just as is everybody else.
In any event, whether right or wrong, the McDonald case has now
been decided. The damaging effects on the agency system of the agency's
not having the power to withhold approval of adoption placements and
therefore of adoption petitions can now only be corrected by the Legisla-
ture. A bill which will preserve the judicial function in adoption cases and
at the same time adequately safeguard the proper role of the agencies is
now before that body It is A. B. 925. It amends Civil Code Section 224n
by adding the following "No petition may be filed to adopt a child relin-
quished to a licensed adoption agency except by the prospective adoptive
parents with whom the child has been placed for adoption by the adoption
agency If an agency refuses to consent to the adoption of a child by the
person or persons with whom the agency placed the child for adoption, the
superior court may nevertheless decree the adoption if it finds that the
refusal to consent is arbitrary and capricious."
VII. Independent or Direct Adoption
The agency and independent adoption programs differ in important
respects. They involve different theories as to the role and function of the
state. In the independent adoption program, the State Department of Social
Welfare and its agents, the county adoption agencies, exercise a regulatory
function, seeking, by various devices and procedures, to regulate activities
carried on by others. In the relinquishment program, since 1947, through
the rapidly growing county adoption agencies, financed by the state and
serving as its agents, the public itself carries on the activities consisting of
the rendering of a welfare service. The private adoption agencies, the third
and the least of the factors in the field, lie somewhere between the other two.
They are much nearer the public than the independent program, since they
are philanthropic agencies, financed by public contribution, themselves
actually performing the welfare service, and closely controlled by the state
through the license and the general and very sweeping rule-making power
vested in the State Department of Social Welfare.' In all three cases, the
public object is the same. To furnish necessary and adequate protections
1 CALVM. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1521.
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to and thereby safeguard the interests of the community in the child, the
natural parents and the adoptive couple.
The important questions concerning independent adoptions, then, are:
What are the regulatory devices employed by the state? Are they adequate
to the purpose?'
There is no general grant of rule making power as there is with respect
to the agency program. All authority exercised therefore must be traced
to particular code sections. The devices are these: (1) A prohibition,
coupled with a misdemeanor sanction against any person or organization,
excepting natural parents and licensed agencies, placing children for adop-
tion or advertising in connection with doing so.3 (2) A requirement that
the state department, or its agent, a county adoption agency, conduct an
investigation whenever a petition has been filed in an independent adoption
case, to determine whether the child is a proper subject for adoption and
the adoptive home is suitable; 4 and a supplementary requirement that the
department or agency file with the court a full report of its findings and a
recommendation as to whether the petition should be granted or denied;
the report and recommendation to be filed within one hundred and eighty
days after the filing of the petition or within such extension of time as the
court allows.5 (3) A requirement that the department or county agency
submit to the attorney for the petitioner, or if he has none, to the petitioner,
a copy of any report or finding submitted to the court? (4) A requirement
of parental consent, (with a few exceptions),7 and that the parents residing
in California, sign the consent in the presence of an agent of the state
department or county agency on a form prescribed by the state depart-
ment? If the department fails or refuses to take such consent, the superior
court judge may allow the signing of consent in open court? Consent once
2 For a treatment of independent adoptions m California and elsewhere see: Final Report,
Citizens Committee of Califorma (1953), Report, California Adoption Survey Committee
(1946), Annual Report, State Department of Social Welfare (1954), Hearings, Subcommittee
on Domestic Relations and Juvenile Court Matters, Assembly Committee on Judiciary, (Nov.
1954), Report, Senate Interim Committee on Social Welfare, Pt. 4 (1953), Symposium on
Adoption (1953), WALTER GELLHORN, CLDREN mNm FAmlx s IN CouaRTs o NEW YoRx
Cn= (1954), Edwin Lukas, Babies Are Not Vendible or Expendable, 5 RECORD OF Ass'N OF T
BAR or THE CITY OF NEw YORK 88 (1950), Note, Moppets on the Market. The Problem of
Unregulated Adoptions 59 YALE L. J. 715 (1950), Note, Improving the Adoption Process:
The Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 102 U. oF PA. L. REv. 759 (1954).
3 CALIF. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1640, CALIF. Civ. CODE § 224q and § 224p.
4 CALIF. CiV. CODE § 226[3].
5 CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226[5].
6 CALIF. CIrv. CODE § 226[6].
7 CALIF. CiV. CODE § 224.
8 CALIF. Civ. CODE § 226[1].
9 CALIF. CIv. CODE § 226[111].
given may not be withdrawn without the permission of the court. ° (5) A
requirement of department consent in cases in which parental consent is
not necessary" or has been signed outside the state' if it finds that the
child's welfare will be promoted by the adoption and provided that the court
may act without such consent if the department fails or refuses to give it.'3
(6) Requirements that the department or county agency- (a) submit a
report and represent the child at the hearing if the parents petition the court
for permission to withdraw consent; ' (b) to recommend a suitable plan for
the child and to represent it at the hearing if the adoptive couple ask that
the petition be dismissed or if the department or county agency recommends
that it be denied.' 5 (7) A requirement that the department or county
agency accept the commitment of the child if the court sustains its recom-
mendation that the child be removed from the home of the petitioners and
does not return to the parents.'6 (8) A requirement that all hospitals and
maternity homes send the state department, within 48 hours, an infant
dismissal form in all cases in which children are released to persons other
than relatives by blood or marriage showing the names and addresses of
the persons who received the child.'
Some of these devices, while a part of the overall regulatory scheme, are
either minor parts of it or incidental to it. Recommending a suitable plan
for the child if the adoptive couple decide that they do not want it, accept-
ing commitment of it when it is removed from the adoptive home and not
returned to the parents, representing it in court when the parents wish to
withdraw consent or the adoptive parents wish to dismiss or the depart-
ment to deny the petition - in all of these circumstances which may hap-
pen in any event but which result primarily from inadequate aid to the
parents in reaching a solid decision and inadequate prior investigation of
the adoptability of the child and the suitability of the adoptive home-
the child somehow falls parentless in the gap between natural and adop-
tive parents. In that event or in the immediate neighborhood of it, these
sections assign to somebody - the State Department of Social Welfare
or county adoption agency - responsibility for planning and caring for the
child. On the theory that somebody must always be responsible for giving
the initial consent, department or county agency consent is directed in
those comparatively not numerous cases in which parental consent is not
10 CALIF. Civ. CODE § 226a.
11 CALIF. CIv. CODE § 226[4].
13 CALIF. CIV. CODE §226[9].
13 CALIF. CIV CODE § 226111].
14 CALIF. Civ. CODE § 226a.
15 CALIF. CIv. CODE § 226b.
16 CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226c.
IT CALIF. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1620.5.
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necessary If parental consent is signed outside the state, some additional
precaution, it is felt, should be taken because of the difficulty of making
sure that it was properly done in satisfactory circumstances. Department
or county agency consent is that additional precaution. The requirement
that the department or agency reports be sent to petitioners or their attor-
neys is designed both to recognize the proper role of lawyers in the process
and to give the petitioners opportunity to present their case to the ad-
ministrators and to the court in the light of department or agency evalua-
tion of their fitness as parents and the suitability of their homes.
The infant dismissal forms, long required by administrative ruling of
the Health Department, but only since 1953 by statute, have been a minor
device. The volume of such reports has increased since the enactment of
the statute, reports since that time being received at the rate of 275 a
month. Followup letters are sent to hospitals not reporting properly If a
petition for adoption is not filed within thirty daysi s by the non-relative
receiving a child, he is sent a letter pointing out that, if a petition is not
filed and the child remains with him, it will be necessary for his home to
be licensed to care for the child.1" No further action based on the infant
dismissal form is taken. 0
Evasion of the requirement is, of course, easily possible. A child carried
from the hospital by a relative can be handed to a third person - the adop-
tive parent, a lawyer's secretary, a cabdiver - around the corner.
The major regulatory devices now existing in California thus are the
criminal prohibition against unauthorized placement for adoption, the tak-
ing of consents by the state department or county agency and the depart-
mental or county agency investigation and recommendation. The first of
these is the source of much of the current furor. The other two seem to give
rise to little criticism.
In his 1953 opinion, the Attorney General dealt with the meaning of
placement and the permissible role of third-party intermediaries under the
criminal prohibition, Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1620b, Sec-
Von 1629 and Civil Code Section 224q. He concluded that the third party
intermediary could not evade the prohibtion "under the guise of acting as
agent of the natural parent."2 1 The situation posed by the state depart-
ment in asking for the opinion was this: "An expectant mother tells her
obstetrician that she does not want to keep her baby. The obstetrician
informs an attorney who contacts the expectant mother. The attorney tells
18 Notice of all petitions must be sent to the department or county agency by the clerk
of the superior court, CAIJa. Civ. CODE § 226[1].
1 9 
CArxF. WE.F. & INsr. CODE § 1620b.
2 0 Anual Report, SDSW, 48 (1953-54).
2153-228, 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 35 (1953).
her he has a client who wants to adopt the child and who will pay all ex-
penses of confinement and adoption. The expectant mother agrees to the
plan. She does not select the people to adopt the child nor does she see them
or know their identity Upon the birth of the child the attorney, through
an intermediary, obtains physical custody of the child and has the child
delivered to his clients." "This case," said the Attorney General, "is a clear
and almost classic violation of Civil Code Section 224q since the attorney
did everything necessary to the placing of the child. He did more than per-
form a legal service and did more than merely recommend the prospective
foster home. He actively promoted the placement." The policy embedded
in our adoption laws, moreover, "makes it clear that the placing of a child
for adoption is an act to which the natural parent is bound to give his or her
personal attention and is an act so peculiarly personal that it may not be
delegated to an agent."22
Enforcement of the prohibition of unlicensed placements unless by the
parent present unusual difficulties. The Attorney General has ruled that the
state department has authority under Government Code Sections 1180 and
1181 to conduct investigations and hold hearings to determine whether per-
sons are engaging in the making of such placements. Such investigations,
however, would serve little purpose other than to publicize already known
facts. There have been almost no prosecutions for violation of Civil Code
Section 2 24q. Many share the opinion of one Los Angeles County judge:
"The average citizen who would serve as a trial juror in the event of crimi-
nal prosecution knows nothing of that provision in the law or of the reasons
for it. Such a prosecution would doubtless result in an acquittal unless it
were shown at the trial that the placement was in a home which is unfit as
judged by ordinary standards. It must be admitted that a wise physician
may make a placement which is as good or better than that which might be
made pursuant to strict legal procedure. ' 23 More than that, there are in-
22 CALIF. CiV. CODE § 2304.
23Report, California Adoption Survey Committee 20 (1946) Cf., however, the state-
ment of W G. La Fever, Los Angeles attorney, and former chairman of the Citizens Committee
on Adoptions in California, that "as the day aporoaches when the present development
and expansion of their facilities permit agencies to carry more of the adoption load, so also does
the day approach when we are going to see prosecution under this Code section ol the un-
licensed intermediary placing children for adoption." The Three "Rs" ot Adoption-Whose
Responsibility, Symposium on Adoption.
The State Department of Social Welfare reports: "There have been two cases of successful
prosecution. The first of these involved a woman who had a license to board aged persons and
who had offered to a representative of the District Attorney and his wife a child for adoption
for $300. The trial resulted in a conviction for violation of Section 224q of the Civil Code with
a fine of $100 suspended for one year. The District Attorney handled the prosecution.
"The second case involved two women who were charged with paying natural mothers
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herent difficulties in the statute and in the situation to which it applies. What
is forbidden is the act of placement. It is then, of course, perfectly perrms-
sible for parents, expectant parents and persons seeking a child to consult
with their doctor, lawyer, minister, high school counselor or friends and for
the persons so consulted, with or without fee, to impart advice and infor-
mation. The no-man's land between the forbidden act and the permitted
advice is very large and its boundaries indistinct. The situation posed by
the Attorney General presents a clear case of the forbidden act. The situa-
tion in which the mother actually selects the adoptive parents - perhaps
they are the people downstairs or she has known them for many years -
and in which she has consulted her doctor about the effect of adoption upon
her child and her lawyer about its legal aspects, presents a clear case of
parental placement and permissible advice. To what extent must the parent
participate in the selection of the adoptive couple for the placement to be
within the law? The state department's answer that she must participate
"responsibly," while doubtless an accurate statement of the law, is of little
concrete help to the lawyer or doctor who wishes both to stay within the
law and to serve the needs of his client. A more detailed set of rules spelling
out the concept of responsibility is what is needed and what the department
cannot permanently avoid developing. In the meantime, however, Civil
Code Section 224q serves as a general legislative expression of disappro-
bation, a frown on the practice of third party intermediaries. As such, it
has its values in constituting pressure in the right direction as the present
concern of doctors and lawyers makes clear; and it does, in addition, of
course, make criminally liable the flagrant violator. It is important there-
fore that it remain on the statute books.
Widespread violation of the section is strongly suggested, if not con-
clusively demonstrated, by the following data regarding acquaintance be-
tween parents and petitioners and the person making the placement. In
1953 in 38 per cent of all independent placements in California, the parents
made the placement. In 55 per cent of the cases the parents were not ac-
quainted with the petitioners. Of the cases in which the parents and the
for their babies and placing the babies for adoption for a higher fee from adopting parents.
Complaints were issued by the District Attorney of the county involved, charging the women
with conspiracy in the sale of human beings. They were indicted by the Grand Jury under a
section of the Penal Code which prohibits the sale of human beings. The indictment was later
changed to accuse the women of conspiracy and violating the Civil Code prohibition against
placing children for adoption. The women admitted their guilt and were allowed to plead guilty
to the lesser charge. They were sentenced to six months in the county jail but the sentences
were suspended and they were placed on probation for three years. The reaction of the unmar-
ried mothers involved and probably that of a large part of the general public was that the
women were kindhearted and were attempting to be helpful to girls in trouble and to persons
who wished to adopt children." Letter to author from Supervisor, Bureau of Adoptions, Feb.
19, 1955.
petitioners were not acquainted, physicians made the placement in 51.4
per cent, attorneys in 9.6 per cent, relatives and friends in 16.2 per cent,
unlicensed officers and agencies about 10 per cent.24 About 15 per cent of
all independent adoptions in California were placements with relatives and
rune-tenths of these were made by the parents. In 83 4 per cent of the place-
ments neither petitioner was related to the child, physicians place 35.5 per
cent of these children and attorneys 6.6 per cent and parents 29.7 per cent.
It is clear from these data that the overwhelming preponderance of in-
dependent placements are placements with nonrelatives, that less than
40 per cent of all placements are made by the parents, that well over half
are illegally made by third party intermediaries, and that the largest single
group of such intermediaries are physicians. That the doctor should be so
prominent in the picture results more or less unavoidably from his medical
function in caring for the mother before, during and after birth. He cannot
ignore her need for other help at the same time. Nor can he easily pass
off the urgent requests of sterility patients to solve their problems by an
adoptive if not by a biological delivery Having the source of supply in his
care on the one hand, and of demand on the other, and feeling that he is
helping to solve the problems of both thereby, he serves as a conduit be-
tween them. There is, in addition, a strong financial consideration so far as
the mother is concerned. In 58 per cent of the cases in 1953, the adoptive
couple paid some or all of the hospital and medical expenses of the birth.
Sometimes, instead of arranging the matter himself, the physician refers the
mother or expectant mother to an attorney who has among his clients
couples seeking a child.
The lawyer is normally drawn into this situation sometimes by reference
2INDEPENDENT ADOPTION
Acquaintanceship of Petitioners and Parents by Person or Agency (1) Making Placement
January-December 1954
Acquaintance of Parent with Petitioners
Were Not
Person or Agency Total Were Acquainted Acquainted Not Reported
Making Placement Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total 3,981 100.0 1,725 100.0 2,172 1000 84 100.0
Percent 100.0 43.3 54.6 2.1
Parents 1,512 38.0 1,435 83.2 61 2 8 16 19.0
Relative of Parent 147 3.7 51 3.0 96 4.4 .... ........
Physician 1,176 29.5 57 3.3 1.113 51 4 6 7.1
Attorney 219 5.5 10 0.6 209 9.6 .... ....
Friend of Parent 301 7.6 44 2.5 257 11.8 .... ....
Probation Officer 102 2.6 30 1.7 68 3.1 4 4.8
Out of State Agency 66 1.6 12 0.7 54 2.5 .... ....
Other Welfare Agency 130 3.3 21 1.2 105 4 8 4 4.8
Other 239 6.0 41 2.4 192 8.8 6 7.1
Not Reported 89 2.2 24 1.4 17 0.8 48 57.2
(1) Agencies or officials not licensed to place children for adoption in Califorma.
State Department of Social Welfare, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Nov. 16, 1954.
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from a doctor, sometimes because the parent is his client and seeks his
help, but most often because the petitioner is his client. It is thus generally
the adoptive couple whose interest he serves. In the end, of course, all pe-
titioners have to have a lawyer to handle the court proceedings. Only a hand-
ful of lawyers or firms in California are building or have built what might
be called an adoption practice. A tabulation of the attorneys' names appear-
ing on adoption petitions filed in a three months period, (August, September,
and October, 1954), shows that 1076 petitions were filed by 799 different
attorneys or firms of attorneys. Twenty-five petitions were filed by one
attorney; 23 by another; two attorneys filed six each; four attorneys filed
five each; seven attorneys filed four each; 29 attorneys filed three each;
126 attorneys filed two each; and 629 filed one each. This tabulation does
not show that the attorney was involved in any way in arranging the place-
ment. One attorney whose name stands high on this list hires an investigator
to collect information on both natural and adoptive parents. He charges a
fee for this service to the adopting parents in addition to his legal fee.
He sets up a trust fund which the adopting parents furnish from which
medical expenses, living expenses, and travel expenses of the mother may
be paid. He works with obstetricians practicing in a number of hospitals
who refer mothers to him. Would-be adopting parents are referred to him
from doctors and other sources and many seek him out voluntarily having
heard of his activities.2a
The second major device in the regulation of independent adoptions in
California is the requirement that parental consent be signed in the presence
of an agent of the state department or county adoption agency While, on its
face, this may seem to be an automatic procedural requirement, and while
the state department or county agency is under a statutory duty to accept
the consent - the discretionary power of approval or disapproval having
been once granted and then withdrawn by the Legislature - the department
is of course free to implement it by stating when and where agents will be
present to witness the signature and the manner in which this must be done.
In exercising this power, the department has set forth rules to make certain
that the signature is freely, knowingly, and purposefully given. Consent
may not be taken in the hospital or maternity home, thus assuring the
mother an opportunity to recover from the physical and emotional experi-
21' "Attorneys are placed in the position now in independent adoptions of being the attor-
ney for two parties to the adoption, the mother and the adopting parents. If he does the best
for the mother that he can do, he will get her expenses paid and paid well, sometimes. If he
does the best he can do for the adopting parents, he will get them a baby from a good back-
ground.
"But I don't know what he does for the child. I don't know that that enters into his con-
scious arranging of this thing. Maybe it does. But it hasn't been brought out, if that is so."
Walter Heath, Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions, Heartngs, supra note 2 at 107.
ence of childbirth before making her decision. 5 The agent must inform the
parent that the consent is permanent and binding and can be withdrawn
only with the permission of the court; that parental rights and responsibili-
ties are not terminated by the consent; that the department is free to recom-
mend denial of the petition for adoption if it thinks that in the best interests
of the child, that if the parent is in doubt she should take further time to
make up her mind, that in fairness to all parties the execution of the consent
should represent as nearly as possible a final decision.2 6 The state depart-
ment or county agency has no jurisdiction until the petition has been filed
and notice of the pendency of the action is received from the county clerk.
Signature of consent will not be witnessed before that time27 and, if pos-
sible, sufficient investigation of the case will be made before witnessing
consent to determine the advisability of the adoption."
Since the consent must be specifically to the adoption by the particular
petitioners," the Adoption Manual provides: "It is the responsibility of
the agent taking the consent of the parents to see that the full names of the
petitioners appear on the consent at the time the parent signs the form.
The information shall be made available to her and she shall not be pre-
vented from reading the names on the consent. The agent shall not refuse
to witness the consent even though the parent may not choose to read the
names."3 But for this requirement of disclosure written into the law and
implemented by this manual section, which embodies what otherwise is re-
garded as a bad practice, the consent would in effect be signed in blank
and the intermediary would be able to dispose of the child when and to
whom he wishes and at whatever price he could get. The way would thus be
open for a potent source of black market evils.
The requirement that parental consent be signed in the presence of an
agent of the state department or county adoption agency is a force in the
direction of giving the parent adequate opportunity to come to a calm and
lasting decision while fully aware of the nature and consequences of the
act of signing consent. As can be seen, the requirement is insufficient to
achieve that objective standing by itself. But it makes a substantial con-
tribution toward it.
The third of the major instruments through which public regulation
of independent adoptions is sought to be effected in California is the report
and recommendation asked of the state department or county adoption
2 5
ADOPTION MANUAL § 2275-00-A-2.
26 ADOPTION MANUAL § 2275-00-A-4.
2 7 
ADOPTION MANUAL §2275-00-A-1.
28 ADOPTION MANUAL § 2275-00-A-3.
29 CALIF. CIV. CODE §226[1].
3 0
ADOPTION MANUAL § 2240-00.
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agency As stated in the statute, the purpose of this investigation is to deter-
mine the suitability of the adoptive home and whether the child is a proper
subject of adoption.3 Since the same code section and purposes apply to
the agency study in relinquishment cases, the departmental rules and regu-
lations which govern the character of that study are also applied to the
investigation in independent adoption cases. Was the parent's consent vol-
untary, given with knowledge of alternatives available to her, procured
from all the necessary parties? Are the child's health, heredity, intelligence
and personality such as to render him a proper subject for adoption? Are
the petitioners' motives for adoption sound? Are they of suitable age, health,
emotional stability, harmonious home life, understanding of children, finan-
cial security, cultural level, and background? Is the child well adjusted in
the petitioners' home? Will his full potentialities be developed there? Will
the child be brought up in a religious faith acceptable to his natural parents?
"If the petitioners are not of the same religious faith as the child's parents,"
provides the manual, "this subject should be discussed with the natural
parents and their express approval should be given before their consent
to the adoption is accepted. " 2
In evaluating the usefulness of this device in the regulation of independ-
ent adoptions, the central and determinative factors relate to the time of
the investigation and report and the advisory character of the recommen-
dation. The state department or county agency is in a position to give some
advice to the parents and often some information about the adoptive home.
It can also transmit to the adoptive couple some facts about the background
of the child gathered from contact with the parents. But these services are
incidental to the fact-finding nature of the investigation and are limited
by it. Of much greater importance, however, is the circumstance, that the
state department or county agency enters the situation only after the peti-
tion has been filed, after the child has been born, and after the dynamic
point of the whole process has passed, namely, the making of the placement
decision. The possibilities of constructive aid or action are over. No alter-
natives remain but to recommend termination of an already established
relationship or to patch up what has been done. A state department deter-
mination that the child is not a proper subject for adoption or the adoptive
home not suitable is, moreover, not an administrative determination which
the courts will sustain if supported by evidence. It is a recommendation
only which the courts are free to disregard and which they frequently do.
Not only are the courts understandably reluctant to uproot the child again
unless very strong reasons can be given, but their judgment may be based
31 CALF. Civ. CODE § 226[3].
32 ADOPTIoN MANuAL §§ 2330-00, 2350-00, 2360-00, 2370-00.
upon entirely different standards and tests from those employed by the
state department or county agency The law merely provides that "if the
findings of the State Department of Social Welfare or the county adoption
agency are that the home of the petitioner is not suitable for the child and
it recommends that the petition be denied, the county clerk upon receipt
of the report of the State Department of Social Welfare or the county adop-
tion agency shall immediately refer it to the superior court for review "3
The character of the "review" is not specified or limited.
Thus, when the devices are reviewed individually and collectively by
which the Legislature, while permitting direct placement by the parent,
has sought to regulate independent adoptions and thereby to protect the
multiple interests involved, they are seen to be inadequate to the task. In
specific areas, they have succeeded in mitigating the harshness of the con-
sequences of the system on the child when he is left without either set of
parents or when the adoptive home is positively damaging to him in ob-
jectively demonstrable ways. They have supplied minor aids to the bio-
logical and adoptive parents but only after it is too late for them to be of
value in the constructive making of the critical decisions, even if they were
of a more substantial character. They have generally indicated a policy
of the Legislature as one of disapproval of existing and wide-spread prac-
tices. Singly and in combination, their employment has resulted in decided
progress but they leave much yet to be done. It cannot be done by further
administrative development through a more effective use of the devices
already available, though concrete improvements are still possible in that
area. Additional positive programs and controls are necessary and they can
only be created by the Legislature.
The basic defect of the system of independent adoptions as it exists in
California today, modified to the extent that it is by the devices and con-
trols just discussed, is that it does not sufficiently safeguard the interests of
the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and, most serious of all, the
child. A well-known practicing doctor has described the process: "In any
adoption, three parties are involved in a situation which is long-lasting
and arouses the strongest emotions. First, there are the adoptive parents,
who are frequently well known to the doctor. As a sterility patient, the
doctor may have seen the wife over a series of visits which were directly
concerned with her desire for a child. He has had a pretty good opportunity
to judge whether or not she would make a good mother.
"Then there is the natural parent. Less frequently does the doctor know
her as well. She often is a nonresident who is his patient for only the length
of her pregnancy She has something to conceal and an urgent need to place
33 CALIF. CIV. CODE § 226[7].
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her child. Has she told him the truth about herself and the child's father?
Is her child going to be the kind of child the doctor would like his eager
adoptive parents to have? Maybe yes - maybe no! But by the time any-
one knows for sure, the child is in the home- ties are made. Then who can
say how much of the future behavior of the child was due to heredity and
how much to living with over-eager, possibly older parents?
"The third party to an adoption is the child, whom the obstetrician
meets only briefly in the delivery room. Who is looking out for his interest?
Like a piece of goods, he is passed from one person to another with only the
obstetrician to say that he is getting a fair deal...
" ... In general the placement is arranged before delivery and the baby
goes directly from the hospital to his new parents. Most adoptive parents
immediately file a petition for adoption with the court. They have good
reason to do this, for there is an interval of six to eight months before that
petition can be granted, and during that time things may happen which are
disastrous to one or another of the interested parties. For the adoptive
parents, there is the hazard that they will not get the baby after all. Until
the final adoption papers are signed, the natural mother is the legal parent
of the child; she may repossess him at any time. Adoptive parents, who
know this, live in apprehension during this period - hardly the best state
of mind in which to start a baby on its life. The hazard for the natural
mother is that maybe the adoptive parents will change their minds about
adopting the baby and return it to her, thus ruining the life she had com-
menced to build for herself remains. There is another hazard. If the adop-
tive parents do not file for adoption, or if they withdraw their petition,
there is no check on what becomes of the child."' From this portrayal, the
hazards and disadvantages of independent adoptions may be itemized.
They are likely to center on the interest of adults rather than the inter-
ests of children, on trying to secure a child for a family rather than a
family for a child. One variation of this is the use of the child to attempt to
bolster a sagging marriage or to treat an individual's emotional and psycho-
logical illnesses. The range and number of prospective adoptive families is
likely to be limited and this limits the opportunity of choice for the child.
If the adoptive couple declines to accept the child, the doctor or others,
having no way to care for it, must hastily find another couple, with all the
dangers implicit in this mode of selection for the child. The doctor is likely
to know well just the wife or just the husband. The doctor is likely to know
little of the background of the child, i.e., the hereditary elements which
may have a bearing on the adoptability of the child. The mother's decision,
3 4 James V Campbell, M.D., The Phystcian's Interest in Adoptions, Symposm- ox ADop-
TION.
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made under stress and without knowledge of alternatives, may not be final
and she may seek to regain the child later. All of the necessary consents may
not be secured and the adoption will therefore be subject to being upset.
The biological parents are likely to know who the adoptive parents are or
to be able to trace them. The adoptive couple, once accepting the child,
may thereafter reject it. The mother may have to take it back or, if she
has dropped out of sight, the child may then be handed around in the
absence of any continuing responsibility for it from the beginning through
adoption.
Some striking illustrations of independent placements m which the
county agency recommended denial of the petition were produced by Wal-
ter Heath of the Los Angeles County Adoption Agency at the November,
1954 Hearings of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary They may be
classed as "horrible examples" which ought not to serve as the foundation
of legislation" but they nevertheless exist and open the view to many more
numerous, less drastic but still undesirable placements. "Here is placement
by a doctor and attorney Petitioners were good. The problem was that the
natural and legal father had not been thought of at all in this process. He
was in jail at the time. He does not want his child to be adopted. He is now
taking legal action to get his child back.
"Here is a placement by an attorney The man petitioner is sixty-eight
years old, woman petitioner is forty-six. They have three other children.
With a man sixty-eight, I think it is not likely that the child will have a
father during his - this was an infant - during his growing years.
"Here is a placement by a doctor. The problem is that the petitioner
has got an interlocutory decree of divorce in July, 1952, and at the time the
child was born, the woman [petitioner] was in jail, convicted of grand
theft and embezzlement. She was released a short time later and pending
her release, the doctor cared for the infant in his own home, so that it could
be placed with this fine woman.
"Here is an infant of Mexican parentage, is very dark, was placed by
an attorney in a home of light Caucasian people. Petitioners could not be
happy with this child and gave it back to the attorney, who in turn put the
baby into a very poor home. Now this home, it happens the man is fifty-
three and the woman is fifty-nine. This is the second placement of the same
child. The woman is suffering from latent syphillis, arterial sclerosis and
hypertension heart disease. They have only one bedroom and the child is in
the bassinet in their room. That particular case brings out. a point which is
often overlooked, that independent adoptions are arranged before the baby
is ever born, and it might be a good baby for somebody else and these par-
5 See remarks of Assemblyman Tomlinson, Hearngs, Assembly Committee on Judictary,
Ill (1954).
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ents might be fine parents for another baby, but they don't always belong in
the same family." 6 The state department statistics on reasons for recom-
mending denials and dismissals in independent cases are shown in the fol-
lowing table. Denials were recommended in 16.9 per cent of the cases and
dismissals in 3.9 per cent.




Reason Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total cases 826 100.0 672 100.0 154 100.0
Parent did not respond 127 15.4 126 18.8 1 0.6
Parent refused consent 198 24.0 156 23.2 42 27.3
Parent's consent withdrawn 10 1.2 6 0.9 4 2.6
Legal status of child not cleared 204 24.7 202 30.1 2 1.3
Child not a proper subject 20 2.4 17 2.5 3 2.0
Child not in petitioner's home 68 8.2 44 6.5 24 15.6
Child or petitioner died 10 1.2 7 1.0 3 1.9
Home not suitable 27 3.3 25 3.7 2 1.3
Petitioner not continuing
action m California 134 16.2 79 11.8 55 35.7
Other 28 3.4 10 1.5 18 11.7
About one-half of the recommended denials and dismissals in independ-
ent adoptions in 1953 were because the parent refused to consent to the
adoption or because the legal status of the child was not clear. Over one-
half of the denials were for these reasons and about one-third of the dis-
missals. Other important reasons for recommending denial or for dismissal
were the failure to reach the parent for necessary consent and the unwill-
ingness of the petitioners to proceed with the adoption.
What is the remedy to these evils in independent adoptions? What
measures can and should be taken to strengthen the regulatory arm of the
state?
1. It must be recognized that the hazards which have been mentioned
are inherent in the independent process and exist in placements by natural
parents as well as third party intermediaries. All placements by parents
are not good and all placements by intermediaries are not bad. The hazards
in independent adoptions, consequently, would continue to exist even if all
present irregular and illegal placements were brought to an end. Some
parents after transferring custody would still refuse to consent and would
later reclaim their child. Some parents would still disappear without con-
senting or refusing to consent. Some parents would still give incorrect in-
formation on their parental status and the legal status of the child. Some
children would still be placed in very unsuitable homes. Some children
after placement would still prove to be improper subjects for adoption.
36 Id. at 108-110.
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Some prospective adoptive parents, after receiving the child directly from
the biological parents, would still decide against adoption and seek the dis-
imssal of the petition. Courts would still leave children in undesirable
homes because of a quite proper hesitancy to break up the established
relationship and subject the child to a second traumatic experience.
The general proposition that parents have the right to the control of
their children and to bring them up as they see fit is not at issue here,
though that right is subject to the power of the state to make reasonable
rules for the protection of children and their interests. The right of parents
permanently to dispose of their children, completely abdicating their rights
and escaping their responsibilities, is hardly to be counted as an aspect of
the right to control and rear them. In fact, it is precisely the opposite. It is
an extinguishment of the right. What biological parents do with their
children when they keep them is one thing; what they do when they get
rid of them is quite another. Parental renunciation of rights and duties -
whether through the independent or agency system - is legalized aband-
onment; and the only object to the legalization is to control the mode in
which the abandonment is accomplished in the interests of the child, and
the biological and adoptive parents.
For these reasons and also because of the difficulty of drawing the line
between intermediary and parental placements, regulation of independent
adoptions cannot stop with measures applicable only to intermediaries.
The measures must encompass parental placements as well. This is of course
already true of the consent-signing, investigations, reporting and recom-
mending, as well as other requirements in existence in California. It must
also be true of the additional devices which sooner or later will have to be
authorized if the objectives of this program are to be achieved.
2. It is often suggested that the solution to the problem of independent
adoptions lies in the growth of public and private adoption agencies and
their pre-emption of the field through their offering of superior services to
biological and adoptive parents .37 This result, say or imply some others,38
rmght eventually be brought about through the prohibition of all independ-
ent placements when the agencies have developed sufficient staff and facili-
ties to handle all adoption cases.
Since 1947, private and public adoption agencies have developed in
California with great rapidity Not only have they increased their numbers,
but they have greatly increased the number of children placed and they
have improved their relative position in the field. In fiscal year 1948 agen-
cies placed 596 children and there were 3759 petitions received in inde-
37 See e.g., Hearngs, supra note 2 at 84.
38 Note: Improving the Adoption Process: The Pennsylvanza Adoption Act, 102 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 759 at 781 (1954)
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pendent adoptions. In fiscal year 1953 agencies placed 1746 and there were
4032 petitions received in independent adoptions. The rate of increase of
agency placements, thought it may continue for a time, may not persist
indefinitely But even if it does, for the present and for years to come in
the future, sizable numbers of children, will, in all likelihood, be adopted
through the independent process. The necessity for contriving adequate
controls therefore, cannot be escaped on the ground that the evil will soon
go away
Moreover, there are reasons for allowing independent adoptions to con-
tinue, if the regulation of them can be made effective. Competition with
them has had and is having a salutary effect upon agencies. The agencies
are stimulated to improve their efforts and their services by the existence
of this alternative machinery. It is at least in part due to this that agencies
have been and are working so hard to reduce what is commonly regarded
as excessive red tape, to reduce unnecessary delays and to make a good
immediate placement rather than waiting a long time in search of an ideal
one.3 0 Perhaps most important of all, state department and county agency
standards for determining adoptability of children and suitability of homes
- always in need of re-evaluation - benefit from having a source of con-
tinuous outside criticism capable of making itself heard.
3. The unmarried mother, as a substantial and critical element in the
system of independent placements, deserves special attention. Constructive
measures to aid her would reduce many pressures which result in unsatis-
factory placement decisions. Such measures should include: (a) available
counseling services beginning in the early or middle pre-natal period and
continuing through delivery until satisfactory plans for both mother and
child are evolved, (b) medical care and hospitalization, (c) sheltered liv-
ing arrangements for the mother either in family boarding homes or in
maternity homes for girls or women who need or desire this service; (d)
financial assistance if needed during the period the mother is unable to work.
Charles Schottiand, former Director of the California State Department of
Social Welfare, assessed the situation as follows: "With reference to com-
munity services in California in this area, we can make one generalization.
services are fragmentary, incomplete and in most areas of the state prac-
tically unavailable."4 o
Working along these lines, the conclusion of the Citizens Committee on
Adoptions should be implemented. "No child should be deprived of his right
to his own family either because of the economic need of his parents or
because the community lacks resources for temporary assistance to help
his parents maintain a home for him."41
41 Final Report, at 13 (1953).
39 Hearings, supra note 2 at 81-82.
40 PROCEEDINGS, INsTrTum OF UNWED PARENTHOOD 8 (1952).
4 Aid of the sort just mentioned would bring the community into the
independent placement process by a positive program at or before the first
dynamic decision, namely, whether to retain the child or surrender it for
adoption. The second dynamic decision is the decision-whether reached
by the biological parents or in fact by the intermediaries-to place the child
with a particular adoptive couple. At or before this point also, the interest
and authority of the public need to be intruded. With whatever implement-
ing devices, a pre-placement study seems to be what is required. The present
requirement of a state department or county agency investigation, report,
and recommendation on the granting of the petition begins only after the
petition is filed and seldom ends until six months later or more. It is then
not a factor in the making of the placement decision. It constitutes a con-
sideration of whether that decision should be reversed, not made differently,
after a new, weighty and often controlling factor has been added. The
child has been established in the new home. If an investigation is made
before placement it comes at a time when it can be effective in preventing
bad placement decisions.
A pre-placement study, to accomplish the desired results, would have
to have certain features or be conducted in certain conditions. It would
have to apply to all independent placements no matter what the degree of
participation in the selection of the adoptive couple by the biological par-
ents or third parties. If this were not true, it would be a mere preferential
referral service for intermediaries, in effect removing the present ban of
ciminal illegality from their activities. The study would be designed to
correct evils inherent in the entire independent placement process and not
to affect in any way previous laws determining what persons might lawfully
engage in that process.
Sufficient time would have to be allowed in which to make the study -
sufficient time for counseling and interviewing the biological parents for
clearance of the legal status of the child, for determning that the child is
a proper subject for adoption, and for judging the suitability of the adop-
tive home and the fitness of the adoptive parents. A preplacement study
plan which does not extend the study to the biological parents and to the
child, as well as to the adoptive parents, renders the whole plan ineffective.
The experience of the State of Illinois with a requirement for a departmental
study before a child is released from a hospital into an independent place-
ment is illustrative.42 An official in the Division of Child Welfare of the
Department of Public Welfare in Illinois makes the following report re-
garding this provision. "We are not happy with this law The workers
immediately begin the study of the home when the form is received and
4 2
ILL. STATS. C. IIIY2 § 152 HOSPITAL LICENSING ACT (1953).
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within a week the home is approved or disapproved. There is not sufficient
time to permit an adequate pre-placement study of the family and if the
family meets the minimum standards, their home is approved. The parents
of the baby aren't interviewed. The physician or attorney very often does
not accept the decision of the agency in regard to the home and it is pos-
sible for the mother to carry her baby out of the hospital and to give it to
the doctor or lawyer who places it with the family In situations in which
the grounds are not tangible and obvious, we have the placements occurring
regardless of our disapproving the home." 3
A study of sufficient intensity and extent to encompass all the elements
necessary to make it effective would entail so much time that provision
would have to be made for a responsible plan for the care of the child during
the progress of the study.
A pre-placement study necessarily implies authority on the part of the
investigative agency to prevent the placement if the investigation indicates
that to be in the best interests of the child. Otherwise, all the old problems
of judicial reversal after the child is placed in the home recur. Placement'
with the adoptive couple would, therefore, have to be forbidden following
an adverse judgment by the investigative agency unless and until that
judgment is overruled by the court.
A pre-placement study would not altogether displace the present re-
quirement of a state, department or county agency investigation after the
child is in the home and the petition filed. Since the other elements would
already have been covered, that investigation would be confined to the ad-
justment of the child to the home and the discovery whether conditions
have changed or hidden factors emerged.
To do all this, provision must be made for sufficient staff.
5. The function of the courts in adoptions should be clarified and made
consistent with prevailing practice in other areas in which administrative
operation by a specialized agency has been made dominant by the Legis-
lature. The responsibility of the courts, which has progressively diminished
through the years, should still be preserved, but it should now be trans-
formed from that of primary administrator to that of reviewer of adminis-
trative activity carried on by others. California has now developed or
closely regulates extensive administrative machinery in the field. That
machinery consists of licensed and supervised private adoption agencies,
of county agencies licensed and supervised as adoption agencies and re-
ceiving in addition investigative and administrative powers by delegation
from the State Department of Social Welfare, and of the State Department
4 3 Letter from Illinois Department of Welfare to California Bureau of Adoptions, State
Department of Social Welfare, Dec. 14, 1954.
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of Social Welfare itself acting directly through its own personnel. The
function of this machinery and the object of its creation is to investigate,
regulate and control adoptions in such a way that bona fide parental con-
sents will be insured, that children who are placed for adoption will be
legally free for adoption, that children placed for adoption will be proper
subjects of adoption, and that the adoptive home will be suitable - all so
that the best interests of the child can be served. All of this requires inves-
tigative staffs, the establishment of standards and the development of
techniques. In short it requires specialization. The courts are not equipped
for this in terms of time, training, staff and facilities. The administrative
function should be carried out exclusively and initial determinations made
by the adrmistrative set-up which the Legislature has created for that
purpose. When this stage of development has been reached in other areas,
the role of the courts has properly become that of review, no longer making
determinations administratively and de novo, but sitting in judgment on
whether the administrators acted within their statutory authority and pro-
ceeded upon evidence.
As was long ago judicially observed in California, there is nothing
peculiarly judicial about the court's function in adoptions.44 They were
legislatively assigned that function because of the importance of having
some official participation in the process, because the courts have tradition-
ally had a large role in matters affecting children, and in the absence of an
administrative agency and specialized knowledge in the field. The courts,
the organ of government in the best position to protect the rights of in-
dividuals, should always be available to scrutinize the termination or ac-
quisition of parental rights. But that does not mean that they have to serve
as administrators. For forty years in California, (in modified form for
more than eighty), biological parents have been abdicating their rights and
relieving themselves of duties towards their children by relinquishment to
adoption agencies without participation by the courts. There is no more
reason why the courts should administratively preside over the acquisition
of parental rights and duties. The function of passing on petitions for adop-
tion in all cases should be transferred to the State Department of Social
Welfare or a licensed county adoption agency In relinquishments and in
adoptions, the courts should be authorized to review the adminstrative
determination and to set it aside if the agency acted beyond the authority
conferred on it or if the determination was inadequately supported by
findings and evidence. In this way can the advantages of administrative
specialization and the judicial protection of individual rights be combined
to further the community's interest in parents, biological and adoptive,
and in parentless children.
44 In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 331, 23 Pac. 378, 382 (1890)
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